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Source: *Modern China*, Oct., 1980, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Oct., 1980), pp. 363-396

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/189034>

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The Radical Critique of Political Interest, 1966-1978

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“Interests” and “ideal interests” directly govern the acts of men. Nevertheless, “views of life” created by ideas, have frequently . . . indicated the lines along which the dynamic power of interest propels action. The “view of life” will determine from what and for what one wants to be—be it said—can be “saved.”

—Max Weber (Mommsen, 1965: 30)

At the heart of the ideological dispute between radicals in China’s “ten years of Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976) was an underlying divergence over the meaning and proper role of “interests” in socialist society. The radical arguments on this issue are still worth our attention even though they were politically defeated at the time, for to the extent that they were valid their echoes may be expected to reverberate in future debates. And the experience of the West suggests that with economic modernization questions of interest are likely to become increasingly salient while issues of “world-view” decline (Weber, 1958).

Before proceeding, let us define our terms. A person has an *interest* in whatever is profitable to that person, whatever helps one get what one wants or will satisfy one. Whenever people unite for the defense, maintenance, or enhancement of any more or less enduring material advantage that they possess alike or in

AUTHOR’S NOTE: *I wish to thank G. William Skinner, Joseph Esherick, and Ramon Myers for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this article, which was presented at a California Regional Seminar of the Center for Chinese Studies in Berkeley.*

MODERN CHINA, Vol. 6 No. 4, October 1980 363-396

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common, the term may be applied to both the group created and the cause that unites those people. Besides the “subjective” interests of which one is aware, one may also have “objective” interests, as defined by the socially significant groups to which one belongs. A group or cause whose claims on the system have been widely accepted as legitimate is a “vested” interest. On this much all parties to the debate could agree. They differed over such things as the correct criteria for class membership, the appropriate relationships among individual, group, and public interests, and the proper moral response to the vestment of interests.

The first part of this article traces the radical-conservative polarization on this issue to certain latent contradictions in classical CCP doctrine. The second shows how the radical concept of interest was expanded and rationalized in the 1972-1976 period, while the third shows how these conceptual innovations were transposed into political conflict. The conclusion attempts to evaluate the internal validity and political viability of the radical critique of interest.

ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

The concept of interest has played a prominent role in both traditional Confucianism and modern Marxism, the two idea systems to have most influenced contemporary Chinese political thought. The contribution of Confucian ethical writings has been analyzed elsewhere (Munro, 1977; Fingarette, 1979), and may therefore be succinctly summarized: “interest” (*li-yi*) was conventionally discussed in terms of the polarity between “self” (*si*) and “public” (*gong*), usually in order to characterize (pejoratively) the desires of the individual as opposed to the needs of the group. To pursue selfish interests was to fail to recognize the integral relationship between the individual and the group of which the individual was a part, thus committing cognitive error as well as moral fault.

The role of interests in Marxism is absolutely central but more complex. Marx denied the existence of a public interest and also

tended to derogate the possibility of autonomous individual interests, attributing interest rather to the relationships surrounding the process of production from which people derived their wherewithal, i.e., to *class*. The objective interests of the individual could be reduced to those of his/her class. The public interest was an ideological delusion purveyed by the dominant classes in order to manipulate subordinate classes to act in a manner contrary to their own interests, specifically, to work for a fraction of the value of their labor while allowing the ruling classes to appropriate the surplus.

Marx viewed this as an unnatural state of affairs, but in his explanation he tended to conflate moral critique with causal analysis. From a moral perspective, the upper classes were to *blame* for appropriating “surplus value” without making a commensurate contribution to the value of the product, thereby exploiting and alienating the working class. From a scientific viewpoint, the question of blame or guilt was inappropriate and no more (or less) could be expected of the ruling classes, given their social backgrounds and roles in the economic system; the problem was less serious with the bourgeoisie—who perceived their interests quite clearly—than with the workers, who were prevented by “false consciousness” from correctly recognizing theirs. Both of these arguments have subsisted in Marxist-Leninist ideology because each served a definite function for a revolutionary party: the moral critique justified and helped motivate the violent overthrow of the oppressing classes; the scientific analysis admonished clear-sighted realism in the formulation of strategy and rationalized leadership of the movement by “petty bourgeois” intellectuals (and working class apprenticeship). But while these arguments were complementary in launching revolution, they had diverging implications once that revolution succeeded.

In China’s case, it was the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution that first publicly articulated the “contradiction” between these two concepts of interest. Representatives of the “scientific” viewpoint, hereafter to be stigmatized as “revisionists,” seem to have believed that just as the pursuit of class interests under capitalism had endowed that system with an internal dynamic

that would burst its integuments and usher in socialism, so under socialism the continued pursuit of interests would propel that system toward the realization of the communist utopia. Revolution had emancipated the economic system from an economically irrational set of relations of production, and it was now, with the advent of socialism, so arranged that the class interests of the proletariat for the first time truly coincided with the public interest. Indeed, inasmuch as class was defined in terms of economic relationships, once the means of production had been socialized there was no reason why everyone in society should not in fact become a member of the proletariat, making "class struggle" obsolescent.

To those adherents of the moral point of view who identified with the "proletarian revolutionary line," on the other hand, self-interest was inherently objectionable, a "bourgeois" mode of thinking that should, with the advent of socialism, make way for general dedication to the public interest and to universalizable values. Not only would the continued pursuit of self-interest tend to divert people from making their fair contribution to the public sector, it would lead to increasing income stratification and thence to the political and cultural suppression of the less advantaged. In line with their moral concerns, they tended to define class in behavioral terms: any members of the proletariat who did not behave as such risked backsliding into the bourgeoisie.

According to the radicals, the essence of revisionism was contained in the works of former chief-of-state Liu Shaoqi. Although the radicals read these works with malice aforethought and often exaggerated outrageously, if we turn to the works themselves I think we must concede the general accuracy of the radical characterization of Liu's position on this particular issue. The most basic point is that Liu did believe that self-interest was legitimate and could be accommodated within the structural parameters of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In his "How to Be a Good Communist," Liu acknowledged that (Liu, 1969: I, 334):

So long as the interests of the Party are not violated, the Party member can have his private and family life, and develop his

individual inclinations. The Party will use every possibility to help members develop their individual inclinations and aptitudes in conformity with its interests, furnish them with suitable work and working conditions and commend and reward them. . . . The Party will attend to and safeguard its members' essential interests.

Liu seems to have had few qualms about appealing to self-interest as a legitimate form of incentive. In 1956, he told a graduating university class (Liu, 1969: II, 406):

It is perfectly justifiable and necessary to demand, on the basis of developed production, an increase in one's income and improvement in one's living standards. Only in this way can the enthusiasm of the workers be continuously promoted and the outstanding workers' movement acquire a solid foundation.

Although Liu also commended altruism, he seemed to feel that it had its limits; thus he attempted either to reinforce it by augmenting it with some material incentive (such as salary or position) or to assure altruists that they were bound to draw reciprocal benefits: "If you suffer hardships to let others have a better life, they will appreciate it and look after you" (Liu, 1969: I, 334ff.).

Liu justified his belief in the continued legitimacy of self-interest in two ways. First, somewhat like Maslow, Liu seems to have believed in a natural hierarchy of values in which an aspiration for the higher cultural and spiritual values was normally reached only after the base physical appetites had been sated (Maslow, 1968). Thus, the satisfaction of material interest was but the "basic foundation" in a long process of "raising the level" whereby people could be brought to an understanding of the interdependence of their interests with those of others in the same socioeconomic circumstances. Although the political organization was the "highest" form of organization, the economic organization was thus the most "important," because everyone had economic interests. Therefore, "all the economic demands of the masses must be integrated with political or cultural demands. When the masses begin to take action on one simple demand so that they can understand better a series of problems and further push their actions to a still higher stage." Thus, by "raising the

economic demands to political demands, raising partial and temporary demands to whole and permanent demands, and raising local demands to state and national demands," the masses would be elevated to a higher conception of their interest (Liu, 1969: I, 99-115). Self-interest would never be renounced or transcended in any quasi-religious sense, but it would become more inclusive, "enlightened."

Liu's second justification for self-interest derives from his confidence that in a socialist system the interests of the individual and those of the collective were always in principle compatible—that is, they "merged." Merging took place by tacit reciprocal agreement: the individual performed certain services for the group, and the group in turn provided for the individual's welfare. Indeed, this was the group's obligation (SCMM, May 5, 1969: 27):

You must not be double-minded and pay attention to both ends. . .
 You must have faith in the Communist Party and exert your efforts in this direction. As to the other end, we will take care of it, and if it is not taken care of, you should point this out to us.

Consistent with Liu's conception of the hierarchy of values, this transaction involved the exchange of tangible assets on a quid pro quo basis among the uncultivated masses, but among cultivated Party cadres it involved the exchange of increasingly symbolic or deferred values. The good Party member, having attained the insight that the inexorable course of historical development assures that his or her interests will ultimately merge with those of the working class and the Party, would be willing to perform services in disregard of immediate subjective interests.

Liu's general conception of the role of interests in the socialist transition was allegedly manifested in the early 1950s in the so-called theory of productive forces. According to this "theory," the pace of the revolutionary transformation of the relations of production was limited by the capability of the forces of production to provide the wherewithal for that transformation; with regard to the issue at hand, this would mean that the collectivization of agriculture should wait until China had sufficient industrial capacity for the mechanization of agriculture. On the basis of this theory, Liu is said to have opposed the

accelerated collectivization of agriculture of the early 1950s, and he himself admitted having approved the 1955 decision dissolving 200,000 cooperatives for which the material preconditions were considered immature (Liu, 1970: 621-625). Though the evidence relevant to this case is still incomplete, the theory of productive forces is entirely consistent with Liu's views of the functions of interest as expressed elsewhere. The expansion of the productive forces must keep pace with the transformation of the relations of production because the satisfaction of material interests has basic priority. As productivity expands, the greater efficiency of larger units will become evident, and people will voluntarily pool their resources to join them. Thus individual self-interest and the interests of the collectivity will coincide, "merge."

The radical critique of the revisionist conception of interest asserts that the hierarchy of values bears a quite different relationship to the social stratification pyramid than Liu had assumed. It is not the "cultivated" Party members, but workers and peasants and soldiers who are most likely to approximate Communist ideals: they are more intelligent, because their work puts them in closer touch with empirical reality; more selfless, because their acquisitive and possessive instincts have not been developed; more revolutionary, because they have less to lose and more to gain from radical change (Shen, 1967: 7-27). It is the *elites* who are in most danger of falling into revisionist ways, for their responsibility for the disposition of social resources inclines them to treat those resources as if they owned them. It is the elites who have therefore to learn from the masses rather than vice versa. The picture of a materialistic mass and a selfless Party leadership may have been accurate during the nearly forty years that the Party was an itinerant pariah group, a fair-minded radical might concede—those who persevered under such trying circumstances could hardly have been motivated by material advantage. But it began to acquire a hollow ring once the Party occupied the state apparatus and became the main distributive network for the nation's resources. At this point, the hierarchy of offices came into correspondence with allocation of tangible rewards, so that the doctrine of the merging of public and private interests (and even more the notion that the Communists had cultivated a moral aristocracy capable of consistently forswearing self-interest on

behalf of the public interest) began to assume some of the self-serving functions of an "ideology."

The possibility of a conflict of interest between the individual and the collective, implicitly denied in the revisionist format, was presumed by the radicals to be a regular and almost necessary state of affairs. It was further presumed that in this instance self-interest would usually prevail, while the notion of a public interest provided elites with a palatable rationalization for the credulous masses. This presumption was not entirely a priori, but was supported by two claims. First, it was alleged that the capitalist-roaders in the Party were directly responsible for the implementation of policies that were in the interest of the bourgeois and neobourgeois classes in society. For example, they sponsored material incentives for high productivity, thereby permitting "kulakization" and other forms of income stratification to emerge; and their plans to introduce sophisticated managerial systems and import advanced technology created career opportunities for the educated middle class while relegating the workers to monotonous assembly-line tasks. Second, they "embezzled social wealth," exploiting the privileges and perquisites of public office for their private benefit. Whereas the first of these actions had broader social ramifications, the latter was more potent symbolically, illustrating the consequences of complex policy issues at an immediate personal level. The self-serving, sometimes frivolous lifestyles of the elite, as caricatured in radical big-character posters and tabloids, represented the antithesis of socialist ideals.

RADICALIZATION OF THE CRITIQUE

In the 1972-1976 period, the radicals proceeded to systematize their views, defining bourgeois interest in increasingly inclusive terms. The result was to heighten the tension between "is" and "ought" by narrowing the range of the permissible. In this section, the radical redefinition of interest will be examined at a theoretical level; in the next, we turn to the political and organizational implications.

In perhaps the most significant theoretical essay to appear since "On the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Among the People," Zhang Chunqiao, following Mao (who followed Stalin in this respect), defined the relations of production to include not only property relations but forms of distribution and relations among people (Zhang, 1975). Inasmuch as class is defined by the relations of production, Zhang's classification expanded the concept of class; inasmuch as interests derive from class, it expanded the concept of interest. More specifically, however, it expanded the concept of *bourgeois* class and *its* interests (referred to as "bourgeois rights") in a way that made it meaningful to still speak of "bourgeoisie" in a society in which the state had expropriated private ownership of the means of production. We shall examine each category in Zhang's tripartite definition *seriatim*.

OWNERSHIP RELATIONS

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the heavy emphasis on ownership as a criterion for class membership tended to perpetuate class distinctions in Chinese society even as the objective basis for those distinctions was being abolished. For although private property was appropriated by the state, the former owners and their families were permanently stigmatized for having once owned it; this was designated their "family origin" (*jiating chushen*) and placed in their permanent files. This proved to be an increasingly inaccurate indicator of current socioeconomic status, including among the "proletariat" both poor peasants and high-ranking cadres, for example (Kraus, 1977). And just as certain strata among the proletariat became "established," certain strata among the nonproletarian classes were systematically discriminated against, generating resentment. Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, when the Party lost monopolistic control of the mobilization process and all classes were invited to participate, ideological militance failed to coincide very precisely with existing class lines (Lee, 1977; White, 1976). Under these circumstances, the radicals found it to their advantage to deemphasize family origin as a basis for classification and to lay

greater stress on ideological preferences and on performance (*biaoxian*) in the movement itself. Ideology qua Mao Zedong Thought proved open textured enough to permit myriad factional interpretations, however, and performance was impossible to predict.

In the post-Cultural Revolution campaigns, the radicals continued to resist a rigidification of the Chinese class structure on the basis of inherited family origins. One of the most significant inferences Mao had drawn from the Soviet experience in socialist construction was that the transformation from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people constituted one of the most vulnerable periods in the entire history of socialist transition. Because collective ownership in the Soviet Union had been allowed to "consolidate" too long without pressure for further transformation to a higher level of collective ownership and finally to ownership by the whole people, the Bolsheviks had failed to complete their socialist revolution and had lapsed into revisionism (Mao, 1977). The lesson seemed clear: socialization of the means of production should not be accepted as a *fait accompli*, but as the beginning of a long process requiring perseverant struggle.

This "contradiction" between collective ownership and ownership by the whole people also existed in China, Zhang Chunqiao pointed out, manifesting itself *inter alia* in the persistence of the "three great differences" (Zhang, 1975). While whole-people ownership held sway in industry and commerce, collective ownership still predominated in agriculture. This implied that if further progress toward ownership by the whole people could not be sustained, giving more accountability to the brigade and the commune, then regress was inevitable. A further implication was that industrial workers (in large-scale, state-run factories) were more "advanced" than peasants, representing something of a shift from Mao's tendency to redefine the proletariat as the poor and lower-middle peasants. This may have reflected a shift in the radicals' base of support from an increasingly conservative peasantry (which repeatedly frustrated the Party during the Socialist Education Movement and contributed relatively little to the Cultural Revolution) to the factories of Shanghai and Hangzhou.

FORMS OF DISTRIBUTION

Confronting the fact that the State had become the nation's paymaster, the radicals went beyond ownership relations to challenge the principles on which distribution had been based in the PRC. "From each according to his work" was a bourgeois and not a socialist principle, provisionally necessary, to be sure, during the transition to socialism, but devoid of ultimate ideological legitimacy. Distribution according to work exemplifies the principle of exchange of equivalents, or "exchange between a given amount of labor in one form and a similar amount of labor in another form," and as such is part of the "commodity system" (Zhang, 1975). In capitalist economies, ownership of the means of production gives the bourgeoisie insuperable advantages in this only apparently equal exchange. In the socialist economy, the commodity system is mainly built upon the foundation of the two kinds of public ownership—whole-people ownership and collective ownership—and is hence not exclusively regulated by the "law of value" (which predicts a growing contradiction between value and exchange value), but also by the law of planned development. Most products of the economy are brought into the sphere of commodity circulation through the channels of state-run commerce and supply and marketing cooperatives, where commodity production and exchange are not in a state of free competition but are carried out according to state plan, with prices fixed centrally by the state and with important commodities subject to planned purchase (Zheng Kai, 1975).

Be all that as it may, commodity production and exchange does continue under socialism in the form of competition between collectively owned enterprises or production units and even individuals in the rural markets, where the law of value continues to apply. Because of differences in market conditions, conditions for production, and levels of technology, equal right in the exchange of equivalents in socialist society is still unequal in reality. And as Marx put it in his *Critique of the Gotha Program*, "Equal right here is still—in principle—a bourgeois right" (Quoted in Gu et al., 1977). The commodity system will remain functionally necessary so long as the two kinds of ownership exist

in socialist society and so long as that portion of the economy under whole-people ownership cannot produce sufficient products to practice distribution according to need. As long as it exists, it must be politically "restricted," for otherwise it will tend to generate various spontaneous capitalist tendencies. Although the dictatorship of the proletariat can restrict various inequalities in resource endowment through planning, control, and taxation, given the objective existence of these distinctions and the inherent logic of the commodity system, there will be continuing pressure in a capitalist direction. Units will be prone to concern themselves only with the "ratio of exchange for their products," bringing them into conflict with state planning. Inequalities among them entail that gain and loss must figure in the exchange, leading to ruthless competition between units to improve conditions for production, raise technological levels, and reduce the necessary labor time as much as possible. Inasmuch as money remains the general equivalent of exchange, these inequalities of initial endowment and subsequent return will tend to accumulate until classes consolidate again (Xia, 1975; Anon., 1975). These trends, once set in motion, will lead to the following dilemma (Yao, 1975a: 22-23):

If we do not follow this course, but call instead for the consolidation, extension and strengthening of bourgeois right and that part of inequality it entails, the inevitable result will be polarization, i.e., a small number of people will in the course of distribution acquire increasing amounts of commodities and money through certain legal channels and numerous illegal ones; capitalist ideas of amassing fortunes and craving personal fame and gain, stimulated by such "material incentives," will spread unchecked; such phenomena as turning public property into private property, speculation, graft and corruption, theft and bribery will rise; the capitalist principle of the exchange of commodities will make its way into political life and even into Party life, undermine the socialist planned economy and give rise to such acts of capitalist exploitation as the conversion of commodities and money into labor and labor power into a commodity; and there will be a change in the nature of ownership in certain departments and units which follow the revisionist line; and instances of oppression and exploitation of the working people will once again occur.

Despite the apocalyptic consequences of allowing current trends to continue, the radicals were for the time being surprisingly prudent in their policy recommendations. Associating attempts to “abolish” the commodity system with Trotsky and attempts to “perpetuate [it] forever” with Bukharin, they sought to steer a middle course. The commodity system was fatal in the long run but tonic in the short, so structural reform could be postponed. The current level of ownership in the countryside could not be permitted to consolidate and should eventually be raised from the production team to the brigade and finally to the commune, but it was unnecessary to do so immediately. The radicals succeeded in blocking a scheduled wage adjustment and called on workers voluntarily to forego extra pay and donate their labor, but they did not call for an immediate elimination of commodity trade and the monetary exchange system, for leveling distribution patterns, or for a shift from the “works” to “needs” principle (Yuan Guangxia, 1975). Tactically, their stance seems to have been designed to defend the “new born things” of the Cultural Revolution in the face of the “four modernizations” drive of 1975, parts of which directly threatened those redistributive arrangements introduced by the Cultural Revolution, and to provide an ideological pretext to counterattack Deng Xiaoping and his supporters.

Thus, the radicals found themselves in the awkward position of nullifying the legitimacy and ideological rationale of “bourgeois right” while ignoring its societal manifestations. Even the masses seem to have been puzzled by a campaign so ambitious in theory yet so modest in intent. “Since distribution according to work is about the same as in the old society, why is it still in existence now?” queried one peasant. “And since it is allowed to exist, why is it necessary to restrict it under the dictatorship of the proletariat?” Although “to each according to his work” indeed embodied “bourgeois right,” came the editorial reply, “we must not say, ‘long live distribution according to work.’ The fact that we recognize it and allow it to exist at the present stage does not mean that we should extend or develop it” (Wu, 1975).

RELATIONS AMONG PEOPLE

In shifting their target from ownership in *sensu stricto* to forms of distribution, the radicals took their first step toward a *political* critique as applicable to socialist systems as to capitalist. By including "relations among people" as well, they made a great leap in this direction. For the essential question here was one of the relationship between masses and leaders; specifically, when could the Party vanguard accurately be said to represent the interests of the proletariat? The easy assumption that there was an "organic," almost tautological identity between the two lay among the first casualties of the Cultural Revolution.

In 1965, Mao seemed to approach Milovan Djilas's position with his offhand remark that a "bureaucrat class on the one hand [namely, the Party-State officialdom] and the working class with the poor and lower-middle peasants on the other are two classes sharply antagonistic to each other" (Zhai, 1976). About a decade later, he reiterated this point of view.¹ But although he was fond of categorical indictments, Mao was also willing to qualify his generalizations if necessary. When radical Red Guards drew the inference that 95% of all cadres should be struck down and the Party's accomplishment of the previous 17 years be reassessed, for instance, he interceded to affirm that most cadres were good or comparatively good. And the criterion he introduced to discriminate good from bad was the cadre's relationship to the masses. "When we judge whether a person is a true or false Marxist, we need only find out how he stands in relation to the broad masses of workers and peasants, and then we shall know him for what he is," Mao decreed. "This is the only criterion, there is no other" (An, 1973b). All leadership errors could be attributed to its violation: "Mistakes made by cadres invariably stem from separation from the masses. When a cadre implements a wrong line, he will also basically separate himself from the masses" (Juzu, 1973).

According to refugee informants interviewed in Hong Kong, the Cultural Revolution was in fact quite successful in inducing leaders to cultivate a closer relationship with their constituents, and most informants felt that this gave them somewhat more

control over local policy implementation and improved their chances to attain political demands or redress grievances.² But the policy of intensified elite-mass fraternization also brought two problems in its train, the first involving the demands of the activated masses, the latter the motives of the more accessible leaders.

The first problem lay in the possibility that the masses might take advantage of the more conciliatory posture of the leadership to escalate their demands or to thwart policies to which they objected, thereby promoting their own interests at the expense of the public interest (as the Party saw it). Apparently, one of the reasons for the inefficacy of the Revolutionary Committee as an administrative network is that it was utilized by mass representatives so extensively to pursue the interests of local constituents. The use of this more fraternal relationship to attain demands was apparent in the proliferation of the "back door" phenomenon (the use of one's privileged official access to scarce goods or services to allocate them in exchange for reciprocal goods or services rather than according to universalistic criteria of need), a form of corruption formerly visible primarily among Party cadres and their families. Its use to articulate grievances was apparent in the proliferation of strikes and slowdowns in 1975-1976, or in the Tiananmen incident of April 1976, an almost unprecedented case of major mass protest without demonstrated elite collusion.

The second danger inhered in the possibility that *elites* might cater to the subjective interests of the masses under their aegis as a way of cultivating personal constituencies beyond the ambit of the formal mechanisms of control. Though perhaps superficially similar to revisionist appeals to mass interests, the former operated through the Party organization and according to agreed-upon procedures, while this new form of constituency cultivation was conducted by individual leaders for explicitly factional objectives without any ideology or organization committed to "raising the level" of constituent interests. This tendency appeared in its most dangerous form at the highest levels of elite politics, and in the Lin Biao case in particular. While the reasons for the rift between Mao and his erstwhile heir apparent still

remain somewhat obscure, the consensus of most analysts is that it was precipitated not so much by ideological or policy differences as by Lin's attempt to exploit his patronage and other official powers in order to consolidate his own political base (Kau, 1975).

In their efforts to repudiate such self-serving interpretations of the edict to "serve the people," the Chinese media (ironically, led by the radicals who had been its strongest original supporters) found it necessary to introduce certain qualifications. The most sophisticated critique of distorted fraternization appeared in Zhang Chunqiao's 1975 "bourgeois right" article. His argument, similar in its implications to Kant's categorical imperative (that a person should be treated only as an end and never as a means), held that those "relations among people" that resembled the instrumental relationship between people and commodities in a capitalist system were ipso facto "bourgeois" (Zhang, 1975: 3-13). Thus, Lin Biao, whose generally leftist policy record and abstemious personal regimen defied conventional reproach, was accused of "handing out official posts and making promises, inviting guests and given them presents, wining and dining, and traffic in flattery and favors. . . . When his sworn followers were exposed by the masses, he used his position and power to . . . protect them and help them sneak away" (Mass Criticism Group of Beijing University and Qinghua University, 1974). Lin's notebooks were found to contain telltale mention of "inducement—official post, emolument, favor," stripping bare the manipulative intentions behind Lin's services to his constituents. This was "bourgeois," according to Yao Wenyuan, because it transformed the relations among people into "relations of buying and selling commodities . . . if you pledge loyalty to me, I will offer you higher official posts" (Yao, 1975b: 8).

The argument was based on an extended analogy between economic and political exchange, and as such did not provide a precise criterion to distinguish bourgeois from proletarian "relations among men." The informal services that a capitalist-roader might render his constituents—the allocation of patronage, funding, protection, and other positive reinforcements—were not essentially different from those provided by a true servant of the

people; the main difference was in the *motives* behind the action. Is the servant of the people acting exclusively for their welfare, or does he or she harbor hopes for some form of reciprocity? The difference is difficult to ascertain when reciprocal benefits are likely to be forthcoming in either case, if only in the form of gratitude or enhanced loyalty. Attempts to draw such a distinction begin to seem hair-splitting, inquisitorial (Tian, 1973).

The proletariat always attaches importance to class unity and class friendship. . . . Such relations cannot be confused with the bourgeois-type relations that depart from the principles of the proletarian Party spirit and aim at cultivating private connections and mutual exploitation. Some people, while paying lip service to socialist cooperation and comradely relations, practice the bourgeois philosophy of life, benefit others only when they are benefited, and help others in order that they may be helped later on.

As a corrective to the tendency to build particularistic loyalties that might compromise the implementation of central policy or pose a threat to the leadership, the leadership introduced two general guidelines to govern elite-mass relationships. The first emphasized that service to the people meant serving the “overwhelming majority” of the people. “The words and deeds of Communists are judged by whether they conform to the highest interests, and enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the people,” Mao is quoted as saying (Hong Yuan, 1973). And again:

Proceeding from the greatest interests of the broad masses of the people, the Chinese Communists believe that their cause is entirely just and supported by the overwhelming majority. Should anyone at any time think it is unnecessary and impossible to unite with the vast majority, that would only show that his thinking and action are far from or even may run counter to the interests of the Party and the masses [Xie, 1974].

Although there was no marked difference in emphasis between conservatives and radicals in this shift, under the circumstances it seems to have redounded to the greater advantage of the former:

first, because the appeal to adhere to the interest of the “overwhelming majority of the people” tended to counteract the concurrent call to “go against the tide,” which was addressed to a nonconformist minority; and second, because most members of the masses would not presume to judge what the “interests of the broad masses” were and would therefore feel compelled to rely on superior authority to tell them. Only the bold and imaginative would venture to go over the heads of the local Party committee for this information; for most, the interests of the broad masses would be what the Party decided. The Party was quite explicit in endorsing this interpretation, recommending to local officials that they exercise strong leadership without fear of alienating their constituents through the use of punitive sanctions: (Gan, 1972).

Some comrades say “In any case, we have nothing to gain . . . don’t get too serious or you will alienate yourselves from the masses.” Is it permissible to ignore principle when working for one’s own unit or “the public?” No. The principles of the Party are based on the need to safeguard the maximum interests of the broad masses. . . . If we ignore Party policies and the relevant regulations of the State, and if we reap private gains at the expense of the public, even though certain people in one’s unit may obtain some advantage for the time being, the interests of the broad masses of the people will be impaired. Yet some comrades . . . do not understand that once they depart from Party principles, however hard they work, they cannot be said to “show concern for the masses” and “work for the well-being of the public”; on the contrary, they divorce themselves from the broad masses.

The second general guideline for true service to the interests of the revolutionary masses was ideological: Is the “line” taken by the leadership “correct” (i.e., Marxist-Leninist) or not?

The historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat at home and abroad tells us that whether the socialist system advances or moves backward is closely linked with whether or not we correctly adjust the relations between men. . . . Here the key lies in who holds the leadership, whether Marxism or revisionism is practiced, and which line is implemented [Yuan Qing, 1975].

The question of lines was of such surpassing importance that its answer superseded the issue of property ownership as a defining criterion of class membership in socialist society. The “correctness or incorrectness of the ideological line, and the control of the leadership in the hands of one class or another, decide which class owns a factory in reality” (Fang Hai, 1976). In a striking reversal of the Cultural Revolution formulation, which traced the existence of capitalist-roaders in the Party to the bourgeois and neobourgeois class in society of which they were the witting or unwitting representatives, this new position defined social classes in terms of the line their leaders took, thereby planting its origins firmly in the political superstructure (Tsou, 1977: 498-528; Bettelheim, 1978: 37-130). Bourgeois tendencies arose within the Party not in response to the vicissitudes of class struggle in society but because of a “new law” that “the persons who directly control the state apparatus inside the Communist Party use dictatorial powers to appropriate surplus value and this is ‘the bourgeoisie within the Party’” (theory Group of Shenyang PLA Units, 1977). The correct line thus took on something of a Platonic aspect, finding its only empirical reference point in the person of Mao Zedong, whose role as authoritative doctrinal exegete the radicals hoped to inherit.

In sum, according to this analysis there has been a gradual tendency to retreat from the more intimate relationship between elites and their mass constituencies that was introduced during the Cultural Revolution. This trend was endorsed by both radicals and conservatives for different reasons. For the conservatives, the restoration of somewhat more social distance between rulers and ruled was probably deemed necessary in order to ensure compliance with unpopular central directives and reinforce discipline. For the radicals, it was ideologically necessary to break up particularistically based factions and to foster a more universalistic form of dedication to the community; political groups should be held together by a shared commitment to certain values, not by the exchange of favors. This retreat from elite-mass fraternization was marked by more abstract formulations of proletarian class interests, permitting the latter to be subsumed by “correct” Party procedures or by central ideological leadership.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Although the radicals were opposed not merely to the manifestation of "bourgeois rights" but to the articulation of interests altogether (model proletarians were never depicted as pursuing their own interests, but only as sacrificing them on behalf of the nation, the construction of socialism, or some other just cause), they themselves acquired an "interest" in this selfless ideal that led them into the political arena in its defense (Jowitt, 1979). Here they found themselves in continual disagreement with the customary means of pursuing political interests and yet quite frequently at a loss to propose new patterns of behavior that did not either violate their principles or frustrate their political objectives.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the aggregation and articulation of interests was monopolized by the Communist Party apparatus. A number of ancillary organizations were established to represent functional interests, such as the trade unions, mass organizations, and various academic and professional associations, but their relationship to the Party was essentially corporatist: The Party controlled the appointment of leadership, internal structure, and recruitment of new members (Pike and Stritch, 1974). Interests were aggregated and collated into univocal statements through the arrangement of meetings. A fairly well-established sequence of preparatory meetings, work conferences, policy ratifying conferences, policy announcing and implementing conferences was established for the translation of sectoral interests into the public interest, embracing every echelon of the apparatus and including the masses as the beginning and end of the policy process (Lieberthal, 1978).

During the Cultural Revolution, the radicals challenged the legitimacy of the Party's monopolization of the aggregation and articulation of interests, claiming that the revisionists' penetration of the apparatus enabled them to manipulate the "public" interest to their own advantage. Thus, the radicals repudiated the doctrine of the "merging" of interests that allowed both to be accommodated and postulated an irreconcilable difference between the two, forcing a personal choice between self-protection

and self-sacrifice. Under the circumstances, this implied a choice between continued conformity to the apparatus and its repudiation, for to accord “unconditional obedience” to organizational directives was to be a “docile tool” of those who controlled the organization at a time when the ideological reliability of the organization man was most in question. Unquestioning obedience should be replaced by conscious and discriminating adherence to “correct” directives, as defined by their conformity with Maoist ideology.

Such notions tended to unravel the organization, which had indeed been based on the assumption of unquestioning compliance, this assumption in turn being premised on the legitimacy of the procedures used to make decisions and attain consensus (such as democratic centralism, the mass line). The Party organization was temporarily eclipsed by quasi-pluralistic voluntary associations (“factions”) spontaneously assembled on the basis of ideological like-mindedness. These associations, cited by some radical publications as a model for the ultimate reorganization of the State itself, lacked coherent internal structure and rested on the assumption that concurrence on a set of abstract universals entailed concurrence on various concrete particulars. This assumption proved untenable, for just as agreement constituted the basis for inclusion, disagreement became sufficient grounds for exclusion or schism. “Struggle” was the constitutive principle and *raison d’être* of these associations, and it proved difficult for them to cooperate in more peaceful and constructive endeavors. The factions were disbanded in 1968 and repeatedly condemned whenever they reconstituted themselves. Thenceforth the radicals displayed a restless ambivalence on the question of an ideologically acceptable organizational vehicle for interests. Initially, they endeavored to cooperate in such hybrid ventures as the triple-alliance Revolutionary Committee, but as they came to feel they were being squeezed out of any meaningful political role in these organizations they tended to revert to factionalism, which triggered the imposition of additional sanctions.

For their part, the veteran cadres proceeded to reconstruct the Party apparatus on the basis of principles indistinguishable from those that obtained before 1966. First, they abandoned the

interdict against “merging” public and private interests. “Chairman Mao has consistently taught us the need to give concurrent consideration to the interests of the State, the collective and the individual,” *Hongqi* proclaimed. “This gives the correct expression to the intrinsic linkage among the three” (Jiang Hong, 1972). Following completion of Party rebuilding in 1971, the CCP emerged as the most suitable receptacle for such merging: “The policies of the Party embody the unity of the long-range and immediate interests of the whole and the part. Therefore, they have the support of the broadest sections of the masses and call forth the enthusiasm of the masses for socialism” (An, 1973a). And again:

Being a proletarian Party armed by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, our Party represents the greatest interests of the vast majority of the Chinese people. It has no special interests separate and apart from those of the masses of the people as a whole [Yan, 1973].

As the Party reassumed its traditional role, it also returned to procedural criteria for the definition of the public interest and demanded unquestioning compliance to them. With the understanding that “a revolutionary political party is carrying out a policy whenever it undertakes any action,” Party members were instructed to obey all Party policies (Tian, 1973):

We do not depart from Party policy when doing any kind of work. . . . If the policy of the Party is violated, we will be alienated from the masses and the Party organization will lose its fighting power.

The Party’s demand for such obedience followed logically from its reassertion of monopolistic control over the organization of interests, which entailed that diverging views must find a haven under the same umbrella. “There is no conflict of fundamental interests within the working class,” Mao is repeatedly quoted as saying (Commentator, 1974). Therefore, “Differences of opinion arising out of differences in the degree of consciousness and ideological knowledge can be removed through mutual discussion” (Zhang Hongzhi, 1973). Resorting to ideology as the sole

legitimate ground for the aggregation of interests was no longer encouraged: The public interest embodies diverse sectoral interests, which are reconciled by the Party according to correct procedures. Thus, “we must unite with those whose opinions are the same as ours, but we must also be good at uniting with those whose opinions differ from ours and, moreover, at uniting with those who have opposed us before” (Jiang Hong, 1972).

Beginning in 1973 with an intensified campaign to criticize Lin Biao (now helpfully labelled an “ultra-rightist”) and Confucius, the radicals initiated efforts to break down the equation of public and bureaucratic interests. This was most powerfully expressed in the slogan, “Going against the tide is a Marxist-Leninist principle,” first uttered by Mao and then cited by both Zhou Enlai (but with exclusive reference to foreign policy issues) and Wang Hongwen in their reports to the 10th Party Congress. In the initial wave of publicity propagating this slogan, the media clearly indicated that it applied to non-Party masses as well as Party members,³ that it encouraged voluntary political action on behalf of the public interest⁴ (“Public interests here mean those of the proletariat”—the Party is not mentioned), and that it sanctioned militant nonconformity for the sake of the correct line even in the face of an opposing majority (Li Qinglin, 1973):

Those revolutionary comrades who dare to go against the tide may sometimes appear to be in the minority and weak. In fact, their persisting in Marxist principles, in taking the socialist road, and in daring to go against the tide precisely reflects the revolutionary will of the broad masses of the people and represents their interest. Therefore, they are by no means isolated in the course of going against the tide, because they have strong revolutionary forces to back them.

All this would seem to herald a breaking away from procedural discipline and perhaps a revival of the spontaneous voluntary association of ideologically like-minded activists as the preferred organizational vehicle for the defense of the public interest. But although the media gave public endorsement to a variety of relatively informal voluntary associations during this period, there was never a hint of public support for rebel factionalism at

any time, notwithstanding the successor regime's allegations to the contrary. In fact, the call to go against the tide was coupled (sometimes in the same article) with injunctions to observe Party discipline (Fang Yanliang, 1973):

Going against the tide is completely consistent with observing Party discipline. . . . In the course of the struggle between the two lines within the Party, our great leader Chairman Mao always unwaveringly abides by Marxist-Leninist principles and dares to go against the tide; he also firmly safeguards the Party's organizational principles and observes the Party's discipline. Chieftains of the opportunist lines within the Party, because they want to push the revisionist line, always sabotage the Party's organizational principles and oppose the Party's discipline.

It has been suggested that this public ambivalence reflected an intra-Party cleavage between radicals and conservatives over the most suitable way to organize the public interest, and this may be so. It is also, however, conceivable that the radicals had simply not given adequate consideration to the organizational consequences of their rhetoric, and that when factionalism recurred they were forced to revise their slogans. It is my impression that the radicals did play by the "rules," at least until the Tiananmen incident in April 1976: they preserved the anonymity of their polemical targets and acceded in the suppression of the mass movement whenever factionalism threatened seriously to disrupt production. To be sure, this left them in a conceptual no-man's land on the original question: they still opposed the reduction of ideology to (Party) organization, but they also tacitly agreed that the only available alternative entailed serious problems and could not be implemented systematically.

CONCLUSION

At this point, it seems appropriate to pose two questions. First, is the radical critique of interest internally valid? Second, how politically viable is it? These questions are empirically connected in that the validity of the critique may be assumed to have

something to do with its viability, but they are analytically distinct, and it is best to maintain that distinction rather than assume some relationship before it can be demonstrated.

(1) The radical critique may be said to have *internal validity* if it makes an accurate analysis of current tendencies in Chinese society and logically relates this analysis to central themes in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist framework of meaning accepted as legitimate in China. As already noted, there are two aspects of the radical critique, one of which was systematically broached in their polemical literature, the other consisting of the organizational innovations introduced in the course of popularizing their ideas.

In expanding the definition of "class" to include different forms of ownership relations (i.e., collective versus whole-people ownership), patterns of distribution (i.e., "bourgeois right" versus socialism), and noneconomic (i.e., self-interested versus altruistic) "relations among people," the radicals succeeded in calling public attention to the persistence of elitism in socialist society and in initiating a search for its post-revolutionary causes. Thus, they turned Marxism into a tool of critical analysis that could be used by the masses as well as their leaders. This was in the interest of all who had suffered under the inflexible classification of classes introduced in the late 1940s and early 1950s, opening the way to a reclassification of classes that would take realistic account of emerging bases of cleavage. Although CCP efforts to encourage mass feedback have been unusually insistent, bureaucratization of the leadership has been a central post-Liberation trend, with a consequent proliferation of perquisite stratification, patronage networks, and so forth. Although the work principle offers obvious economic advantages, its consequential application will exacerbate income differentials. These new cleavages based on bureaucratic and meritocratic tendencies may be expected to become more salient with the current emphasis on modernization. And they stand in obvious contrast to the central egalitarian value in Mao's thought. The radicals have in this respect contributed an ideologically valid and rhetorically compelling critique of Chinese socialism at its present stage.

This is apparent in the failure of the successor regime to come to grips with the issues raised in their counter-critique. The radi-

cals are often merely accused of exaggeration—which is true but hardly exceptional in Chinese polemics.⁵ The radical attack on “bourgeois right” is fended off with the argument that there is an overriding “contradiction” between capitalist and socialist systems. In view of this, such admitted “gaps in wages and living conditions” as the difference between the masses on the one hand and those leading cadres who live “in a 300-400 yuan house, complete with car and guards” on the other are commensurate with an “identity of fundamental interests” (Theory Group of Shenyang PLA Units, 1977). Such differentiation is qualitatively different from the “class inequality that exists between the exploiters and the exploited in capitalist society,” because the latter is based on differences in *types* of income (Gu et al., 1977). The radicals, however, explicitly recognized this, and their critique of income differentiation under socialism based on “exchange of equal values” remains ideologically valid. The radical critique of nonsocialist “relations among people” has been met solely by an ad hominem counterattack: *tu quoque*.⁶ The most fully articulated countercriticism is, however, a revival of the “theory of productive forces”; i.e., utopian socialist objectives must await attainment of sufficient productive capacity to reward participants (Theoretical Group of Beijing Normal University, 1977: 13-19). Economic growth is considered a necessary precondition for more equal distribution, but unequal distribution (as in the works principle) is assumed to be a necessary precondition for economic growth.

The critique of existing procedures for the aggregation and articulation of interests also has considerable validity *as a critique*. It is true that the organization of interests within the Leninist framework results in the suppression of heterodox viewpoints. It does not necessarily result in the triumph of the public interest, only in the hegemony of that leadership group that advocates a specific hierarchical relationship among general, particular, and individual interests. This arrangement tends to mask conflicts of interest by defining them all as identical (they “merge”) and demanding conformity with them, thereby threatening to become the ideology of those with the organizational prowess to define the public interest as they see it. All this is valid

and quite trenchant; the radicals' Achilles' heel was in proposing feasible *alternative* strategies for the organization of interests. The like-minded voluntary association of activists was not a deliberate radical creation, but the spontaneous excrescence of a period when the central institutions were under attack and the masses permitted to organize autonomously. The materialistic demands and factional conflicts of such associations in fact violated radical assumptions that the masses were idealistically motivated and shared the same interests. The radicals were in no position to defend factionalism, and they had to suffer the suppression of the mass movement whenever it relapsed into factional violence. This is not to say the problem was solved, and indeed, factionalism recurred sporadically throughout the post-Cultural Revolution decade, chiefly because the mass movement that provided a pretext for factionalism was still sanctioned and the bureaucracy was unable to grasp control. But this was no longer an *ideological* problem, for the legitimacy of this form of interest articulation had long since been destroyed.

(2) An ideological innovation may be said to be *politically viable* to the extent that it demonstrates a capacity to mobilize a politically effective constituency, i.e., one capable of establishing it as a politically relevant standard of evaluation. The fate of the Gang of Four and their supporters, and the manifest irrelevance of their critique to subsequent policy developments, all strongly suggest that it lacked viability. There were many reasons for the fall of the radicals, including their lack of political "base" and the difficulties they faced building one, given their narrow, insubstantial career backgrounds (Dittmer, 1978: 26-61). But the principal reason for the failure of their *critique* was the "vestment," or social sanctification, of the interests of the modernizing sector of the Chinese economy at the time the radicals were elaborating their critique of interests. For the inescapable *raison d'être* of economic development is the satisfaction of interests, and the historically unprecedented capacity of the modern industrial system to do so has tended to foster a strong functional interdependency between that system and its participants and beneficiaries.

The vestment of the interests of the modernizing sector can be documented on the basis of the relative isolation of this sector from political disturbances and the maintenance of essential policy continuity amid marked discontinuity in the cultural and political arenas. This continuity is evident in the persisting validity with only minor adjustments of basic regulatory documents and formal organizational structures. For example, the basis of the post-Great Leap Forward industrial recovery program was the "Seventy Articles of Industrial Policy" drafted by Bo Yibo in September 1960 under the sponsorship of Deng Xiaoping. Although Deng admitted in self-criticisms made in 1968 and again in August 1972 that he should bear responsibility for some serious mistakes made in the "Seventy Articles" because that document did not adhere to Mao's "Anshan Constitution" or put politics in command, the document remained in effect from the early 1960s until 1975. In the summer of 1975, it was supplemented by a document known as the "Twenty Articles," also drafted under Deng's auspices, which laid the basis for the post-1976 reforms; while making some attempt to incorporate aspects of the Anshan Constitution, this document was still based on the Seventy Articles (Gong, 1976: 14-20). It advocated subordinating the activities of all other organizations (such as Revolutionary Committee, Trade Union, Youth Corps) to a strengthened Party committee, in effect resuscitating the "director responsibility system under the collective leadership of the Party committee" first established at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 after Gao Gang's one-man management was rescinded. Under this arrangement, the Party committee is equivalent to the board of trustees in the Western context, while the factory director and his deputies (chief engineer, chief accountant, chief designer, and chief industrial artist—a revival of the "one director, four chiefs" system) perform executive/managerial functions. The radicals were probably justified in complaining at the time of inception that the document shifted leadership responsibility from mass representatives to "white" experts⁷ and imposed "systems and regulations" that excluded workers from participation in management and subjected them to expert control at every step of the production process.⁸ In the

agricultural sector, the vestment of modernizing interests was indicated by the maintenance of formal continuity on the issues of ownership and the division of functional responsibilities within the commune from 1962 to the present, despite the occasional introduction of models and mass movements designed to push opinion toward the adoption of more advanced forms of distribution.⁹ Since early 1972, the major emphasis in agriculture has been not on changes in ownership levels or egalitarian innovations in work-point allocation but on agricultural mechanization; since 1975, ideological models and mass movements have also reflected this shift in emphasis, Dazhai itself having transformed its meaning in the wake of two major national conferences on agricultural mechanization held there in 1975-1976.

Underlying the vestment of the interests of the modernizing sector is the socialization of the bureaucracy responsible for this sector in the esoteric technical and financial knowledge considered necessary to manage a modernizing economy competently. Acquisition of specialized expertise gradually became a prerequisite to promotion to certain posts and provided a degree of tenure security, so that those who had made such an acquisition also acquired an interest in the functional system whose workings they so thoroughly understood. The dependence was reciprocal, because specialized knowledge gave these technocrats control over specific spheres of uncertainty relevant to the operation of these systems and thereby made them dispensable only at a given cost.¹⁰ These people could be eliminated without impairing the operation of the system only if they were replaced by someone who shared their specialized knowledge, thus also sharing their interest in maintaining the system.

As the size and complexity of the economic system grew, Mao himself seemed to lose confidence in his ability to deal with economic questions, as he indicated in a series of in camera statements made in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Mao, 1969: 243-244, 278, 302). Such statements were probably not motivated by modesty, but by Mao's perception that he was not recognized by his colleagues in terms of his mastery of the specialized literature of economic construction now considered pertinent to the success of China's modernizing endeavors. In order to isolate

himself from continued exposure of his lack of this type of knowledge and to retain the ideological authority he still enjoyed, he decided in the late 1950s to divide the leadership into two "fronts." He also attempted to overcome his inadequate knowledge of economics by immersing himself in the study of Marxist political economy, thereby broadening his still essentially ideological competence to include economic issues and giving him the confidence to launch his bold demarches of the mid-1960s.

The economy could not, however, be run by Cultural Revolution, nor by the inexperienced youth it brought to prominence, and as an external control mechanism the mass movement could exercise only a crude, costly, and strictly temporary veto power. Even the purge was limited as an instrument of control because of the exacting role requirements that positions of economic leadership imposed on the recruitment of replacements for purged officials. Throughout the period from 1956 to 1976, Mao did not appoint any radical leader to a leadership post in the economic or industrial spheres; even after economic panjandrums Liu Shaoqi and Bo Yibo had been dismissed, Deng Xiaoping had to be reinstated in the early 1970s, and he proceeded to run the national economy in pretty much the same way Bo had run it. Thus, Mao's authority over these institutionally entrenched leaders was quite limited, unless ideological issues could legitimately be raised; even then he was unable to intervene directly in their spheres of competence and in most cases had to recognize their authority there (Lee, 1977).

If the radical critique of interest was ideologically valid but not politically viable, what may we conclude about its future prospects? That the modernizing sector of the economy seems to have become more securely institutionalized than the political or cultural sectors does not necessarily signify that it will now proceed to establish its uncontested sway over Chinese life. Recent Chinese political history shows that apparently discredited ideological currents (revisionism being a case in point) may survive for some time at a subsurface level to make a strong resurgence. There is still a social constituency available for anti-elite protest in China, as indicated by recent events associated with the "democracy wall" in Beijing; and the age distribution

among the leadership suggests that the succession crisis may not yet be fully resolved. Should the modernization effort fail to meet expectations, could this stimulate a revival of systemic critiques and a search for radical alternatives? Though the radicals failed egregiously to provide positive alternative leadership, their criticisms of socialist modernization remain cogent ones that may yet reappear in some form.

NOTES

1. "After the democratic revolution the workers and the poor and lower peasants did not stand still, they want revolution. On the other hand, a number of Party members do not want to go forward; some have moved backward and opposed the revolution. Why? Because they have become high officials and want to protect the interests of high officials" (quoted in Li Xin, 1976).

2. Interviews conducted by the author in Hong Kong in the Spring of 1977.

3. "In order to resolutely resist the reactionary and erroneous tide, not only must comrades of the whole Party have the revolutionary spirit of daring to go against the tide, but the broad masses of the people outside the Party . . . should also have this spirit" (Li Qinglin, 1973).

4. "Any hesitation, compromise, and retreat are despicable and are the manifestation of selfishness and cowardice" (Li Qinglin, 1973).

5. For example, one article concedes that while there are bourgeoisie in the Party, they are "only a mere handful," not a "bourgeois class" (Theory Group of Shenyang PLA Units, 1977).

6. The radicals allegedly divorced themselves from the masses and "used a portion of the power they usurped to 'happily' loot the national coffer and live extravagantly" (Gu et al. 1977).

7. While affirming that politics was "in command," technical and professional personnel were assured protection to devote themselves wholeheartedly to research and development, and cadres were even encouraged to acquire some technical and professional knowledge.

8. The Twenty Articles proposed to strengthen the evaluation of enterprise performance on the basis of eight technical and economic indicators that set standards for financial accountability and quality control; in this respect, the Twenty Articles were almost identical with the Seventy Articles.

9. The basis for the agricultural recovery from the failure of the Great Leap was laid in the 1962 commune regulations (Sixty Articles), and these have not since been rescinded, despite voluntary radical efforts during and after the Cultural Revolution to abolish private plots and household sidelines and move from the team to the brigade or commune as units of accountability. Following the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee in early 1979, mention of a "New Sixty Articles" appeared, said to be essentially identical with the old (no draft available).

10. After Max Weber, the organization theorists who have most stressed the role of uncertainty control in the acquisition of bureaucratic power are James March and Herbert A. Simon (1958: 165), and Michel Crozier (1971: 162-165).

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