Japan, China, Russia, and the American "Pivot": A Triangular Analysis*

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Japan, China, Russia, and the United States, four of the most powerful nations in the world, positioned cheek by jowl in Northeast Asia with some of the world's most extensive trade and mutually interlocking investments binding them together, have long had "complicated" political-strategic relations. They form two duos, each of which is or was formally bound by a mutual security alliance. In focus here is the Japan-US security alliance (JUSA). Though the JUSA is "the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none" (according to former ambassador Mike Mansfield), forming the northern tier of the pentagonal US "hub-and-spokes" Asian-Pacific alliance network, it is a bilateral alliance from which China is excluded. The JUSA has never been explicitly directed against China but against the former Soviet Union, wherein it enjoyed full Chinese support. Since the end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet Union as a target of the alliance and both Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations began for a number of reasons to fray, China's view of the alliance has grown increasingly skeptical, however. This tension was dramatized by the events of September-October 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler in Japanese territorial waters being chased by Japanese coast guard patrol boats took evasive action and collided with its pursuers, leading to the arrest of the crew and captain. This in turn precipitated indignant Chinese diplomatic protests, unofficial trade sanctions, tit-for-tat personnel detentions, and mass demonstrations in the streets of both countries, ultimately resulting in the Chinese

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captain's release and repatriation. Because the underlying cause of the dispute was conflicting territorial claims to areas involving rich subsurface hydrocarbon deposits currently under Japanese control, and because the terms of the alliance commit the United States to support Japan militarily if Japan comes under attack, the JUSA has suddenly acquired new strategic relevance. This was reinforced by the escalation of bilateral tension over the Diaoyu/Sankaku islets following their nationalization by Japan in August 2012.

This chapter provides an explication of the increasingly troubled Sino-Japanese relationship in terms of American pivotal involvement in an increasingly tense set of relationships—Russia also figures in the analysis, mainly as a basis for comparison. The strategic dynamic has become triangular. The first part of the chapter focuses on the role of divergent views of alliances in general and of the JUSA in particular. The second introduces the triangular framework, which brings the US "pivot" into the picture.

Asian Alliances

Though a staple of international politics since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, alliances are relatively new to East Asia, as indeed is the concept of the nation-state. But before delving into its distinctive Asian characteristics, we analyze what exactly the term alliance means. Ever an integral component of the Westphalian system, alliances are "formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the aggrandizement of their members, against specific other states, whether or not these others are explicitly identified."1 There are at least two different interpretations of the logic of alliance formation. The first is realist, rooted in balance-of-power theory: when a nation comes under a threat that it is unable to deter based solely on its own resources, it has two choices: either attempt to appease or to form an alliance with the source of the threat ("bandwagoning"), or try to resist the threat, either through self-strengthening ("internal balancing"), or by forming an alliance with another country (or countries) with a common interest in resisting the threat ("external balancing").² "Power" and "threat" are conceived to be universal and the theory is thus readily applicable to any actor in the international system. The second is constructivist, according to which these and other relevant variables may be differently understood in different political cultural contexts, in that the perception of threat depends not only on the objective balance of forces but on the timeframe, ideological

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perspective, domestic political culture, and other contextual variables.³ There may be an underlying affinity between constructivism and the older idealist tradition, according to which alliance construction (as well as the national interests on which it is based) depends not on threat perceptions alone but on culturally or ideologically embedded values, expectations/hopes, and national identities. We adopt here a hybrid definition: we begin with the general concept of the alliance and then proceed to show how it has been modified in the East Asian cultural context and what difference such modifications make in their practical political application—all based on the well-known premise that what is perceived as real is real in its consequences.⁴ An alliance is thus assumed to be two-dimensional, with both an explicit power-political logic and a subsurface of connotations that may shape how that logic is applied in a particular context.

The central political unit in premodern East Asia was the empire, not the nation-state, and the international community was conceived to be hierarchical, not an anarchic jungle, in which lower-ranking units professed deference to their superiors via symbolic tribute.⁵ This makes the Western concept of an alliance between sovereign equals somewhat problematic. And ever since the new concept of an international community of sovereign nation-states imposed itself in East Asia, alliances among these "new" nation-states have been formed with extraordinary parsimony, at least by Western standards. Whereas the United States has more than 50 security alliances, the People's Republic of China (PRC) in has had only 2: the 30-year Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union, which (albeit chronically troubled) lasted from 1951 until its scheduled expiration in 1981; and the strategic alliance with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, first formulated in 1961, renewed in 1981, and still formally binding. China's alliance with North Korea, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) extends from China's military intercession in the Korean conflict in 1950-1953, and although the two countries have since diverged ideologically and disagreed tactically, China remains North Korea's largest trade partner, foreign investor, and supplier of food and energy assistance. Both of these alliances are "fraternal," that is, they define relations among Marxist-Leninist or "communist" states, and are thus conceived to be ideologically privileged. China also signed a friendship treaty with Japan in 1978, its first with a noncommunist country, and another friendship treaty with Russia in 2001, but no mutual defense commitment was thereby entailed.

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Japan has had only three formal alliances so far, all in the modern era: the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1902-1922), the so-called Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis (1940–1945), and finally the JUSA (1952–present). The Anglo-Japanese alliance was formed in London in January 1902 and was based essentially on common opposition to Russian expansionism; it was renewed twice before being officially terminated, due to a number of dissatisfactions: Japanese disappointment with the lack of British support in their colonization of Korea following the Russo-Japanese War, perceived anti-Japanese discrimination in the Washington Naval Treaty,⁶ London's chagrin with Japan's miniscule contribution to World War I and its subsequent perceived encouragement of the Indian independence movement, and (perhaps most decisively) growing US opposition to Japan. Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany in 1936 and then the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 as a coalition of authoritarian "have-not" countries whose expansionist ambitions ran athwart (and were censured by) the League of Nations. Yet the Axis was a very loose alliance system (e.g., Japan was surprised by the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov pact with the Soviet Union and then again surprised when Hitler attacked the USSR in June 1941; Hitler was in turn taken aback when Japan launched a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor). The Axis, of course, ended in disaster, with the destruction and unconditional surrender of all three signatories. The alliance between Japan and the United States was signed as soon as Japan regained sovereignty at the end of the Allied occupation in 1951 and was renewed and expanded in spite of fierce domestic resistance in 1960. Despite basing squabbles it remains robust, anchoring the American defense commitment to the Northeast Asian region.

If we look more closely at these alliances, while the logic of alliance formation in Northeast Asia cannot really be said to deviate sharply from the realist model (in the sense that the alliance in each case confronts a perceived adversary posing a national security threat to both allies), there are at least three distinctive cultural nuances. First, in each instance, the alliance binds two sovereign but *unequal* partners, even when (as in the Sino-Soviet case) there is a strong ideological emphasis on fraternity and equality. In other words, these alliances conform to East Asian hierarchical patron-client patterns (*shang-xia guanxi*, or *oyabun-kobun* relations). Second, they tend to be exclusive: to China the Sino-Soviet alliance was central, and Japan as well has had only one alliance at a time. The implicit template for the alliance in these Confucian cultures is the *wu lun*, or five primary

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

kinship relations, particularly the most important father-son relationship. Third, these alliances are typically cross-cultural, in each case with leading Western nation-states. This may be attributed to the important subsidiary features of such alliances, specifically the teleological path-dependency in which "Western" was equated with a "modern" goal-culture.

The cultural context of this type of asymmetrical, hierarchical relationship has at least two psycho-sociological implications: (1) The client state expects much more of the patron than support in the case of military attack, just as the patron expects less from the client than full reciprocal support. These expectations are rarely spelled out, of course, in the formal documents, but they are important: the "senior" partner is expected to provide not only aid and support, but also to function as a model for the client's future development. In the case of the Anglo-Japanese alliance it seems clear why England, not only the world's first modernizer but at the time the world's leading naval power, also an island just off the coast of a powerful continent, would be an attractive role model for Japan. China's choice of the Soviet Union, the world's premier revolutionary communist country and successful embodiment of the socialist ideals that also inspired the Chinese revolution, is equally self-evident. (2) The intrinsically asymmetrical nature of the relationship and the culturally implicit role model expectations inculcate a sense of arrogant entitlement in the patron and a corresponding sense of dependency and resentment in the client. In the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as in the Sino-Soviet alliance, the inflated early expectations of the client are soon dashed. The patron, on the other hand, often expresses bewilderment at the client's resentment, given the client's relatively minor contribution to the alliance. The Confucian subtext of these relationships helps explain some of these discontents: in the kinship model, the ultimate payoff for the son's filial subordination to the father is that the father eventually passes away and the son takes his place. But although the notions of national development or modernization are somewhat analogous in that they do offer an upside to the client they are by no means a reliable model for an international alliance (e.g., nation-states cannot be expected to pass away).

Whereas the alliances of China and Japan have both been asymmetrical and culturally freighted, the two have responded quite differently.⁷ While both have been aggrieved about the asymmetry, China has been much more impatient, even indignant than Japan. The Western imperialist powers imposed harsh punitive treaties on

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Japan and Korea as well as China, after all, usually at the conclusion of victorious imperial wars, which all three countries resented and eventually succeeded in overturning. But it was China that coined the term "unequal treaty," and only here did it become a cause célèbre and target of competitive nationalist mobilization by both the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To be sure, Chinese relative outrage is a matter of quantity rather than quality: the JUSA, too, aroused fierce anti-American demonstrations at the time of its revision in 1960 as well as smoldering nationalist discontent since then ("Japan Can Say No," etc.) demanding a more equal, "normal nation-state" relationship, which has evolved over time into contentious negotiations over the location of American bases and periodic discussion of repealing Article 9. But there are two qualifications in the Japanese case. First, discontent has been reciprocal: beginning in the 1980s, the United States too has complained about Japan's inability to contribute in kind to the "mutual defense" commitment, inducing the latter to pav the most generous host nation support costs in the world and gradually to agree to expand its ambit of responsibility for self-defense (much to Beijing's chagrin). Second, despite its complaints and occasional protests Japan has never abandoned the alliance-the previous Anglo-Japanese alliance, too, was abrogated not by Tokyo but by London. Japan seems to attach greatest significance not to equality but to alliance loyalty, expressing, for example, bitter resentment at the Soviet Union's "betraval" in annulling the 1941 Neutrality Pact to invade Manchuria in April 1945 (after Japan had already decided to surrender in the wake of the Atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). For China, in contrast, the foremost issue has always been one of equality. China complained bitterly and constantly about the Sino-Soviet alliance within its first decade, which escalated to violent border skirmishes by 1969-1970, culminating in both internal and external balancing behavior by Beijing before ultimately abrogating the alliance in 1981.8 At the core of the Sino-Soviet dispute, according to Deng Xiaoping's retrospective analysis, was always the issue of "equality." Yet from a more objective perspective, "ambivalent" might be a better characterization, for the two countries were never equal during the entire tenure of the alliance, and indeed the alliance never functioned more smoothly and amicably than during the early period when it was most unequal.⁹ This inequality was accepted at the outset, but after Stalin's replacement by Khrushchev Mao, for a mixture of personal and ideological reasons, soon found it intolerable.

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

Why the disruptive sense of outrage in the Chinese case but the (albeit reluctant) tolerance on the part of Japan? This can be explained by both structural and cultural factors. Structurally, the asymmetry was proportionally greater in the case of Japan's alliances, and in highly asymmetrical alliances the client typically gives the patron greater discretion, for it is obviously more dangerous for the client to withdraw.¹⁰ Britain was far more advanced and powerful than Japan during the latter's post-Meiji restoration industrial takeoff (though that ranking has since been upended) and the United States has since Japan's defeat also remained predominant, particularly in its immediate aftermath. Though initially less advanced than the USSR in both developmental and ideological terms, the Chinese always viewed their relatively backward status as a humiliating but temporary anomaly, so indelible was the sense of historical cultural superiority. And even objectively considered, China's size and population were consistently more nearly comparable to those of the Soviet Union, particularly after World War II from which the USSR suffered more devastation than any other country. The political cultural context is that whereas China was a revolutionary state throughout the first half of the twentieth century and hence more imbued with the principle of sovereign equality, Japan was a modernizing economy grafted onto a neotraditional political cultural base, in which State Shintoism elevated the emperor to quasi-divine status and the state hierarchy was sanctified via the educational and media apparatus (cf. the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education). The intramural context was also somewhat different: whereas the Soviet Union provided the ideological blueprint for Chinese political-economic development but proved a somewhat unreliable supporter of particular CCP policies thereafter (sc., the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution), Japan unconditionally surrendered to an America that had bombed its cities to rubble and then proceeded to occupy the country and even write its constitution (ironically including the famous "Article 9" that has since limited its alliance contribution). Thus while in both cases we find ambivalence about an asymmetrical alliance, only in the Chinese case did this result in an outright break. And these different experiences have had a lasting impact on the subsequent attitudes of both sides not only about their alliances but also about bilateral relations and foreign policy more generally.

Without undertaking a detailed historical recapitulation, let us consider in brief and bold outline the essential practical differences as they arose in the course of implementing the two alliances. Although

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

the Sino-Soviet alliance was initially formed in an atmosphere of suspicion, the early period after collaboration in the Korean conflict was one of apparently whole-hearted cooperation, in which China adopted the Soviet Union root and branch as a path-dependent model for its development and accepted Soviet leadership of the international communist movement, a large Soviet-subsidized loan at a time when Moscow's fiscal plight could ill afford it and the advice of some 10,000 visiting Soviet technical experts. This alliance disintegrated soon after the death of Stalin, for both surface and subsurface reasons. On the surface the most recent research indicates that the problem was largely ideological: after all, ideology was fundamental in the formation of the alliance and formed the basis for both domestic and foreign policy, so all policy choices had to be not only correct for one country but for both (and for the world communist revolution) and if one country took a separate path this was taken to be an implicit rebuke of the other.¹¹ In the words of Chinese historian Yang Kueisong, "what irritated Mao the most was Soviet unwillingness to carry on revolution. For Mao, revolution, whether it was the class struggle or the anti-imperialist variety, was not only the focal point of his life experience but also the key to the success of the Chinese revolution. In his mind the negation of revolution, particularly violent revolution, meant the negation of the universal applicability of the Chinese revolutionary model and the rejection of the 'unique contribution' that he had made to Marxism-Leninism."12 With ideology the ultima ratio, the two stood equal before the Truth whatever the distribution of gross domestic product (GDP) growth or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) (or rather, more than equal-Mao was right and Khrushchev wrong). Yet aside from ideology, if the pivotal crises that contributed to the alliance's disintegration are considered, it seems that the underlying reason was that Moscow was failing in Mao's eyes to conform to the proper role of the senior partner, that is, to protect and nurture the junior partner to enable it to mature and stand on an equal footing. To Mao, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which the Soviet Union had rashly promised to provide in the early 1950s, was not only a useful deterrent against the ability of the United States to check his revolutionary ambitions but also the ultimate symbol of the national coming of age. But Khrushchev, at what seemed to Mao the cusp of world power and demonstrable superiority to the capitalist states with the launching of Sputnik I and the world's first ICBM in 1957, then abandoned the world revolution to make peace with the leadership of the bourgeois world at Camp David (forgetting for

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

the moment that the CCP had also enshrined the same guidelines, as the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," in its 1956 state constitution and in every constitution thereafter). So when Khrushchev reneged on his commitment to provide China with nuclear weapons after Mao provoked the United States into a pointless nuclear confrontation over the Taiwan Strait in 1958 Mao may have publicly dismissed the bomb as a "paper tiger" but also launched a crash program for China to build its own. He also took advantage of the Cuban Missile Crisis by timing a border attack on India to coincide with the crisis, later mocking Khrushchev's compromise with Kennedy as first adventurous and then craven. After public polemics in the early 1960s culminated by the end of the decade in violent border clashes with dangerous escalatory potential between two nuclear weapon states, Mao embraced the implicit American promise of extended deterrence to forestall a threatened Soviet preemptive attack. The alliance was terminated upon its scheduled expiry in 1981 even though Mao, its most adamant critic, had already expired.

In view of its bitter disappointment with the Sino-Soviet alliance it is perhaps not surprising that the PRC has not entered into another new alliance since. While the formal alliance with the DPRK has been sustained, at times amid complaints, even occasional sanctions, the CCP has frequently reiterated its refusal to extend nuclear deterrence (i.e., a "nuclear umbrella") to any state, ally or not. Yet China, like any other nation, sometimes needs alliances (or their functional equivalent). Beijing has responded to this need with a number of tentative expedients:

- 1. With regard to the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, the Chinese entered into protracted "normalization" talks, resulting in the normalization of party-to-party relations in 1989 and in border demarcation and demilitarization agreements in the late 1990s. In 2001, reportedly at Chinese behest, the PRC and the Russia Federation signed a 20-year "Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation," which both sides stress is not an alliance (no promise of mutual strategic support and no explicit target). In addition to its continuing alliance with the DPRK, China has also maintained since the early 1960s an informal "all-weather friendship" with Pakistan, which included a border settlement, military advice, weapon sales, and technology transfer but no dispatch of troops or commitment of support in the event of hostilities.
- 2. One partial substitute for alliances that China has adopted is the "partnership." The first and still the strongest partnership is with the

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

Russian Federation, but China has since undertaken partnership agreements with many different states and even with international governmental organizations. According to Ning Sao there are four different types of partnerships, each with its own attributes: the simple strategic partnership (zhanlue huoban guanxi), as with the United States, which may contain competition as well as cooperation, but has three main elements: the two are partners rather than rivals, based on strategic considerations, and "constructive" rather than aiming to counter other countries or seek hegemony. Second is the "strategic consultative partnership" (zhanlue xiezuo huoban guanxi), such as that established with Russia in April 1996, which is the most comprehensive. Third is the "good neighborly partnership" (mulin huoban guanxi), which china established with ASEAN in 1997. The final type is a "basic partnership," used to describe relations between China and developing countries, such as that between China and Mexico in 1997.13 Su Hao ranks these partnerships on three levels: the lowest rank is "constructive" strategic partnerships, such as between China and the United States, Japan, or India, which still contain serious disagreement. Next step-up is the "consultative" partnership, based on friendly cooperation between countries interested in deepening the relationship, such as between China and Britain, Germany, ASEAN, or the European Union (EU). While these partners have many common interests, the level of mutual trust remains to be improved. Highest is the "strategic" partnership, such as that with the Soviet Union, between countries sharing strategic aims and common interests and no fundamental differences between them.¹⁴

3. Since the late 1990s China has shifted from its earlier endorsement of "multipolarity," often envisaging a world consisting of five "poles" (China, the United States, EU, Russia, and Japan), to one of "multilateralism." This was a basic policy departure for Beijing, previously limited to bilateral relations and suspicious of multilateral associations as a tool of the great powers (perhaps a hangover from post-Tiananmen United Nations (UN) sanctions, or from their earlier unhappy membership in the International Communist Movement).¹⁵ Thus China joined the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1991, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the ASEAN plus 3 (including Japan and Korea) in 1999. In 2001, Beijing initiated the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with Russia and four former Soviet republics in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan), later joined by four observers (Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia). This is a formally anarchic "multilateral mutual security organization" (hezuo zuzhi)-not a military alliance-whose chief target has been the "three evils" of "terrorism, separatism, and extremism," but which has permitted China

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

to make economic inroads into Central Asia without infringing on residual Russian regional interests. In 2003, fearful that G. W. Bush would intervene forcibly in North Korea as he had in Iraq to forestall the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), China organized and convened the Six-Party talks, which successfully managed the proliferation issue without, however, resolving it. China has also become increasingly active in bilateral and multilateral preferential trade agreements, or FTAs, the largest of which is the ten-nation ASEAN plus one agreement (CAFTA), which came into full effect in January 2010. None of these is a multilateral alliance with any binding commitment to collective security.

4. None of these arrangements fits conventional definitions of an alliance. But then China has now come to disdain the concept of alliances and blocs as an outmoded "cold war mentality" that focuses too narrowly on the military dimension, too much on possible conflict, and too little on peaceful cooperation.¹⁶ In its place Beijing advocates the "new security concept" (xin anguanguan), based on "comprehensive security," first announced by Jiang Zemin in a UN address in October 1995 and further elaborated in an ASEAN meeting the following year and in a good deal of subsequent promotional literature. This new concept, as in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, emphasizes "mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation," "dialogue, consultations and negotiations on an equal footing," and a "win-win" "positive-sum" formula with no conceptual room for security threats or even conflicts of interest.¹⁷ Similar is the concept of "harmonious world" (hexie shijie), coined by Hu Jintao in Jakarta in April 2005 and further elaborated in a UN address that September.¹⁸ These are obviously normative models that conceptualize away the need for a conventional security alliance against mutual threat.

Japan's experience with JUSA, after a stormy revision and renewal marred by street protests in 1960, has been generally more positive. Like the Sino-Soviet alliance during its heyday, it was initially comprehensive, a vehicle to sustain of the postwar reconstruction of Japan following the departure of allied occupation forces in 1951 (e.g., land reform, education reform, *zaibatsu* breakup, democratic constitutional structures). Since then JUSA has become strictly strategic, serving as the insurance policy underpinning the Yoshida doctrine, which allowed Japan to focus on economic reconstruction while relying on US extended deterrence for national security. While its East Asian neighbors were spending 2–6 percent of GDP for military armaments Japan could keep its military budget below 1 percent and never impose conscription. This was not only efficient

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

budgetary policy but reassuring to neighboring countries like China and Korea sensitive to the prospect of Japan's rearmament. The United States accepted its hegemonic stabilizer role throughout the period of Japan's rapid recovery, but when Japan became the world's second largest economy and a keen competitor in American markets while keeping its own market impenetrable, the United States came to view JUSA as enabling Japan to "free ride" economically (particularly after Japan declined to participate in the first Gulf War in 2001, preferring "checkbook diplomacy" of a US\$13 billion support payment). At this point alliance obligations were readjusted at US insistence in order to enhance Japan's defense capabilities and download some of the US defense burden. Inasmuch as much of this burden displacement occurred after the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was no longer a target of the alliance and international communism seemed an endangered species, Beijing began to suspect that the strengthened alliance was now aimed at China. When in 1996 and 1997 Nakasone raised the defense budget above the tacit 1 percent limit immediately after the Taiwan Strait crisis, Deng Xiaoping criticized this as a sign of Japanese militarism. But more than the size of the budget (which has remained below 1 percent since, in contrast to the Chinese defense budget¹⁹) was the expanded geographic range of the JUSA. This Tokyo justified to permit the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and later to participate in the US-led "Global War on Terror."²⁰ Why did Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro welcome these added responsibilities? Because (from the Chinese perspective), he aspired to a more prominent regional and global role for Japan, including permanent membership in a reorganized UN Security Council, using the security partnership with the United States in the War on Terror as a legitimating pretext.²¹ China has not yet expressly opposed the JUSA per se, no doubt bearing in mind that the logical alternative would require Japan to assume full responsibility for its own defense, possibly including nuclear arms. But there is no question that the Chinese are chary of what they view as Japan's growing ambitions to play an international role under cover of the JUSA. This they decry with the support of a public nationalism whipped up since Tiananmen in a nation-wide "patriotic education campaign" that positions Japan as its most prominent bête noir, using not only the education system but also memoir literature, popular culture, a translation of Iris Chang's bestseller on the Nanjing massacre, and a proliferation of war memorials and museums.22

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

So what do these parallel but diverging alliance experiences have to do with current Sino-Japanese relations? The post-Cold War period has been one in which China's economic development has gone into overdrive while Japan's economy has plateaued. China's 2010 passing of Japan in GDP seems to have inspired more assertive Chinese claims regarding territorial disputes, aggravating relations with India and several Southeast Asian countries as well as Japan. Thus the Realpolitik becomes one of "power transition."²³ The relevance of different alliance conceptions in this context is that while the JUSA has been institutionalized and remains fully operational, China has divested itself of the Sino-Soviet alliance and adopted a medley of interesting substitutes, none of which is, however, entirely equivalent. This helps fuel Sino-Japanese tension by fostering the sense in China that two of the strongest countries in the world are combining forces to keep China down. And since China has no allies it can trust to protect the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in case of hostilities (over, say, Taiwan); it faces a "Malacca dilemma" that it is strengthening the PLA navy to solve, inadvertently fostering a security dilemma among other Asian countries likewise dependent on the SLOCs. Meanwhile, Japan, the United States, and other trade partners are rattled by trade imbalances and the sudden momentum of China's growth. While these concerns bolster JUSA, Tokyo is not immune to anxiety about possible American abandonment in favor of Beijing. Thus, stunned in February 1972 by the "Nixon shock" visit to China, Tokyo abruptly reversed course, dropping Taipei to recognize Beijing the same year; the 1998 Clinton visit to China occasioned similar anxiety because he did not (at Beijing's specific behest) make a Tokyo stopover ("Japan passing"). While the relationship among the three has many points in its favor— Japan and the United States have huge trade flows with China, China and Japan are geographical neighbors and share a Confucian cultural legacy-whenever tensions arise for whatever reasons, these tensions tend to reinforce JUSA solidarity and this in turn evokes China's abiding nightmare of being encircled by hostile forces (baoweiquan).

This brings us to the role of the United States in this tense relationship. The introduction of the United States, as *tertius gaudens*, makes the Sino-Japanese relationship triangular, as in the previous case of the Great Strategic Triangle between China, the United States, and the USSR. The United States has played a structurally analogous (albeit not equally successful) role in both alliances. We first turn to a brief discursus on the logic of the strategic triangle before applying the framework to the three principals.

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The Sino-Japanese-American Triangle

A strategic triangle, as an analytic construct, may be said to exist if three conditions are met: (1) All three participants are sovereign (i.e., free to decide their foreign policies based on perceived national interests, rational (i.e., not overly inhibited from expedient maneuver by ideological dogmatism) actors; (2) each bilateral relationship is contingent upon the two participants' relationship with a third; and (3) each participant is essential to the game at least insofar as its "defection" would critically shift the strategic balance. The most frequent previous application of the triangular logic has been to the relationship between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States during the final two decades of the Cold War, when the Nixon administration succeeded in taking advantage of the growing alienation of China from the Sino-Soviet alliance to form a triangular relationship in which Washington's relationship to Beijing and Moscow was better than these two had with each other. This created a "romantic" triangle permitting Washington as "pivot" to forestall ongoing hostilities and possible further escalation and to extract more concessions from each "wing" than might have been feasible without the "jealousy" factor.24

But a romantic triangle is only one of four possible configurations. If we assume that relations among players may be classified as either "positive" or "negative" (a simplification, but a necessary one routinely made by national security planners, international risk insurance agencies, budget chiefs, banks, etc.), there are only four logically possible configurations of three players. These are the unit veto, consisting of mutually antagonistic relationships between all three actors; "stable marriage," consisting of a positive relationship between the two spouses, each of whom has negative relationships with a third pariah; the "romantic triangle," consisting of positive relationships between one "pivot" player and two "wing" players, who in turn have better relations with the pivot than they have with each other; and finally the menage a trois, consisting of positive relationships among all three players. Within this triangular context, an alliance is a stable marriage, consecrated via a formal document that will be more or less honored by the two "spouses" (from a realist perspective, probably less) depending on their values, strategic ambitions, interests, and fears (figure 8.1).

The rules of the game are to maximize one's national interest by having as many positive and as few negative relationships as possible.

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.




Figure 8.1 The Logic of the Strategic Triangle.

The implication is that, first, each player will prefer to have positive relations with both the other players; second, failing that, each player will wish to have positive relations with at least one other player; and, third, that in any event each player will try to avoid incurring negative relations with both of the other players. This would imply a simple rank order in triangular configurations, with a menage being the optimal configuration, followed by a romantic triangle, followed by a marriage, with unit veto least preferable. Yet the rank order of options for individual actors is not the same: the most advantageous role is that of *pivot* in a romantic triangle, second *spouse* in a marriage, the third partner in a ménage, and fourth pariah excluded from a marriage. The two preference rankings differ because an actor's level of security is enhanced in part by the mutual alienation of the two other actors. Some configurations (and some roles) are more stable than others: a ménage is typically a relatively unstable and transient configuration. Given that the outcomes for each player vary based on one's position within the triangle, it is logical to assume that any nation finding itself in a triangular game will seek to "elevate" its role in the game, thus raising its payoff.²⁵ But the attractiveness of the actors will vary not only based on positional advantage but according to such conventional indices of national power as GDP growth and

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

military force projection capability. In either case positive relations with a strong nation will be worth more than positive relations with a weak nation. Given the fact that the "best" position in the triangle is that of pivot in a romantic triangle, the actor best qualified to play that role is the strongest of the three (i.e., with the greatest capabilities), provided that it can fulfill the pivot's role requirements of mediating between the two "wings."

Given the game's grounding assumptions that international relations are not anarchic but hierarchical, that the game is competitive and some positions are better than others, differential change in the capabilities of the actors is one of the factors apt to change the configuration of the triangle. If one actor's capabilities grow faster than those of the other two it becomes both a more attractive partner and a more formidable foe. Each of the other two actors will hence be tempted, provided their interests are reconcilable, to realign with the pivot while preventing the other from doing so, in order to bandwagon with the stronger power and avoid the budgetary burden (not to mention the security risk) of balancing against it. Thus the political implications of the triangular model differ from those of either classical realism or power transition theory. According to classical realism, if a weaker actor can overtake a stronger actor in capabilities, that would constitute a balance of power. Such a balance is considered to be a relatively stable configuration. According to power transition theory, on the other hand, for a weaker power to overtake or surpass a stronger one excites great anxiety and an enhanced possibility of war. In the triangular model, a "catch-up" scenario would simply lead to a realignment of the triangle as one or both of the other actors realigns with the "natural" pivot (or, if this proves nonnegotiable, forms a defensive coalition with the weaker power). Although the implications of the triangular model thus differ from those of either classical realism or power transition theory, there is an elective affinity with Kindleberger's theory of hegemonic stability. The original conception of the role of "hegemonic stabilizer" was primarily economic-serving as lender of last resort, ensuring stable exchange rates, and so forth.²⁶ But the role of the pivot, though strategic rather than economic, analogously provides a "public good" by reconciling an otherwise dangerously polarizing antagonism. To be sure, the pivot's intervention is not necessarily eleemosynary-it may indeed be quite self-interested, for by definition the pivot gains more from a romantic triangle than any other actor. But the premise that it provides a valued public good is supported by the fact that both

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

wings are willing to sustain such a relationship as being preferable to any other.

As hegemonic stabilizer or pivot, the United States inserted itself into both the Sino-Soviet and the Sino-Japanese rivalries. Chronologically, the first US intervention was in the Sino-Soviet dispute, symbolized by Richard M. Nixon's famous February 1972 visit to Beijing, the "week that changed the world." The reasons for the long deterioration of the Sino-Soviet alliance, as noted above, are still a matter of scholarly debate, but seem to have had little to do with power transition, except perhaps as a future nightmare in the mind's eve of the Soviet leadership. In any event the alliance had by 1969 escalated to violent border clashes, and although these were suspended following a meeting at the Beijing airport between Zhou Enlai and Aleksei Kosygin on November 17, 1970, Moscow was sufficiently concerned about the looming Chinese threat that it seriously considered a preemptive strike on Chinese nuclear weapons facilities and even solicited American active or passive collaboration. The chief US motivation for a deal with Beijing rather than Moscow was the apprehension that the United States was losing the strategic arms race with the USSR.²⁷ The conceptual innovation in the American response was that rather than simply supporting the weaker side against the stronger (as prescribed by classic balance-of-power realism), the Nixon administration opted to open relations with China while continuing to cultivate détente with the USSR, maintaining better relations with USSR and PRC than the latter had with each other,

The resulting "romantic triangular" configuration provided advantages to all three participants, putting a lid on the escalating bilateral dispute while enabling the United States to extract concessions from both sides, based on the "jealousy" each experienced lest its rival negotiate a better deal with Washington than it had. At the same time it facilitated an earlier end to the Cold War in Asia than in Europe, as the anticommunist animus against the PRC (and the anti-American animus in China) was sublimated by joint concern with the greater Soviet threat. The US assessment of the relative growth of threatening capabilities at the time eventually led it to share the Chinese obsession with the "Polar Bear" threat, giving rise to an increasingly unbalanced pivot tilting toward Beijing, particularly after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even so, Washington remained sufficiently even-handed to conduct SALT I (culminating in the 1972 ABM treaty and the interim agreement on strategic weapons [INF]) and SALT II (left unsigned because of Afghanistan but mutually honored until

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

1986) with the Soviet Union, to sign a START treaty in 1991 and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. The opening to China was more modest in terms of bilateral arms control agreements but even more impressive if measured against the status quo ante. China's capabilities were less advanced than the Soviet Union's at the time but Chinese foreign policy was far more radical and uncompromising, and its support of "wars of national liberation" leading to world revolution from the developing countries to overthrow the developed West was taken guite seriously at the time by American strategic planners and by many in the Third World. The immediate impact of the opening was to facilitate US withdrawal from Vietnam, as China reduced its subsidization of the national liberation war there (thereby earning Hanoi's future enmity), by extension also making possible the "Guam Doctrine" of drawing down American forces in East Asia. It also laid the groundwork for the later "China rise" by facilitating PRC entry to the Security Council of the UN, removing US obstacles to widespread diplomatic recognition and opening Western markets to Chinese exports. All of these developments coincided with American interests. But in triangular terms perhaps the most important result was to stabilize relations between the two actors whose antagonism had first facilitated the creation of the triangle. No longer intimidated by a Soviet strategic threat they could not deter, Beijing regained confidence under the American nuclear umbrella to enter first into border talks with Moscow in 1973-1976 and then into semiannual normalization talks in 1982, resulting in eventual elimination of "three fundamental obstacles" and full normalization of party-to-party relations in May 1989. Thus the American pivot seminally contributed to one of both countries' signal diplomatic achievements, the resolution of a 30-year bilateral antagonism and formation of a robust "strategic partnership"-whose utility as a counterbalance to American unipolarity is (unconvincingly) denied by both partners.

During the Cold War, the Sino-Japanese-American triangle was, of course, formally a marriage, consisting of the JUSA on the one side and facing an opposing Sino-Soviet alliance on the other. Yet even after the Korean War the level of Sino-Japanese tension was lower than one might have anticipated. There were crises in Korea, Vietnam, and the Taiwan Strait, but in response to these Beijing turned its ire on the United States and spared Japan. China was relatively well treated by Japan—relations were better, that is, than either Japan-Soviet or Sino-US relations—and Japan was also relatively well treated by Beijing—Beijing lambasted "American imperialism" while

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

viewing Japan as hapless puppet of the hegemon. This was partly because of relative power: to China, Japan was not yet a serious threat (digging out of the ruins of American nuclear and fire bombings and constrained by Article 9 of a superimposed constitution) while the United States clearly was. To Japan as well, China was less threatening than the USSR (which attacked Manchukuo despite their neutrality pact in the waning weeks of the war and then proceeded to annex Sakhalin and the Kuriles, repatriating all Japanese residents) and a complementary trade partner to a recovering trading nation. Beijing tolerated the JUSA as preferable to Japanese rearmament, and after the Sino-Soviet split it was a useful deterrent to the USSR, which displaced the United States as China's main security threat.

The high tide of Sino-Japanese relations was reached in the 1970s and 1980s, prompted by the US opening to China and by strategic triangular collaboration against the USSR, in which Japan participated. Since the end of the Cold War, the relationship has deteriorated. The argument here is that the key reason for this deterioration has been US inadequacy in its role as the hegemonic stabilizer, or "pivot.". Japan's opening to China was implicitly contingent on US approval and has remained so. Whenever Sino-US relations deteriorated, Japanese suspicions of China increased; when Sino-US relations improved Tokyo set about improving relations with both Beijing and Washington for fear of being frozen out of a Sino-US marriage. But whereas the United States facilitated resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute by maintaining a stance of pivotal neutrality on the territorial issue, since the 2010 fishing boat incident Washington has allowed itself to be drawn into an implicit defense of Japan's territorial claims. Of course, Washington has its interests and alliance commitments, but going beyond these to "tilt" to one side is not conducive to compromise. There are other issues as well. The 1994 reform of Japan's electoral system from SNTV to a MMC in effect wiped out the socialist and communist parties that had previously been most committed to close Sino-Japanese relations, and in the wake of the Japanese economic malaise its contribution of official developmental aid (ODA) to China declined.²⁸ The end of the Cold War did not change the triangular balance as much as one might expect. Although the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 sovereign republics, removing the main target of the JUSA, Tokyo and Moscow failed to resolve their impasse over the Northern Islands, and Russo-Japanese relations remained cool. Sino-Japanese trade became the fastest growing bilateral trade nexus in Asia after Deng Xiaoping's 1992 "southern voyage"; by 2004 China

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

had replaced the United States as Japan's leading trade partner and host of foreign direct investment (FDI). But political relations have not kept pace. There was a perceptible drop in favorable Japanese public attitudes about China after Tiananmen and again after the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mirroring the simultaneous fall in favorable American views of China. But increasingly, the most intractable issues have been bilateral. The rise in Chinese perceptions of Japanese war guilt, stimulated by the CCP's revival of Chinese nationalism in the wake of the collapse of international communism, by "patriotic" Ministry of Education textbook selections in 1982, 1984, 1986, 1995, and 2005; by Koizumi's six visits to the Yasakuni Shrine in the early 2000s; by the "comfort women" issue-the whole politics of historical amnesia are all highly sensitive to Sino-Japanese relations. More specific is the maritime territorial dispute. While Japan has altogether three territorial disputes in Asia,²⁹ the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is the only one in which Japan is the current stakeholder, and it is the most sensitive and hotly contested of the three. There are at least four reasons for this: first, the Senkakus form part of the "first island chain," a maritime glacis that inhibits the blue-water strategic ambitions of the PLA navy; second, the circumstances surrounding Japan's claim are controvertible, on historical if not legal grounds; third, the islands lie athwart vast subsurface hydrocarbon deposits that both countries need, as second and third largest oil importers in the world; and fourth, this dispute pits Japan against China, its strongest rival for leadership of the region. Japan staked legal claim to the islets in 1895 and occupied them until World War II and the United States returned them along with Okinawa in 1972. China (and Taiwan) began seriously to contest the claim only after the UN economic commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) reported the prospect of sizable subsurface hydrocarbon deposits in 1969, and it has since served as a pretext for repeated Chinese intrusions into Japanese territorial waters, which Japan has invariably protested.

While the United States played its pivotal role skillfully in moderating the Sino-Soviet dispute, its role in the increasingly volatile Sino-Japanese dispute has been less successful. This is certainly not to say that Washington is somehow responsible for all of the issues that have arisen since 1989 to plague the relationship. Yet all these issues—including the territorial dispute, the current flashpoint—were already extant during the heyday of Sino-Japanese amity in the 1970s and 1980s, then more successfully contained.³⁰ What has changed is that the Sino-US relationship has become more wary and "hedged"

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

as China's GDP and strategic capabilities have grown, leading to a mutual strengthening of the JUSA since the 1980s, partly (from the American perspective) to download part of the East Asian defense burden to an alliance free rider, partly because Japan hungered for greater global responsibility as a "normal nation." Japan's self-strengthening has not been reflected in arms spending (which has remained below 1 percent) or in troop strength, but in greater flexibility in international SDF troop deployments. From a Chinese perspective this looks like strategic encirclement. The War on Terror, from this perspective, was utilized for the same purpose, establishing bases in South and Central Asia and blithely waiving aside India's violation of the nonproliferation treaty while excoriating the DPRK's analogous violation.³¹ China was particularly critical of the 1996–1997 revision of the JUSA guidelines that authorized the use of SDF forces to maintain peace in the "region surrounding Japan," accusing Japan of including Taiwan within its defense perimeter—an allegation Japanese spokespersons disputed but did not categorically deny. These suspicions were heightened by the issuance of a joint security statement in February 2005 that included Taiwan as a shared security concern.³² At this time some 25 million Chinese signed an online petition against Japan's inclusion as a permanent member of a reorganized UN Security Council, while others took to the streets in a brief but intense anti-Japanese protest movement. The Chinese government took no immediate action to curb these protests, nor were the "ringleaders" ever called to account (in contrast to other such protests). Japan's support for UN Security Council reorganization was perceived in China as part of a Japanese-American plot to grasp regional leadership. Leadership rivalry also emerged in disputes over membership in the East Asian summit (EAS) and other multinational regional organizations. China criticized the cooperative development of high-tech weaponry in Theater Missile Defense (TMD), lest this neutralize their small nuclear deterrent and perhaps even be extended to the defense of Taiwan. This historically rooted Chinese fear of strategic encirclement proved in a sense to be self-fulfilling in 2010, when controversy over a fishing boat clash with Japanese coast guard patrol boats (after a series of such Chinese intrusions)³³ elicited an explicit American commitment to defend Japan's territorial claims under the terms of the JUSA.

To many American strategists, the Chinese have overplayed their hand since 2010 and are hence directly responsible for the consequent strengthening of the JUSA partnership.³⁴ This may be so. But to the United States, as self-appointed regional hegemon assuming

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

responsibility for the regional commons, a more polarized East Asian triangle will complicate its pivotal role, making a negotiated solution to the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, moderation of the Sino-Japanese security dilemma and nascent arms race, North Korean nuclear disarmament—indeed any collaborative regional endeavor—more difficult to achieve.

Conclusion

This chapter has had two interconnected foci: the culturally distinctive character of the Asian alliance system, and the logic of the alliance in a strategic triangular context. In contradistinction to the Western multilateral alliance propensity, Asian alliance behavior tends to stake everything on a single security alliance, which is then freighted not only with national security requirements but informal expectations having to do with patron-client ties and path-dependent political-economic development. There is also, however, national variation in this shared cultural pattern. The Chinese revolution brought a charismatic leadership to power that clashed with this (and many other) traditional cultural patterns. Thus the early multifunctional alliance with the Soviet Union soon gave way to a bilateral antipathy that had destabilizing repercussions throughout the communist world and well beyond it. In the process of winding down the Cold War, American diplomatic intervention succeeded in "triangulating" and eventually neutralizing that antipathy, paving the way for the reintegration of revolutionary China into the international community. But the American pivot has been less successful in resolving the Sino-Japanese political security rivalry that has arisen since the end of the Cold War. Indeed, US diplomacy might even be said to have (perhaps inadvertently) contributed to its polarization.

How can we account for such divergent outcomes to a shared structural dilemma? In both alliance triangles, the United States perceived itself to be threatened, and responded in a strategically innovative way to mitigate the threat. But in the "great" strategic triangle between the United States, China, and the Soviet Union it was China that was most seriously and immediately threatened, and it was thus China that made concessions (opening to the United States, the abandonment of world revolution, concessions to Taiwan, inter alia). The opening to the United States was designed to resolve a dangerous antagonism that neither side wished to see escalate. Moscow provided the first opportunity to serve as *tertius gaudens*, then Beijing, and the United States

ultimately interceded on behalf of the latter. The threat prompting US intervention, in retrospect considerably exaggerated, was the risk of losing the ongoing strategic arms race to the USSR. Most seriously threatened, however, was Beijing, which Moscow had come to view as a serious threat to its eastern flank. As the least threatened of the three, Washington could take a somewhat more disinterested, "pivotal" stance. In the Sino-Japanese polarization, on the other hand, it is Japan that feels itself most seriously and immediately threatened, and Japan solicited US intervention. US intervention, though subtle and limited, for the time being has checked further escalation. From the Chinese perspective US intervention on behalf of Japan "overbalances," creating a dangerous asymmetry. The imbalance can be attributed in part to the alliance itself, but also to the pentagonal American alliance network in Asia of which it is a part. Having decided in the wake of the Chinese Olympics and its triumphant survival of the global financial crisis to shift from a policy of strategic reassurance to one of greater emphasis on national sovereignty, Beijing feels itself threatened by the concerted regional reaction this shift has inspired. Washington has exacerbated rather than dampened that reaction, thereby jeopardizing its role as an impartial hegemonic balancer. The likely reason is that China's rise is conceived to pose a threat to American hegemony in the region as well. As for China, John Ikenberry notes, Beijing's post-Cold War strategy under Deng Xiaoping (to some extent emulating Japan's Yoshida doctrine) has been one of "macroeconomic absorption," with a predominant emphasis on positive incentives (trade, investment) and a general avoidance of negative incentives—hence Beijing's opposition to sanctions on Burma, North Korea, or Iran. The application of an informal boycott of rare earth elements against Japan in the aftermath of the fishing boat incident marks a rare resort to negative incentives. Whether this departure from Deng's strategic reassurance policy is only a temporary nationalist aberration or a strategic course correction based on a reassessment of China's relative weight after overtaking Japan in aggregate GDP growth remains to be seen. For the time being the bilateral relationship seems to have returned to a very uneasy status quo.

For a combination of three reasons, then, the Sino-Japanese-American triangle has not become "romantic," with the United States in a pivotal balancing position between Beijing and Tokyo, as in the structurally analogous "Great" triangle of the early 1970s, remaining essentially a "marriage." First, despite its troubles over the years, the JUSA is a far more robust alliance than the Sino-Soviet alliance,

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

which entails greater resistance to abandonment and realignment. Second, in the latter case it is China that is perceived to be challenging the territorial status quo of Japan, posing an asymmetric threat to the other two actors and tending to mute intramural basing disputes and reinforce alliance solidarity. Third, the United States perceives its hegemonic position to be challenged by China's swift economic and strategic "rise." Statistical extrapolations abound, projecting China to overtake the United States in aggregate GDP by 2020, perhaps earlier, and though China's military capabilities are likely to lag GDP growth, the PLA military budget has been growing along with GDP and cannot be too far behind. Thus the United States, haunted by the prospect of "power transition," finds it hard to serve simultaneously as pivotal balancer and stakeholder and has tended to shift from the former role to the latter.

Notes

* Financial support from the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership and the Murata Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

- 1. Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Spring-Summer 1990): 103-124.
- See Stephen Walt, "Alliances in a Unipolar World," World Politics, Vol. 61, No. 1 (January 2009): 86–120.
- For example, see Takashi Inoguchi, "The Triangle of Japan, South Korea and the United States in Northeast Asia: A Japanese Quasi-Constructivist Perspective," *Japan Spotlight*, Vol. 24, No. 5 (September–October 2005): 32–33; and Brian Frederking, "Constructing Post–Cold War Collective Security," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3 (August 2003): 363–378.
- 4. Thomas, Wm. I. and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 Volumes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1918–1920).
- See David Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); and East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
- 6. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 limited Japan's naval armament plans to three-fifths of the capital ships permitted to Great Britain and the United States.
- 7. Zhang Jingquan, "Zhan hou Zhong Ri jie meng guan bijiao yanjiu: yi Zhong Su tong meng, Ri Mei tong meng wei li" [A comparative study of the Chinese and Japanese concepts of alliance formation, taking the Sino-Soviet and Japanese-US alliances as examples], unpublished paper, Jinan University, Changchun, China, 2010.

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

- Internal balancing consisted of the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the external balance was the informal alliance with the United States beginning with the 1972 Nixon visit.
- 9. On this early period, see, for example, Hua-yu Li, Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953 (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Thomas J. Christensen (Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) views the Sino-Soviet alliance as fractious from the outset. Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) views the Sino-Soviet alliance as fractious from the outset. Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
- 10. See Snyder, "Alliance Theory," also Walt, "Alliances."
- See Jian Chen, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998); and Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
- Yang Kueisong, "Changes in Mao Zedong's Attitude toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973," Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 34 (February 2002), as quoted in Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 157.
- Ning Sao, "Xuanze huoban zhanlue, yingzao huoban guanxi" [Choosing partnership strategy, shaping partnership relations], Xinshiye [New horizon], No. 4: 10–13. Reprinted in *Zhongguo waijiao* [China's diplomacy], No. 6: 2–7.
- Su Hao, "Zhongguo waijiao de 'huoban guanxi' kuangjia" [A framework for China's diplomatic "partnerships"], Shijie zhishi [World knowledge], No. 5 (2000): 11–12.
- 15. The CCP stopped attending meetings of the International Communist Movement in the early 1960s and exited other transsocialist institutions as well. It withdrew from its observer role in the Warsaw Pact in 1961 and stopped responding to invitations from the COMECON in 1966, viewing Soviet-backed organizations as little better than Western ones. See Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 68–69.
- Cf. Gilbert Rozman, "Post–Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional Institutions in Northeast Asia," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 19, No. 66 (September 2010): 605–620.
- Kong Fanhe and Mao Qian, "Feichuantong anquan shijiaoxia de anquan limian" [Security conceptions from a non-traditional security perspective], *Taipingyang xuebao*, Vol. 57, No. 12 (2005): 72–79.
- Wang Yi and Zhang Linhong, "Hexie shijie de goujian" (Constructing a Harmonious World), *Heping yu fazhan* [Peace and development], No. 2 (2007): 27–30.
- 19. According to the Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China spends 2.2 percent of its GDP on defense. By 2010 China had the world's second largest defense budget, while Japan had the sixth largest.

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

210 Lowell Dittmer

- 20. Japan responded whole-heartedly to the appeal of the G. W. Bush administration for greater security support in the "Global War on Terror" following the World Trade Center bombing. To wit, it joined the "coalition of the willing" to deal with terrorist groups through increased international police and intelligence cooperation, border movements, and domestic security enhancement. Following the passage of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, Japan deployed aircraft and destroyers to support refueling operations in the Indian Ocean region for the invasion of Afghanistan. In September 2003, Japan (along with 11 other countries) joined the Proliferation Security Initiative to detect and interdict the movement of illegal or suspect weapons and missile technologies, and in December dispatched 600 heavily armed ground troops to the south of Iraq to support US occupation and reconstruction activities after the invasion. Japan also joined the Six-Party talks, generally supporting US demands that Pyongyang completely dismantle its nuclear program. Richard Tanter, "With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei militarization, and the Bush Doctrine," in Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness, Confronting the Bush Doctrine (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 153-180.
- 21. Zhang, "Zhan Hou."
- 22. Iris Chang [張純如], Nanjing hao jie: bei yi wang de da tu sha [The Nanjing massacre] (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1998).
- 23. Power transition theory views the point at which a growing power approaches and surpasses a hegemonic power as relatively likely to result in war, in contradistinction to classic balance-of-power theory, which views a balance of power as relatively stable. See A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958; and Ronald L. Tammen, Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Carole Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A. F. K. Organski, *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Chatham House, 2000).
- 24. See Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992).
- 25. I owe this insight to Prof. Yu-Shan Wu; see his "Power Transition, Strategic Triangle, and Alliance Shift," unpublished paper presented at the thirtyninth Taiwan-American Conference on Contemporary China, December 9–10, 2010, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.
- 26. See Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression*, 1929–1939, revised and enlarged edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
- 27. For a classic example, see Albert Wohlstetter, *The Delicate Balance of Terror* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp, 1958), Rand report number P-1472.
- 28. China has been the biggest single recipient of Japanese official developmental aid (ODA) since 1982, representing more than 50 percent of the total assistance China received from both bilateral and multilateral sources. Since 2000 Japan has publicly announced several times its intention to suspend ODA in the light of China's rapid development, its own foreign aid to Africa and Southeast Asia, and its public ingratitude about Japanese aid, yet ODA continues to date at the rate of about US\$1.2 billion per year (indeed Japan remains the largest source of foreign aid to China). Overseas Economic

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.

Cooperation Fund, *kaigai keizai kyoroku binran*, 1987, 251; as cited in Sadako Ogata, "Regional and Political Security Issues: Sino-Japanese-United States Triangle," unpublished paper, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley; also see Joshua Keating, "China Sends Japan \$1.2 Billion in Aid Every Year," *Foreign Policy*, December 2, 2010; http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/09/28/japan_sends_china_12_billion_in_aid_every_year (Accessed December 12, 2010).

- 29. To wit, (1) Japan contests Korean occupation of the tiny uninhabited island TokDo/Dokto (Takeshima); (2) it claims the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles occupied since 1945 by Russia (Etorofu, Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomais islets); (3) and it claims the Senkakus/Diaoyu (S/D) islets, southernmost in the Ryukyu chain, which China and Taiwan contest.
- 30. The Diaoyu/Senkaku issue first came up during normalization talks in 1972, with the powerful conservative antinormalization group arguing that Japan should not agree to formal diplomatic relations until China conceded ownership of the islands. Zhou Enlai agreed to shelve the issue. It came up again in 1978 when the Chinese were pressing Japan to sign a Peace and Friendship Treaty with an antihegemony clause implicitly directed against the USSR. But Japan was at the time hoping for the return of the Northern Territories from the USSR and also negotiating various trade agreements with Moscow. Again Japanese conservatives argued that the Senkaku issue had to be settled before signing a treaty. In April, an armada of Chinese fishing boats suddenly appeared near the islands, arousing great uproar in Japan. The boats withdrew, with Beijing explaining that they had been pursuing a school of fish and gone off course. China agreed to insert a clause in the treaty stating that it was not directed against a third party, the Senkaku issue was shelved (but not conceded), and the treaty was signed.
- 31. See Rex Li, A Rising China and Security in East Asia: Identity Construction and Security Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2009), 215.
- See Xinbo Wu, "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US-Japan Alliance," Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Winter 2005–2006): 119–130.
- 33. Japan's Air Self-Defense Force scrambled 83 times in the first half of 2011 to check out military aircraft from China buzzing Japan's air space, according to the Defense Ministry's Joint Staff Council, more than triple the amount compared to the same six-month period in 2010. Yoree Koh, "Japan Jet Scrambles Related to China Planes Tripled," *Wall Street Journal*; http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/10/14/japan-jet-scrambles-related-to -china-planes-tripled/ (Accessed October 14, 2011).
- Brad Glosserman, "Beating Up on Tokyo: Good Fun, Bad Policy," *PacNet*, No. 50 (August 7, 2012); http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1250.pdf (Accessed August 28, 2012).

The Troubled Triangle : Economic and Security Concerns for the United States, Japan, and China, edited by T.