

# Taiwan as a Factor in China's Quest for National Identity

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*The premise of this paper is that China has a divided national identity, characteristic of a category of nation-states divided for political reasons since World War II. Until 1999, responsibility for this sense of national division could be diffused, but since the retrocession of Hong Kong and Macao, frustration and blame have focused on Taiwan, the last remaining symbol of China's 'national humiliation'. Characteristic of such a divided identity are ambivalent feelings, aiming on the one hand to idealize and desire to incorporate the 'missing' or 'lost' segment of the nation, and on the other to punish it for refusing to return. It is important to understand that Chinese feelings about Taiwan are not a simple reflection of empirical developments on the island, but also project latent ideas about China's own unresolved national identity. China's attempts to overcome this division have undergone several changes, making significant progress while encountering difficult (and as yet still insuperable) obstacles.*

Whereas a good deal has been written on Taiwan's national identity, some of which of course includes the impact of the People's Republic of China (PRC),<sup>1</sup> it should never be forgotten that Taiwan has also played a leading role in the development of China's national identity—sometimes an indispensable one, always one disproportionate to Taiwan's relative size and population.<sup>2</sup> Because the cross-Strait relationship is reciprocal, Taiwan's impact on Chinese national identity has indirectly also helped shape the way Beijing has dealt with Taiwan, thereby indirectly contributing to the evolution of Taiwanese identity. The relationship has been

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1. See for example Chu Yun-han and Lin Chia-lung, 'The construction of Taiwanese identity and cross Strait relations', *Taiwan Security Research* (1998), available at: <http://www.taiwansecurity.org>. (Although I can recommend this piece based on the reputation of the authors, it was unfortunately no longer accessible to me online.) See also the special issue of *Asian Survey* on Taiwan's national identity, vol. XLIV, no. 4, (July/August 2004).

2. China's unfulfilled quest for identity is of paramount importance in stimulating Chinese nationalism, which has become the regime's main legitimating ideology since the collapse of communism as a plausible candidate for international leadership in 1989–1991. And national division, of which Taiwan is the sole remaining exemplar, is of course the missing piece in the nationalist crusade. The Taiwan question has been absolutely central in Chinese foreign policy (although not 'foreign'), particularly Sino-US relations but as a provisory complication in all formal diplomatic relations and in China's membership in international governmental organizations (IGOs).

asymmetric but mutual, as China and Taiwan both share a ‘divided nation syndrome’, meaning that despite their distinct developmental histories, both ‘sides’ of the Strait, competing for the same sovereignty, have been shaped by some of the same watershed events.<sup>3</sup> There were only four nation-states in this category (viz. Germany, Vietnam, Korea, and China), all of which were created or strongly reinforced by the Cold War cleavage, two of which have since resolved their divisions. Unresolved identity splits in the remaining two, North–South Korea and China–Taiwan, remain a source of tension and volatility both to themselves and to the surrounding regional and international environment. The PRC side of this dialectic relationship has seldom been addressed in the scholarly literature, in large part because of the general opacity of the Chinese political process and the specific opacity of the Taiwan issue in particular, which was for the first two decades of CCP rule not a permissible topic for public discussion and is still dealt with by Chinese media only subject to the most intensive monitoring by the CCP authorities.

This paper takes a first look at this important but neglected issue despite the lack of a scholarly archive and the paucity of empirical data, welcoming criticism and further research. The paper consists of three parts. We begin with a reconsideration of the concept of ‘national identity’, and show how Taiwan’s impact on Chinese national identity may be understood in the context of the more general concept with which we emerge. Second, we introduce a rudimentary periodization to analyze the changing impact of Taiwan on Chinese national identity over time. Finally, we summarize and attempt to explore some of the implications of this aspect of the national identity problematique.

### The concept of national identity

The concept of ‘national identity’ was first imported from philosophy into the social sciences to deal with the problem of ‘psycho-social’ identity.<sup>4</sup> Erik H. Erikson, a neo-Freudian political psychologist, first advanced the term to explore the growth of a sense of identity in the course of the human life cycle, and the possible distortions this

3. It might be argued that Taiwan since the early 1990s has given up this quest for Chinese identity in pursuit of its own, Taiwanese national identity. It is true that Taiwan’s identity dilemma has been far more acute than that of the PRC, for while the latter has since 1971 largely succeeded in being recognized by the rest of the world as ‘China’, overcoming Taiwan’s hitherto successful claim to that title, Beijing has expressly forbidden Taiwan from claiming a Taiwanese identity as part of its diplomatic campaign to force unification, so that Taiwan can claim neither Chinese nor Taiwanese identity. Nevertheless, although there is vigorous partisan debate over this issue (Taiwan’s Chinese identity is more readily recognized by the ‘pan-blue’ coalition), the formal status of the island as enshrined in the constitution is that Taiwan remains the sovereign Republic of China, temporarily lacking *de facto* jurisdiction over the mainland provinces.

4. See Erik H. Erikson, ‘Ego development and historical change’, *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 2, (1946), pp. 359–396; Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963); Erik H. Erikson, ‘The problem of ego identity’, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 4, (1956), pp. 56–121; Erik H. Erikson, ‘Identity and the life cycle: selected papers by Erik H. Erikson’, *Psychological Issues* I(1), (1959), pp. 1–171; Erik H. Erikson, *The Challenge of Youth* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor, 1965); Erik H. Erikson, ‘The concept of identity in race relations’, *Daedalus* 95(1), (Winter 1966), pp. 145–171; Erik H. Erikson, ‘Identity, psychosocial’, *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Free Press, 1968), vol. 7, pp. 61–65; Erik H. Erikson, ‘Identity and identity diffusion’, in Chad Gordon and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds, *The Self in Social Interaction* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968), pp. 197–205; Erik H. Erikson, *Dimensions of a New Identity* (New York: Norton, 1974); Erik H. Erikson, *Life History and the Historical Moment* (New York: Norton, 1975); and Erik H. Erikson, *The Life Cycle Completed* (New York: Norton, 1982).

development may undergo (e.g. a negative identity, identity diffusion) in response to various environmental disturbances. In subsequent works, Erikson found evidence of an identity crisis in the lives of nascent political leaders such as Luther, Gorky or Hitler, with formative consequences for their subsequent careers.<sup>5</sup> Such a crisis appears most likely to occur at a specific stage in the life cycle, according to Erikson (viz. early adulthood) when a congeries of pivotal questions tend to converge (regarding one's choice of career, marital status/spouse, political commitment, etc.). Thus Erikson introduced the notion that identity is not fixed but undergoes a process of development over identifiable stages, leading to variable outcomes, some of them pathological.

A 'collective' identity is linked to personal identity not only by analogy, but in the sense that the latter is defined (at least in part) in terms of membership in some collectivity, either ascriptively (e.g. racial/ethnic affiliation, gender) or voluntarily (e.g. falungong membership, an e-mail list serve). Though some have argued that in an age of globalization it has become economically eviscerated, a 'national' identity is the largest and most inclusive form of collective identity that is practically relevant for most people. As such, it is essentially an ascriptive identity (i.e. one cannot 'exit' without penalty, and in some cases has little 'voice'), with which one may however voluntarily identify to a variable degree, as in patriotism/nationalism. The ascriptive dimension of national identity defines membership in terms of boundaries, or arbitrary lines drawn on a map. Identification is political as well as physical, however. Thus there may be tourists, guest workers, even whole ethnic categories (e.g. 'counterrevolutionaries' in Mao's China, slaves in the antebellum south, Jews or Gypsies in the Third Reich) who are excluded even though they are within the nation's physical boundaries.

As one of the most influential and widely adopted conceptualizations of the term, the definition articulated by Lucian Pye and his collaborators in the Social Science Research Council series on comparative politics was for many years authoritative but deserves further scrutiny. According to this definition, the answer to the national identity riddle has to do essentially with criteria for national inclusion, and there are hence four 'fundamental forms' of national identity crisis, based on conflicts concerning territory, class, ethnicity/nationality, and historical/cultural inclusion criteria.<sup>6</sup> This definition offers a number of advantages: it is relatively coherent, easy to operationalize, and applicable to a wide variety of interesting cases. The problem of discrepant criteria for national inclusion (e.g. territorial vs. ethnic) is indeed a frequent cause of identity confusion or conflict (China, for one, which has boundaries with more states than any other Asian country, has had territorial disputes with nearly every one of them).<sup>7</sup> The issue of whom to include typically arises early in the

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5. Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: Norton, 1958); Erik H. Erikson, 'The legend of Hitler's childhood', in *Childhood and Society*, pp. 326–359; Erik H. Erikson, *Gandhi's Truth* (New York: Norton, 1969), *inter alia*.

6. Lucian Pye, 'Identity and the political culture', in Leonard Binder *et al.*, eds, *Crises and Sequences of Political Development* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 101–135.

7. Ernest Gellner estimates that there are at least 800 irredentist movements in the contemporary world. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 44–45. One major empirical survey found that nationalist and ethnic conflict accounted for about 70% of 160 disputes with a significant probability of resulting in large-scale violence. Steven Rosen, ed., *A Survey of World Conflicts* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Center for International Studies, March 1969).

developmental sequence, because identifying membership in the national domain is preliminary to persuading a citizenry to pay taxes, serve in the armed forces, and otherwise contribute to nation-building. Certainly it is applicable to the divided states, in which case the arbitrary exclusion of a sizable portion of the territorial domain and population remains a highly visible symbol of a national identity crisis.

Yet there are problems with defining national identity purely in terms of inclusion. If discrepancies in criteria for inclusion are what generate identity crises, then those nations with few or no such discrepancies might be supposed to have relatively 'secure' national identities. But in the contemporary international system, such a consistently defined nation-state is a *rara avis*. Walker Connor found in a survey of 132 countries extant in 1971 that only 12 (9.1%) had mutually consistent criteria of inclusion, while a majority (53%) had very large national or ethnic minority populations.<sup>8</sup> In most parts of the world, linguistic communities are either too small (as in Tropical Africa) or too large (as in Latin America and the Middle East) to coincide with national boundaries; in only two dozen or so countries do linguistic and national boundaries coincide. In half the countries of the world less than 70% speak the same language.<sup>9</sup> If inclusion criteria were necessary and sufficient criteria of national identity, we would have to conclude that Switzerland, Belgium, India, and Canada are afflicted by insuperable identity crises, which has not been the case (though nearly all have experienced cleavages along these lines). Taken as a category, the divided nations were rent not by any of the four SSRC inclusion criteria but by arbitrary political diktat, yet not all of them have chosen to reunite since the end of the Cold War that had kept them apart—take, for example, the case of Taiwan. On the other hand, other nations previously held together by Cold War exigencies—Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union—have since opted to split, largely along ethno-linguistic lines, seemingly without leaving any irremediable scars on the national psyches of their separate successor states.

One problem with the SSRC conceptualization is that it is an *analytical* definition, which defines the whole in terms of its parts. But in ordinary language, if asked 'Who are you?' people do not usually respond with a chemical breakdown of their bodies. People identify themselves as Swiss, or Belgians, or Indonesians, not because they all speak the same language (for they do not), nor because they have the same ethnic background (for they do not). To take an example that hits closer to home, a number of researchers have found that since the early 1990s, an increasing percentage of people in Taiwan identify themselves as 'Taiwanese' and a proportionately diminishing proportion identify themselves as 'Chinese', pointing to this as an indicator of a growing sense of Taiwanese national identity.<sup>10</sup> But

8. Another 50 (37.9%) did, however, have a majority ethnic group comprising more than 75% of the population. Of the remaining 70 states, 31 (23.5%) had a majority ethnic group accounting for 50–75% of the population, while in 39 (29.5%), the largest single ethnic community formed less than half the total population. Walker Connor, 'A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group, is a . . .', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* I, (1978), pp. 377–400.

9. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 44; Dankwart Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 22.

10. Thus poll data for 1991 indicate that only 19% identified themselves as 'Taiwanese', whereas 22% identified themselves as 'Chinese', and 50% identified themselves as 'both'; by 2000, the figures were 50% 'Taiwanese', 9% 'Chinese', and 39% 'both'; two years later the corresponding figures were 52%, 21%, and 19%. Poll data for 1991 and 2000 are from the National Chengchi University's Election Research Center; data for 2002 are from a survey taken by the DPP and reported in *Taipei Times*, (22 August 2002).

'national identity' is not a fixed attribute but the result of a process of *identification*, the substantive outcome of which varies over time. 'Identification' is a transitive verb that posits something to identify with, and so to break down the polity into such categories begs the question of why some identify themselves this way and some that. Even if we find (as we have found) a statistically significant correlation between those who identify themselves as 'Taiwanese' and members of the subethnic group referred to as 'native Taiwanese' [*benshengren*], and a corresponding correlation between those who identify themselves as 'Chinese' and *waishengren*, this does not altogether solve our problem.<sup>11</sup> For whereas *benshengren* and *waishengren* are ascriptive categories that change only gradually based on demographic variables, self-identification as 'Chinese', 'Taiwanese', or 'both' changes more rapidly, and voting patterns shift more swiftly still. To take another example, the United States has a two-party system that tends to become highly polarized during national elections, almost to the extent that a man from Mars might think, 'There are Democrats and Republicans here but no Americans'. But that of course would be incorrect.

In short, an analytical definition is not wrong but insufficient, and should be supplemented by a *synthetic* definition, which refers to characteristics of the *whole* and 'the relation of the thing the word means to other things'.<sup>12</sup> When we ask, 'What is Japan's national identity?' we want to hear more than the tautology that Japan is a place ruled by the Japanese government where some 130 million Japanese people are concentrated, but why they live there and why they identify themselves with a common government and national destiny. What is the object of identification (identificand)? There are several identificands in the transitive process of national identity formation. One is the national historical legacy, including consensual interpretations of certain problematic phases in a nation's development when the basic issues of national purpose were raised and decisively resolved in some way. This legacy is normally incorporated into a set of symbols (referred to in Japan as the *kokutai*, or national essence, later translated into Chinese as the *guocui*) representing the principles and values on which the group was founded (including flag, anthem, canonical documents, etc.) and on the basis of which its citizens have contracted to live together.<sup>13</sup> Children learn to define themselves through identification with these symbols, while at the same time projecting their own aspirations and fantasies into them. Once firmly established, a national identity may be expected to provide the state with a sense of legitimacy and security, hence making its behavior more predictable. But if the historical legacy and *guocui* appear to become relatively fixed early in a nation's development, that is in fact not the case—the essence is never fixed but subject to recurrent reinterpretation. Such reinterpretations are typically inspired by major lurches in the state's ongoing role performance, in relation to significant other states in its international environment (its 'reference groups') as well as in relation to its own citizenry.

11. Robert M. Marsh, 'Taiwan's future national identity: attitudes and geopolitical constraints', *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, (August–November 2000), p. 299 ff.

12. Richard Robinson, *Definitions* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950).

13. For a study of this dimension in terms of Bourdieu's theory of symbolic capital, see Thomas Gold, 'Identity and symbolic power in Taiwan', in Gang Lin, ed., 'The evolution of a Taiwanese national identity', *Asia Program Special Report* no. 114, (August 2003), pp. 11–17.

The identity of a divided nation comprises elements of both irredentism and civil war. As in an irredenta, a segment of the population that would normally have been included on ethno-national grounds has been left outside the territorial boundaries. As in a civil war, the excluded group is deemed central rather than peripheral to the nation's identity. Thus a divided nation finds itself in an acute, prolonged national identity crisis. The reason for the long-standing irresolution of this crisis situation is that the division coincided with, and was reinforced by, the Cold War cleavage between the two superpowers, neither of which would allow the crisis to be resolved in favor of the opposing superpower. Thus the collapse of the communist bloc and the end of the Cold War undermined the rationale for the split and revitalized a sense of nationalism. In the case of the divided nations nationalism was more ambiguous than in racially homogeneous systems, resulting in both separatist impulses and a drive for reunification. Moreover, due to the arbitrary, structurally imposed nature of its division, a divided nation is typically oppressed by a sense of having an arbitrarily truncated and incomplete national identity (a national 'castration complex', or in the Chinese case a sense of 'national humiliation', or *guochi*). Because the end of the Cold War removed the structural framework that had for nearly half a century reinforced the separation of the alienated member, Taiwan soon became the target of highly ambivalent nationalist feelings. To be specific, Taiwan played three roles in the rise of Chinese nationalism: first, of course, as desired object of appropriation; second, as *Doppelgänger*, fantasized or 'shadow' self-image; and third, as rival and suspected betrayer.

### **Taiwan's role in China's identity construction**

The Chinese relationship to Taiwan in its own identity construction may be divided chronologically into roughly four phases: an initial period before World War II during which Taiwan was essentially peripheral to Chinese identity; the period of high Cold War in the 1950s through to the 1970s, when Taiwan was conceived in socialist terms as an unliberated semi-colony of Japan and the United States; a third period of 'new deals' for an integrated national identity during the era of Deng Xiaoping and Lee Teng-hui in the 1980s and early 1990s; and a final period of consolidation around competing nationalist identities, from the late 1990s to the present.

Although Taiwan was forcibly separated from China and ceded to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki concluding the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, it was never a high profile irredenta during the first half of the twentieth century, as the mainland was preoccupied by other, far graver threats to national unity (among them, whether Japan would seize control of the country, and whether China would be Nationalist or Communist) and was in any case unable to contest Japanese occupation of the island. Not until the Cairo Declaration in December 1943 was China's claim to the island given unequivocal international sanction. Though Nationalist China never forfeited China's claim to the island, Mao, in a famous 1936 conversation with Edgar Snow, put Taiwan in the same category with Korea as a possible recipient of CCP aid in its struggle for independence.

The CCP position changed promptly upon its accession to national power, mostly because the CCP's defeated opponent in the Chinese revolution took refuge there and proceeded to regain strength. Throughout the Maoist period, PRC Taiwan policy remained one of 'liberation', in which periods emphasizing 'peaceful liberation' alternated with brief forays of 'armed liberation', consisting of artillery duels and naval forays that seemed at the time to be preparatory to an invasion. So far as I have been able to detect, the Chinese people had access to essentially no information about developments in Taiwan during this period, aside from the fact that it was still separate and still successfully resisting the CCP regime. The regime provoked major confrontations in 1954–1955 and again in 1958, both political 'high tides' coinciding with mass mobilization for domestic purposes. Both confrontations prompted US intervention on Taiwan's behalf, subsiding after the crisis was over to intermittent artillery and propaganda bombardments. The domestic impact of the Maoist Taiwan policy was to keep alive the sense of Chinese nationalism otherwise ideologically banned from Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Although the 'liberation' drive was cloaked in socialist terminology, there was obviously something different about the liberation of 'our Taiwanese compatriots' [*tongbao*] from the liberation of other Third World countries.

The ironic impact of the standoff on Taiwan was to reinforce the KMT regime's national identity as 'China', both domestically and in international forums. As the PRC attempted to absolve itself of tradition, launching the Cultural Revolution in 1966 to eradicate Confucianism and all other traces of Chinese culture, the ROC avidly embraced it, celebrating the birth of Confucius and other traditional Chinese rituals, focusing almost exclusively on Chinese history and literature in the schools (making Sun Yat-sen's *Three People's Principles* a *vade mecum*), and enforcing the use of Mandarin Chinese as a lingua franca. The political system remained frozen, continuing to represent all mainland provinces (including Outer Mongolia) in the National Assembly and legislative *yuan*. In the international arena Taiwan monopolized the representation of 'China' on the Security Council and all other United Nations organs, derogating the PRC as an outlaw insurgency and elevating 'bandit suppression' and 'recovery of the mainland' to the top of its foreign policy agenda.

The serious study of Taiwan as a relatively open area for academic inquiry began with the launching of 'reform and opening to the outside world' at the famous 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978. The normalization of relations with the US in December 1979 seemed to have removed a major strategic barrier to recovery of the island, and Beijing in rapid fire launched a plan for 'peaceful reunification' beginning with 'three direct links' and culminating in 'one country, two systems'. Deng Xiaoping (in 1983) made Taiwan's recovery one of the PRC's major tasks for the 1980s: 'Under no circumstances will we allow any foreign country to intervene'.<sup>14</sup> A 'Leading Group on Taiwan Policy' was established at the highest Party level, as well as a State Council Taiwan Office [*Guowuyuan Taiwan Shiwu Bangongshi*] and a Central Committee Taiwan Office [*Zhonggong Zhongyang*]

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14. Deng Xiaoping, as quoted in Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 15.

*Taiwan Shiwu Bangongshi*], both of which included attached research staffs. Taiwan research centers were also established in the quasi-open, specialized research institutes that sprouted up in the capital, typically sponsored by various military and intelligence agencies.<sup>15</sup> In these, scholars were permitted to publish sanitized versions of the reports they submitted to the black hole known as the ‘center’.

Whereas during the Maoist era Taiwan had been the exclusive preserve of *zhengqing fenxi* (i.e. confidential [*neibu*] intelligence analysis on behalf of the State, Party and PLA leadership),<sup>16</sup> now the relatively open, scholarly investigation of Taiwan politics could begin. The Xiangshan Conference on ‘The Future of Taiwan’, in August 1983 laid the cornerstone for an academic approach to Taiwan studies. After 1983, the emphasis began to shift from intelligence analysis to a more theoretical perspective incorporating social science research methodologies (mainly structural developmental *qua* Marxist), as carried out in major universities and think tanks. In some leading universities, a special research subsection [*jiaoyanshi*] for Taiwan studies was set up within the law faculty, political science or international politics department (which typically subsumed political science), and the research conducted in these programs could be published openly in university journals [*xuebao*] or in specialized Taiwan research journals (e.g. *Liang'an Guanxi*, *Taiwan Yanjiu*, *Taiwan Yanjiu Luntan*, *Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan*). Major conferences were also held by the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s Taiwan Research Institute in 1988 and by the Taiwan Research Association in 24–27 April 1990, which convened a total of 120 scholars from all parts of China to its first annual meeting, ‘Taiwan during its Transformation’.<sup>17</sup> In the same month, another meeting was held, sponsored by the *Taiwan Tongbao Lianyihui* [Taiwan Compatriots’ Communication Association] and People’s University’s *Taiwan Falu Yanjiusuo* [Taiwan Law Research Institute], which included mainland and Taiwan law professors (i.e. Chinese citizens of Taiwan origin) to discuss the development of legal institutions in Taiwan, specifically the applicability of Taiwan law on the mainland (e.g. the problem of the inheritance law, for mainland family members who wished to inherit money from Taiwan relatives).<sup>18</sup> Such meetings brought together interested scholars from both government think tanks and university research units (usually under the patronage of the former), giving a stimulus to scholarly collaboration and further research.

15. Among the most important of these are the *Taiwan Yanjiu Suo* set up at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1984, and the *Quanguo Taiwan Yanjiu Hui*, founded in Beijing in 1988 coordinating provincial associations in Fujian, Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang, and Jiangsu, now closely linked to the Association for Relations Across The Strait (ARATS). The associations are supported by the PLA, whereas the CSSA’s institute is supported by the PSB—as is the Taiwan section of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations; the *Hoping yu Fazhan Yanjiu Hui* (Center for Peace and Development Studies) also has a Taiwan institute, supported by the Guoji Youhao Lianluo Hui. There are important academic Taiwan Research Institutes at Xiamen University, Nanking University, Nankai University, Peking University, People’s University, *et al.* See Xiao Jin, ‘Dalu de Taiwan Yanjiu Xianchuang yu Tedian’ [‘The mainland’s Taiwan studies: present situation and special characteristics’], *Taiwan Yanjiu* (Beijing), (March 1994), pp. 9–11.

16. See author’s preface, in Jiang Nanyang, *Taiwan Zhengzhi Zhuanxin zhi Mi* [*The Mystery of the Transformation of Taiwan’s Politics*] (Beijing: Wenjin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 2.

17. See Jiang Dianming, ed., *Zhuanxingqi de Taiwan* [*Taiwan in Transformation*] (Zhengzhou: Henan Renmin Chubanshe, 1990).

18. An article on this conference was published in *Tai Sheng* [Taiwan province] in July 1990.



Taiwan also for the first time became fair game for China's mass media, albeit still very tightly controlled. On the one hand it can be ascertained that discussion of Taiwanese developments in the flagship Party newspaper, *Renmin Ribao* (hereinafter *RR*) has, since the early 1980s, become increasingly informative and detailed.<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, a survey of other media did not detect a single deviation or new departure from what had already been published in *RR*, suggesting a return to the old lockstep pattern of marching behind the official pacemaker, at least on this still very sensitive issue.<sup>20</sup>

Still it is fair to claim that the amount of empirical information available to the lay and educated public has increased. Thus attentive readers of the flagship media are in a position to know that democratic elections have been introduced since the late 1980s on an island-wide scale and that Taiwan now has a competitive multiparty system, publicly responsible legislative organs and a plebiscitary presidency. Thus for example there was a quite detailed account of the prefectural elections held within Taiwan Province in January 1990,<sup>21</sup> and another insightful account of county, municipal and district elections conducted from the end of 1998 to March 1994.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, with the exception of such periods as the 1995–1996 Strait Crisis, Taiwan has had a relatively low profile in the popular media—most of the stories that appear are relatively brief, and no breaking stories at all appeared in 1992 or 1997, only one in 1993. Finally, in contrast to the generally upbeat tenor of the Chinese media with regard to domestic development, Taiwan stories tend to be adversely biased. Democratization is rarely discussed except in the context of an alleged deterioration of public order and the spread of a 'strange political culture' of violence, local factionalism, and the *hei-jin-huang* phenomenon.<sup>23</sup>

Assiduous readers of the publicly available academic research literature on Taiwan can thus emerge with a comprehensive (if biased) picture of postwar political developments and the structural evolution of the economy in the course of modernization. The political economy is seen to have evolved from bureaucratic or state capitalism [*guanliao ziben*, *guoying ziben*], in which the economy was controlled by mainlander [*waishengren*] family cliques (viz. the 'four families' first attacked in the 1940s by Chen Boda) to a more mobile economy controlled by a coalition of folk capitalists [*minying ziben*, *minzu ziben*] and foreign capital [*waiguo ziben*]. The former were former indigenous [*benshengren*] landlords, who after land reform sold their land and became entrepreneurs; the latter included Taiwan's growing professional and business middle class, who became employees of Taiwan's foreign invested sector, whose dependent growth was encouraged by the regime for political reasons. As they grew in strength, both acquired political representation: the

19. Based on author's content analysis of *RR* during the 1989–1999 period.

20. I made a preliminary survey of two sources that might have been expected to express an independent editorial policy—*Jiefang Junbao* [*People's Liberation Army Daily*], to get the military perspective, and *Nanfang Zhoukan* [*Southern Weekly*], a relatively liberal weekly southern tabloid. Neither seemed to contain any news not first carried in *Renmin Ribao*.

21. *RR*, (24 January 1990).

22. *RR*, (12 March 1996).

23. In the color symbolism characteristic of Taiwan politics, *hei* [black] refers to criminal connections, *jin* [gold] refers to money (as in the use of money to buy votes), and *huang* [yellow] to sex scandals. For example, cf. *RR*, (27 September 1989; 30 November 1989; 24 January 1990; 12 March 1996; *et al.*).

former through local elites [*difang jingying*], the latter among the cream of the third generation of Taiwanese who, while acquiring Western higher education absorbed Western values diverging from traditional Chinese views—thus they arrived at progressive views regarding unification, often supported democratization and called upon the KMT to eliminate special privileges [*techuan*] and relax political controls.<sup>24</sup>

Under strong external pressure in the wake of the (unrelated) murders of Aquino in the Philippines and Henry Liu in California, Chiang Ching-kuo, who in March 1972 became chair of the Administrative Yuan, responded with emergency reforms [*Gexin bao Tai, zai Tai shengen*], including replacement of the dying members of the so-called organs of public opinion, or *minyì daibiao jigou*—the National Assembly, legislative yuan and inspection yuan—via *zeng'ò xuanju* elections; and Taiwanization, or localization [*bentuhua*]—i.e. introducing indigenous Taiwanese into the KMT power structure (e.g. Lee Teng-hui, Lin Yang-kang, Wu Po-hsiung).<sup>25</sup> This combination of reforms unleashed the formation of the *dangwai*, which in a series of *zeng'ò* elections in 1977, 1979, 1983, and 1986, made steady gains, capturing many local governmental positions and seats in the legislative yuan. Chiang died on 13 January 1988, to be succeeded by Taiwan native Lee Teng-hui, to the pleasant surprise of PRC observers. In May 1988 Lee announced inauguration of what would be four rounds of constitutional reform [*xianzheng gaige*] in 1990–1997, the most significant results of which included the 1994 provision for direct election of the president (the first such election then being carried out in March 1996), and the *dongsheng* or ‘freezing’ (making non-electoral) of the governor and provincial assembly of Taiwan province. The overall impact through the 1990s has been a growing localization [*bentuhua*] of political authority, as the mainstream group defending localization defeated and purged the leadership of the non-mainstream group within the KMT (leading to the formation of the New Party in 1993). The DPP meanwhile made steady electoral gains, winning the Taipei mayoralty at the end of 1994, and by the end of 1997, in the county mayoral elections, the DPP for the first time got more votes than the KMT, winning 12 of Taiwan’s 23 mayoralties.<sup>26</sup> Localization and the growth of the DPP strengthened the pressure for ‘two Chinas’, as expressed in the formula ‘one China, two equal political entities’; the authorities hence also introduced pragmatic diplomacy [*wushi waijiao*] to purchase foreign friends and to rejoin the UN.

Thus the Chinese understanding of political developments in Taiwan, despite years of neglect and ideological reductionism during the Maoist era, no longer lacks a reasonably accurate empirical base, at least in the specialist literature. Only two features of this specialist literature in my judgment exhibited a detectable bias. The

24. Li Shuiwang, ‘Zhan hou Taiwan Jingji bian qian Jiqi dui Xuanju de Yingxiang’ [‘Social and economic changes in post-war Taiwan and their impact on elections’], in Taiwan Research Institute, CSSA, ed., *Taiwan Yanjiu Wenji* [Collected Works on Taiwan] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1988), pp. 72–83.

25. On localization, see Cao Hui, ‘Kuomintang bentuhua zhengce de xingcheng yu fazhan’ [‘The implementation and development of the KMT’s localization policy’], in Taiwan Yanjiusuo, ed., *Zhuanxing qi de Taiwan Zhengzhi yu Lianqian Guanxi* [The Politics of Taiwan’s Transformation and Cross-Strait Relations] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 38–49.

26. Li Jiaquan, ‘Cong Xianshizhang Xuanju Kan Taiwan Zhengdang Taishi’ [‘Looking at relations among Taiwan parties from the recent county mayorality elections’], *Taiwan Yanjiu Luntan* [Taiwan Research Forum] no. 1, (1998); see also Zhang Wensheng, ‘1997 Taiwan Xianshizhang Xuanju Pingxi’ [‘A critical analysis of 1997 Taiwan mayorality elections’], *Taiwan Yanjiu Jikan* [Taiwan Research Compilation] no. 1, (1998).

first was in estimates of the relative strength of the various political forces in play on the island, which seems to have been affected by wish-fulfillment needs. Thus the strength and prospects of the Democratic Progressive Party have consistently tended to be underestimated, for example, and that of the New Party overestimated (the relatively pro-unification stance of the pan-blue coalition is also far too optimistically interpreted). Second, the assessment of the efficacy of Beijing's policy toward the island is conducted through rose-tinted glasses. For example, the consensus among both written documents and informed interviewees (who tended to be more candid) was that the 1995–1996 campaign of missile shots and cross-Strait war games was politically successful, an estimate that differs from that of most informed outside observers. And the official assessment of Zhu Rongji's election-eve warning to the Taiwanese electorate not to make a wrong choice is that it was successful in intimidating some Chen Shui-bian supporters and suppressing his vote total. If this assessment is mistaken (as I believe to be the case), the CCP's intellectual feedback loop for reality-testing may not function very well. But both of these biases involve inherently ambiguous areas involving subjective judgment.

In the construction of China's national identity, far more important than the factual base is the meaningful framework in which this is placed, which provides the reader with clues to interpret the political action implications of the empirical narrative. The image of Taiwan has been dominated by three role projections: that of the alienated object of appropriation; that of the *Doppelgänger* or shadow self; and that of the traitor or nemesis. The image of the alienated object of appropriation is implicit throughout the PRC literature: Taiwan is *ours*, how outrageous that any Taiwanese could think otherwise! Although Taiwan has not actually been under Chinese jurisdiction for well over a century (with the brief exception of Nationalist Chinese occupation in 1945–1949), the government refers to its lost province as if divestiture took place only recently. The action implication is that the island must be recovered as soon as possible, by force if necessary. The *Doppelgänger* or alter ego role is more complex: in psychology and drama the *Doppelgänger* is an ever-present shadow of the self, a functional complement or offsetting counterpart—Hyde to Jekyll, Watson to Holmes, Caliban to Prospero, yin to yang. As in Turner's conception of the function of the raw frontier complementing the forces of civilization in American history, the other 'half' of a divided nation tends to be perceived as an alienated but complementary member of the in-group, and as such a basket for projected wishes for collective self-fulfillment. The action implication is to take pride in Taiwan's achievement as an achievement of the Chinese people and to avoid violence if at all possible and achieve a peaceful synthesis of the two selves. Taiwan's potential for national betrayal refers obviously to the risk that the island will declare independence, becoming permanently alienated from the self. The action implication of this image is to call forth rage and an urge to destruction.

Since the Cold War, when the Taiwan issue became more salient for reasons adduced above, the mainland's projection of Taiwan's image has taken two different forms, divided by the 1995–1996 crisis.

In the early 1990s, Taiwan was for many mainland analysts China's 'good double', in which they could discern many familiar Chinese developmental dilemmas more benignly resolved. Instead of violent revolution, they saw peaceful transformation

proceeding in accord with Marxist stage theory [*jieduanxingde zhuanxing*].<sup>27</sup> Taiwan's politically motivated opening to the United States was viewed in essentially positive terms, as a source of technology transfer and an opening to new political ideas. Thus it is noted that the student protest movement on behalf of the return of Diaoyu Island from Japan to 'China' [*Bao Diao Yundong*] originated among university students in the US, who brought the movement back home upon graduation, transforming it into a call for Nationalist reform.<sup>28</sup> PRC construals of Taiwan's movement for constitutional reform and 'democratization' (usually kept between inverted commas) are by no means univocal, but they are detailed (*vide supra*) and often quite sympathetic. Democratization presents useful opportunities for Beijing, and in any case is at this stage irreversible [*bu ke nizhuan*] in light of the rise of the middle class, pressure from the US, and the rise of Taiwanese elites. Under these circumstances Beijing should put its faith in the Taiwan people, utilize increasing contact and communication to induce the people to put pressure on their authorities to rescind the Three No's and approve the *santong siliu*. Although democratization is bourgeois, with many negative side-effects, compared to KMT totalitarianism (*sic*) it represents progress, and we should acknowledge that progress in order to win over the Taiwan people: 'Together, let us build a better democracy than you have now'. Thurston reports that scholarly accounts of Taiwan's experience in the early stages of its democratization were appreciatively analyzed by officials in the State Council's Ministry of Civil Affairs in charge of organizing village elections in China.<sup>29</sup> At the same time, successful PRC reform policies in the construction of socialist democracy and the rule of law should be more effectively publicized to the Taiwan people in order to overcome their suspicion of mainland politics and win their understanding and support (e.g. PRC relatives of Taiwan people should be educated to become propagandists of CCP reform policies, and advised not to constantly complain to their relatives about how backward the PRC is in the context of pleas for financial support). Beijing should open contact with all political forces in Taiwan; the DPP may favor Taiwan independence, but it does represent a political constituency, and they have made real contributions to Taiwan democratization—we should thus form a united front with the moderate contingent of the DPP against the radical faction.<sup>30</sup>

In the aftermath of the Taiwan Strait crisis, when bilateral negotiations were suspended as the mainland resorted to coercive diplomacy in the wake of Lee Teng-hui's alumna visit to Cornell in June 1995, mainland analysts perceived in Taiwan a 'dark double' threatening to abandon the motherland. From this perspective, democratization was both a threat to PRC interests and inimical to the interests of the Taiwan people to boot. Taking advantage of Beijing's vulnerability in the wake of the Tiananmen incident,

27. For a preassembled digest of this consensus, see the cadre reader [*ganbu duben*], *Zhongguo Taiwan Wenti* [*China's Taiwan Issue*] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Tushu Chubanshe, 1998).

28. Central Taiwan Affairs Office and State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, ed., *Chongguo Taiwan Wenti* [*China's Taiwan Issue*] (Beijing: Jiuzhou Chubanshe, 1998).

29. Anne F. Thurston, *Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots China* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1998), p. 12.

30. Yu Guomin, Wu Xiaoying and Zhang Xiaolong, 'Taiwan "Minzhuhua" Jingcheng dui Liangan Guanxi de Yinxiang ji Wo Yinying Duice' ['The influence of Taiwan's "democratization" on cross-Strait relations and our counterpolicy'], in Jin Yao, Chang Yansheng and Xin Qi, eds, *Jiushi Niandai Taiwan Zhengzhi* [*Taiwan Politics in the 1990s*] (Beijing: Huayi Chubanshe, 1991), pp. 274–284. This article was augmented by interviews.

the Taiwan authorities cleverly shifted from reliance on the military to 'recover the mainland' to a strategy of 'peaceful competition' [*heping jingzheng*], using economic prosperity and political democracy to win the hearts of the Chinese people. Indeed, this strategy was first manifested during the Tiananmen incident itself, into which KMT agents on the mainland subversively insinuated themselves. Taiwan authorities have since allowed their citizens to visit the mainland en masse, encouraging them to brag about Taiwan's prosperity to their relatives or even to give speeches in public forums; more recently, the authorities have also permitted mainland elites (e.g. mainland students and scholars studying abroad) to visit the island in order to show off Taiwan's achievements. The 'Taiwan experience' [*Taiwan Jingyan*] has also been extensively propagandized in the international competition for diplomatic recognition. In essence, this strategy constitutes a dangerous attack of capitalism on socialism, encouraging domestic forces to rise up and overthrow the PRC government.<sup>31</sup> Not only is Taiwan democratization a strategic threat, but hopes to utilize it to Beijing's tactical advantage are dismissed as unrealistic (one informant seemed genuinely taken aback by the suggestion that the mainland might cultivate a pro-mainland constituency in Taiwan).

Yet the Chinese analysis of what exactly is *wrong* with Taiwanese democratization displays an interesting ambivalence.<sup>32</sup> One set of criticisms revolves around the discreditable *origins* of democratization. But what then is wrong with these origins? The critique is mixed: on the one hand, democratization is an *alien intrusion*; it is 'Western', associated with capitalist investments, Western developmental aid, and so forth. Thus any talk of the 'Taiwan experience' is bogus.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand democratization is also criticized because of its *autochthonous origins*—Taiwanization/localization allowed the DPP to be registered and thus let a lot of people come to power who had not been socialized in the one-China principle [sc. *benshengren*], resulting in a separatist trend or at best leading to a *bu tong, bu du* [no independence, no unity], *bu zhan, bu he* [no war, no peace] policy paralysis.<sup>34</sup> A second set of criticisms seems to derive from Confucian values, focusing on the fetid moral quality of democratization. Here again, there is ambivalence about the reasons for moral disapproval. On the one hand are those who attack it from a 'liberal' perspective (i.e. democratization is inadequate and incomplete), while on the other hand are those whose critique takes a more 'conservative' (i.e. democratization has run amok) line. From the former perspective, Taiwan democratization is not 'real' but illusory, belying continuing dictatorship. All those within the KMT who support unification—Li Huan, Hao Po-tsun, Lin Yang-kang, Song Chu-yu, Ma Ying-jiou [*sic*]—were purged or pushed to the margins of the KMT.<sup>35</sup> Lee Teng-hui's ruthless

31. Lu Dong, 'Zhuanzhexing de Xin Zhanlue' ['New strategy at a turning point'], in *Zhuanxingqi de Taiwan Zhengzhi yu Liangan Guanxi*, pp. 184–203.

32. To say that they are ambivalent or even mutually contradictory is not necessarily to say that they are empirically inaccurate, of course.

33. Cao Hui, 'Xi Guomindang Dangju Dui Xiao de "Taiwan Jingyan"' ['Analysis of the Taiwan authorities' use of the "Taiwan experience"], in Jiang Dianming, ed., *Zhuanxingqi de Taiwan*, pp. 401–405.

34. Li Bosun, 'Taiwan Dangju de Fenlizhuyi Qingxiao ji dui Liangan Guanxi de Yingxiang' ['The separatist trend of the Taiwan authorities and its influence on cross-Strait relations'], in Chang Yansheng and Xin Qi, *Zhuanxingqi de Taiwan Zhengzhi*, pp. 162–171.

35. Li Bosun, 'Taiwan Dangju de Fenlizhuyi', pp. 162–171; Li Shuiwang, 'Guanyu Haiwai "Tong Yun" de Lishi Pingjia' ['Regarding the historical critique of overseas comrades'], in Taiwan Research Institute, ed., *Taiwan Yanjiu Wenji* [*Taiwan Collected Works*] (Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe, 1988).

consolidation of power has led to a ‘superpresidency’, or even ‘tyranny’, violating constitutional checks and balances. From the conservative perspective, in contrast, democratization is terrifyingly real, leading as it does to moral disintegration and chaos: *hei-jin-huang*, gangsters and businessmen buying votes to gain seats in the legislative *yuan* in order to pass purely self-interested legislation, voters selling their votes for up to 5,000 NT. Democratization has led to a degradation of morality into commercialism and consumerism—less than 0.05% of the Taiwan budget is allocated to cultural construction, the obsession with money-making techniques has engulfed Taiwan’s educational curriculum, there has been a dissolution of family values and an upsurge of every type of social problem: prostitution, juvenile delinquency, labor–capital conflict, environmental pollution, generational conflict, gambling, economic inequality, a frenzy with playing the stock market.<sup>36</sup> This literature abounds with scandalous anecdotes of electoral corruption: a campaign for the National Assembly requires 100 million NT, a run for the legislative *yuan* costs 200–300 million NT. From 1994 to 1997, 578 KMT members were found guilty of electoral corruption and bribery; between 1996 and 1997, 32 representatives in the organs of public opinion were found to have ‘black’ [*hei*] backgrounds, etc.<sup>37</sup> I refer to this rhetoric as ‘conservative’ in that it bespeaks profound reservations about modernization, even though it echoes Marxist critiques of capitalism going all the way back to the *Communist Manifesto*. (Indeed, it may be an implicit critique of analogous trends that have been known to surface amid the marketization of the mainland’s political economy—including the corruption of village elections.)<sup>38</sup>

## Conclusions

Based on a redefinition of how national identity is formed, we have attempted in this paper to examine the impact of Taiwan on China’s construction of national identity. We hold that China–Taiwan should still be viewed as a divided nation, sharing a common tradition and cultural legacy. This shared legacy may be questioned in the light of disparate national experiences since the Treaty of Shimonoseki as well as constructivist theories of national memory remolding<sup>39</sup>—and certainly it must be conceded that the two states have had a long history of separate and distinct national experiences, and that the political leadership in Taiwan seems recently to have embarked upon a self-conscious effort to recover and amplify upon this distinct cultural heritage.<sup>40</sup> Nonetheless, for some 30 years the two states were unusual even among divided nations in their uncompromising insistence on ‘one China’, as each tried to achieve that unity. Since Beijing’s entry into the UN and subsequent recognition by the US and most other major powers, the PRC seems to have essentially won the war to be recognized as

36. Zhuang Yiren, ‘Taiwan “Zhuanxingqi” Shehui Wenti Poxi’ [‘Analysis of social problems in Taiwan’s transformation’], in Jiang Dianming, *Zhuanxingqi de Taiwan*, pp. 305–314.

37. Li Shuiwang, ‘Guanyu Haiwai “Tong Yun”’; also *Zhongguo Taiwan Wenti* (1998), *passim*.

38. See Thurston, *Muddling toward Democracy*.

39. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991); and Benedict Anderson, *Long-distance Nationalism: World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics* (Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, University of California, 1992).

40. See Daniel C. Lynch, ‘Taiwan’s self-conscious nation-building project’, *Asian Survey* XLIV(4), (July–August 2004), pp. 513–533.

'China'. So now, after some 36 years of attempting to root out all traces of traditional culture in favor of a more radical outlook consistent with the communist revolution, Beijing has become the champion of Chinese values at home and abroad (e.g. constructing Confucius Institutes worldwide to teach Mandarin), while Taiwan searches for its roots in the small island it now occupies. To some extent it may be said that both nations have been swept up in the nationalist fervor that accompanied the collapse of the communist bloc and post-Cold War globalism, and that although China's nationalism remains insistently inclusive while the upsurge of Taiwanese nationalism has become more exclusive, these twin nationalisms have tended to drive the two nations apart. Yet there are also countervailing centripetal tendencies at work constraining the two to continue to share the same divided identity. Even today, Taipei in the international arena seeks recognition from other countries, membership in the UN and other IGOs, as the sovereign Republic of *China*, modifying that designation only under duress from Beijing. The Constitution and national flag (which Chen Shuibian has promised not to change) are also those of the ROC.

In any event this paper is exclusively concerned with the role of Taiwan in China's quest for national identity. China has consistently viewed Taiwan as a missing piece to be appropriated in order that China's identity might be fully realized. For the first three decades of the PRC's existence Taiwan was viewed exclusively from the perspective of China's identity needs without much interest in Taiwan's internal development. With the advent of reform and opening, Deng raised resolution of the Taiwan issue to top priority, while introducing a new deal with several positive incentives that would make voluntary reunification a more attractive option for the Taiwanese people. In order to facilitate the voluntary integration of the two based on the 'one country, two systems' formula, Beijing also began very circumspectly to encourage the understanding of Taiwan. In this context a fairly detailed and comprehensive knowledge base has been assembled, publicly accessible within the specialist community. Though this detailed understanding of Taiwan has not been widely disseminated, even the 'broad masses' have received a fairly accurate (if cursory and tendentious) picture of recent political and economic trends on the island.

This increasingly complex empirical picture is placed within a meaningful framework that conceives Taiwan in terms of three political images. First, it is lost or stolen property, a standing reminder of China's national humiliation [*guochi*] at the hands of imperialism. Second, Taiwan is the national self that might have been, a people who skipped the revolution and achieved a head start in economic development, becoming richer and more advanced than mainland Chinese, hence valued economic investors and joint venture partners, resented but at the same time envied for their democratic emancipation. Third, Taiwan is the national nemesis, a standing risk of betrayal via independence, with a possible domino effect on other peripheral territories, hence worse even than non-Chinese enemies. These three dominant images of Taiwan have diverging political action implications: (1) Taiwan should be recovered as rapidly as possible and in any way necessary, in order to restore China's lost property and efface its humiliation; (2) Taiwan is a model of a different, non-revolutionary China, a rightward turn in the national historical narrative to be learned from, to some extent even admired; and (3) Taiwan is a traitor, heedless of collective norms in its selfish pursuit of freedom and higher living

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standards, for which it must be destroyed (the only country in the world for whom Beijing retains the right to first use of nuclear weapons) or at least severely punished. China's vision of Taiwan is ambivalent not only because of the different action implications of these political images, but due to very mixed feelings about processes already visible in the post-Mao PRC. Clearly the most challenging of these processes is that of democratization, which evokes very confused and frightening imagery. Upon the collapse of Maoist ideological certitudes, Chinese modernization went from stone to stone to cross the river, with no clear view of the other side.

As a long lost component of China's national identity, could Taiwan represent the future? Do the processes of economic modernization and political reform really represent progress, or cultural decomposition? In their discussions of Taiwan, both prospects can be explored with somewhat more freedom than in discussions of the future of socialism with Chinese characteristics.



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