REVOLUTION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE BUREAUCRACY

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In an uncharacteristic departure from "value-freedom," Weber (1968: 1381 ff.) once dolefully projected the seemingly inexorable trends toward rationalization, secularization, and functional specialization to a point at which modern man would be trapped in a bureaucratic "iron cage" of his own alienated objectifications. Socialization of the means of production, he predicted, would only exacerbate this tendency by subsuming the economic as well as the political subsystems beneath the central administrative apparatus–a prophecy that seemed amply borne out by the subsequent experience of the Soviet Union.[1] As the most dramatic and determined attempt to challenge the inevitablity of this forecast, China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) deserves the serious attention of every student of comparative bureaucracy.

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The following essay consists of three parts. First, in order to establish a basis for evaluating Chinese administrative reforms, the Maoist critique of bureaucracy will be examined as it emerged in the decade preceding the GPCR. This examination will be brief, for this period has been competently analyzed elsewhere (Neuhauser, 1969; Ahn, 1973); a lucid restatement of the Maoist critique is nonetheless necessary to ensure that our evaluation of post-GPCR reforms rests on subjectively meaningful criteria. The second section consists of an attempt to judge the validity of the Maoist critique of bureaucracy by analyzing the reaction of the Liuist apparatus to the crisis precipitated by the mobilization of the student masses during the GPCR. The third section will examine the post-GPCR reconstruction of China's administrative apparatus, evaluating this new, Maoist system in terms of the values reflexively implied by the GPCR critique of the Liuist system. In addition, an attempt will be made to assess the likely durability of the Maoist reforms in terms of the evolving relationship between the bureaucratic superstructure and its routinizing economic base. Clearly, this will be the most speculative part of the paper.

THE EMERGENT CRITIQUE OF BUREAUCRATIC EMBOURGEOISEMENT

Mao's criticisms of what he calls "bureaucratism" *(kuan-liao-chu-i)* derive from his theory of counterrevolution and he has periodically launched rectification movements to alleviate it, such as the "three-anti" and "five-anti" *(san-fan/wu-fan)* movements launched consecutively in the early 1950s. However, the GPCR differed in at least two respects from previous rectification campaigns: it was launched before achieving elite consensus on criticism targets, with the result that "authorities" were often attacked indiscriminately; and the campaign was not implemented by the regular Party organization, but by extra-Party conflict groups imperfectly coordinated via the mass media (Dittmer, 1973). Evidently, Mao's diagnosis of the causes, symptoms, and appropriate cure of bureaucratism had undergone a considerable change between the time of the early rectification movements and the GPCR. In our attempt to

determine how and why it changed so radically we are limited largely to information from the Chinese press, which tends to appear in greatest amplitude on those occasions when politics in China becomes a matter of public controversy. There were a number of such disputes in the decade preceding the GPCR, three of which we have selected to illustrate the radicalization of Mao's concept of bureaucratism: the Hundred Flowers, the debacle of the Great Leap Forward, and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Without examining any one of them in any detail, we shall seek to cull from each incident its implications with regard to Mao's emerging critique of bureaucratism.

The Hundred Flowers. Mao's first abortive attempt to give the masses a greater voice in their government outside regular channels seems to have been stimulated by the 1956 Hungarian uprising which followed Khruschev's secret denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth CPSU Congress. "If one persists in using the methods of terror in solving internal contradictions, it may lead to transformation of these contradictions into antagonistic contradictions, as happened in Hungary," he warned in his famous speech ("On the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Among the People"). "Certain people," he said, even hoped for this outcome–that "thousands of people would demonstrate in the streets against the People's Government" (Gruson, 1957). To put this spectre to rest, he proposed that the masses be permitted to speak out freely, apparently confident in the wake of recent successes in the collectivization of agriculture and socialization of the means of industrial production that his regime had won widespread legitimacy and that this policy would thus "help us to consolidate our country and develop our culture." Clearly he expected criticism to be directed against the bureaucracy, not at such bulwarks of socialism as the vanguard party or the dictatorship of the proletariat; this is implicit in his prior classification of the anticipated criticisms as "contradictions among the people." In fact, the "people" could thus be used as an extraparliamentary lobby to discipline the bureaucracy, which he seemed to regard a priori as the most likely cause of any conceivable revolt against the revolution.

> In 1956, small numbers of workers or students in certain places went on strike. The immediate cause of these disturbances was the failure to satisfy certain of their demands for material benefits, of which some should and could have been met, while others were out of place or excessive and therefore could not be met for the time being. *But a more important cause was bureaucracy on the part of the leadership.* . . . In the same year, some members of agricultural cooperatives also created disturbances, and *here too the main causes were bureaucracy on the part of the leadership* and lack of educational work among the masses [Fan, 1972: 188; italics added].

In a logical deduction from his initial premises, Mao (quoted in Fan, 1972: 164-165) concluded with regard to the coming movement: "But what to do if this is hampered by bureaucracy, which in turn leads to demonstrations and strikes? Such incidents should be considered as warning signals to sectors of the administration where bureaucracy has made its nest." Given Mao's manifest intention to turn popular grievances against the bureaucracy, it is hardly surprising that the bureaucrats had little trouble containing their enthusiasm. Mao was supported by liberal elements in the Party and by officials responsible for economic affairs who were pushing for a greater role for experts, including Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, and Ch'en I; he was opposed by Liu Shao-ch'i, P'eng Chen, and by members of the middle party bureaucracy (Hsu, 1957; Ch'ien, 1957; in Solomon, 1969). Mobilization was for the most part confined to college students and faculty and members of the "bourgeois democratic parties." Many of their criticisms indeed focused on bureaucratic tendencies, prefiguring later Red Guard themes: "Gross inequality exists in the political treatment of Party members and the masses. . . . Party members enjoy many privileges that make them a race apart," alleged a professor at Wuhan University (in MacFarquhar, 1960: 92) An NCNA correspondent claimed in a long letter to the Central Committee (CC) that "with the exception of rice, more goods are consumed by the revolutionaries who make up 5% of the population than the peasants who make up 80% of the population. . . . A new ruling class has arisen." This "new ruling class" had grown corrupt:

"Our Party is not as bad as the Kuomintang, but since it took over the cities seven or eight years ago, some signs of resemblance have now appeared" (Solomon, 1969: 19-20). Cadres isolated themselves from the masses and used "commandist" tactics:

> A wide gap existed between the Party fraction and the masses, and the people generally dared not say anything. There was one teacher who often accused the school of being undemocratic and unconcerned with the masses; he was made the target during the movement against counterrevolutionaries and subjected to repeated struggles. Finally it was found that there was nothing wrong. Although the district Party committee and the Party fraction did apologize to him, yet it was explained that the whole thing was not started without reasons. Has this man still the courage to bloom now? [in MacFarquhar, 1960: 120-121].

The criticisms, however, also went too far in a "liberal" direction, comparing the CCP with the Nazis, staging demonstrations demanding freedom of the press, assembly and speech, and proposing formally free recruitment for minority parties among all classes. Even the Chairman was included among criticism targets (PD, 1957; CB, n.d.f).[2] After scarcely a month of "blooming," pressure began to build within the Party to staunch criticisms; Mao concurred, and an "anti-Rightist" campaign was launched in the summer of 1957 (RF, 1968, in CB, n.d.d) to rectify those who had attacked the regime.

The impact of the Hundred Flowers on the GPCR lies both in what it did and in what it failed to do. What it did was to expose the depth of political discontent with the elitist, repressive characteristics of the Chinese bureaucracy among even the more privileged elements of the populace (including the educated "revolutionary successors") during a period of economic prosperity and political success. Prominent among these grievances were attacks on the bureaucratic "new class" for its privileged position, isolation from the masses, and arrogant leadership style. What it failed to do was to evolve any institutional means for the articulation and peaceful resolution of "contradictions between the government and the people." The spontaneous mass counter-criticism of the intellectuals

upon which Mao had been banking never materialized—largely, he was later to conclude, because of a pervasive and deeply rooted cultural deference for intellectual authority that had eluded his previous attempts at thought reform. Thus the "poisonous weeds" cultivated by the critical intelligentsia were ruthlessly eradicated in the anti-Rightist campaign, forming the basis for an enduring enmity between Mao and the intellectual establishment (later aggravated by subtle literary satires on Mao, and reciprocated on Mao's part by tirades on the uselessness of "book knowledge," the need to revolutionalize the cultural superstructure, and so on). Thus it is hardly coincidental that the GPCR was to begin with a critique of Wu Han and then spread to other intellectual notables, with the enthusiastic support of the natural enemies of academics, their students.

The Great Leap Forward. A mix of sometimes contradictory policies and tendencies, the basic purpose of the Great Leap Forward was to solve the problem of rural underemployment and urban congestion by reallocating investment to the countryside, mobilizing the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses as a form of human capital to achieve a breakthrough to accelerated economic growth. Mao was unquestionably the driving impetus behind the Leap, and his impetuous leadership style elicited serious intraelite opposition even before the dimensions of the Leap's failure became clear. On the basis of an inspection tour of his home province, P'eng Teh-huai launched an implicitly devastating challenge to the moral basis of Mao's authority in July 1959 at Lushan, suggesting among other things that "petty bourgeois fanatacism" had contributed to the immiserization of the peasantry. Mao took P'eng's criticisms personally, and unleashed an embittered counterattack (GLC, 1968-1969). Yet the resolution which was passed to censure P'eng was surprisingly lenient in its impositions of organizational sanctions, possibly owing to the mediating influence of Liu Shao-ch'i: P'eng, Chang Wen-t'ien, Huang K'o-ch'eng and Chou Hsiao-chou were named members of an "anti-Party clique" and dismissed from their executive posts, but they remained nominal members both of the CC and the Politburo (Charles, 1966).

The Leap did not immediately succumb to P'eng's assault, but was revived in the spring and summer of 1960, in a propaganda campaign which reversed some of the concessions that had been granted earlier.[3] It was followed by an economic depression comparable in severity to the depression of the 1930s in the West (Cheng and Galenson, 1969: 86): at the low point of 1960-1962, gross national output dropped by 20-30% from the high point reached during the Leap, per capita income by roughly 32%, industrial production by 40-45% (Richman, 1969: 613). These staggering figures signified that Mao had won the battle of Lushan but lost the war. Although the "three Red Flags" were at no time publicly disavowed, the next three years witnessed a sweeping rollback of most of their programs in a retrenchment program that stressed material incentives and organizational controls (Ahn, 1973). Yet Mao had become personally committed to these forsaken programs; in 1963 he argued (Mao, 1971: 503) that the Leap's failure did not reflect its intrinsic demerits, but the intransigent contumacy of the "forces of reaction": "In social struggle, the forces representing the advanced class sometimes suffer defeat not because their ideas are incorrect but because, in the balance of forces engaged in struggle, they are not as powerful for the time being as the forces of reaction; they are therefore temporarily defeated, but are bound to triumph sooner or later."

The impact of the Leap's failure on Mao's operational theory of bureaucratism was to alert him to the presence and approximate identity of opposition forces within the CC who believed that authority should be based more on material incentives and organizational sanctions than on ideological appeals to popular voluntarism. Reaction to the Leap's failure thus began to define the issues around which the next major confrontation would take place, creating an incipient cleavage between those who assumed that the failure had discredited Mao's theories of authority and organization and those who felt obligated to defend those policies to vindicate themselves. Besides generating many of the pivotal issues, the P'eng Teh-huai affair and its sequel may have affected the form the

next purge should take. For various reasons, Mao found the use of conventional rectification and purge techniques, which had evolved during the 1942-1944 *Cheng-feng* campaign and followed quite closely ever since, highly unsatisfactory in dealing with the deviations of P'eng Teh-huai. In accord with that technique, organizational sanctions had been imposed against P'eng at the end of an in camera session of "criticism and self-criticism," after which anonymous public criticism of the policy issues raised by P'eng's errors was launched. The magnitude of the Leap's debacle, however, sapped this "rectification" of all plausibility. Less important than P'eng's own partially successful attempt to "reverse verdicts" in 1962 (P'eng himself was not rehabilitated, but, thanks to the sponsorship of Liu Shao-ch'i, many of his followers were) was the fact that conventional rectification techniques failed to discredit the policy "line" he represented, with the result that while P'eng fell, his criticisms seemed vindicated, making P'eng something of an unsung martyr *("Hai Jui")* in some quarters. Future purges, Mao probably concluded, must include a more extensive mass education campaign to impress the masses with the ideological import of the purge.

Sino-Soviet dispute. Of greater concern to us in this context than the harrowing questions of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute and the relative justice of the opposing sides is the fact that the dispute provided the original forum for full articulation of the Maoist critique of bureaucratism. Mao Tse-tung made a substantial personal contribution to the polemics in the form of nine lengthy commentaries, which he is reliably reported to have written in collaboration with K'ang Sheng and Ch'en Po-ta between 1963 and 1965 (Johnson, 1969). In "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves" (September 6, 1963) and "On the Question of Stalin" (September 13, 1963), Khrushchev is accused of using his attack on the "personality cult" in his posthumous denunciation of Stalin as a pretext to negate the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the two being implicitly equated; it is a "characteristic common to all revisionists" that

they oppose "absolute personal power." The rationale for such power, most clearly articulated in "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" (September 26, 1963) and in the final commentary "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and the Historical Lessons for the World" (July 14, 1964) is that under more liberal leadership "Capitalism will always try to make a comeback"; i.e., that professional and bureaucratic careerists will usurp control from true representatives of the proletariat and convert the state into a "bourgeois dictatorship" which manipulates and exploits the masses. "This lesson [Yugoslavia] shows us that not only is it possible for a working class party to fall under the control of a labor aristocracy, degenerate into a bourgeois party and become a flunky of imperialism before it seizes power, but even after it seizes power it is possible for a working-class party to fall under control of new bourgeois elements."

In the final essay, Mao began to apply the revisionist critique to his own country. "Is our society today thoroughly clean?" he asked. "No, it is not. Classes and class struggle still remain, the activities of the overthrown reactionary classes plotting a comeback still continue." In his conversation with Malraux a year later, he returned to the same theme, acknowledging that the analogy of revisionism to capitalism broke down, but now basing his use of class categories in a socialist state on alienation between elites and masses, which he equates with the exploitative relationship between bourgeoisie and proletariat (Malraux, 1968: 369-370):

> Humanity if left to its own devices does not necessarily reestablish capitalism (which is why you are perhaps right in saying that they will not revert to private ownership of the means of production), but it does reestablish inequality. . . . You remember Kosygin at the 23rd Congress: "Communism means the raising of living standards." Of course! And swimming is a way of putting on a pair of trunks! . . . I know his theory: you begin by no longer tolerating criticism, then you abandon self-criticism, then you cut yourself off from the masses, and since the Party can draw its revolutionary strength only from them, you tolerate the formation of a new class.

Based on this analogy between bureaucratic alienation and economic exploitation, Mao, increasingly frustrated with the

disappointing upshot of the Socialist Education Movement and by the utter failures of his attempts to reform the cultural, medical, or educational systems through conventional organizational measures, began in 1965 to refer scathingly to CCP officials as "bourgeois" (CLG, 1968-1969): "The bureaucratic class is a class sharply opposed to the working class and the poor and lower-middle peasants. These people have become or are in the process of becoming bourgeois elements sucking the blood of the workers. How can they have proper understanding?"

Mao's emerging critique of bureaucratism bears some resemblance to Pareto's theory of the "circulation of elites" and to Djilas' more recent conception of the "new class." Like Pareto (1968), he attributes revolution to the isolation of elites from masses; like Djilas, he conceptualizes this isolation in Marxist terms, discerning structural analogy between capitalist bourgeoisie and a "stratum of professional revolutionaries" in socialist countries whose "administrative monopoly" over the means of production entitled them to "special privileges and economic preferences." Although Djilas (1957: 39 ff.) considered control practically tantamount to ownership of nationalized property, he still distinguished this "new class" from the "bourgeoisie" because its origins were an unintended consequence of the pursuit of *political* (rather than economic) goals. Mao, on the other hand, did not shrink from the epithet "bourgeoisie," but required more subtle definitional criteria to avoid a blanket indictment of the entire Communist Party elite (incidentally including himself). In Mao's refined formulation, bureaucratic *embourgeoisement* proceeds in three steps: first, a candidate is appointed to an office with disposition over public resources; second, the goals of the office take precedence over the more general goals specified in the ideology (i.e., an "independent kingdom" is built). Third, the official comes to regard himself as superior to the masses he nominally serves and adopts an obsequious posture toward his superiors and an arrogant one towards his inferiors (Starr, 1971: 246 ff.). The first step is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the latter two, which occur as a result of moral ("political") rather than objective socioeconomic factors.

THE FAILINGS OF LIUIST BUREAUCRACY

Political change appears to proceed in China in much the same way that, according to Kuhn (1970), scientific knowledge advances: ideological and institutional parameters are laid down as a way of resolving some systemic crisis, and "disjointed, incremental" change then takes place within those parameters until another crisis occurs, shattering the old parameters and necessitating the construction of new ones. Because the process takes place within the meaning context of the optimistic and essentially linear Marxist view of historical change, the abandoned parameters must be resolutely foresworn and the newly chosen ones extravagantly praised, imparting a Manichaean cast to the transition which necessitates careful study in order to sort out what has actually changed and what remains the same. And so it is with the GPCR and the human debris it left behind, the most prominent of whom was Liu Shao-ch'i. According to GPCR polemics, at an indeterminate time before 1966 a divergence appeared between Mao and Liu concerning the correct nature and functions of bureaucracy, and this divergence, insoluble within the forum of "inner-Party struggle," burst into the realm of public contestation as a result of particularly egregious organizational errors committed by the "Liuists" in their implementation of the GPCR. A disparate interpretation, widely accepted among American analysts, accepts the "two lines" interpretation insofar as it imputes a prior Maoist conspiracy to eliminate the Liuists, but implicitly dismisses the Maoist critique of Liu Shao-ch'i as contrived, sometimes even inferring that Liu innocently walked into an elaborate "trap" (e.g., Bridgham, 1970). At issue here is the sincerity and validity of the Maoist critique of the bureaucratic system Liu Shao-ch'i came to stand for, an issue we shall try to resolve through an examination of CCP organizational behavior in the early stages of the movement.

Although he encouraged the movement from behind the scenes, Mao did not take charge of the GPCR until after two successive sets of elites had failed to implement his instructions properly, each of them in turn allegedly demonstrating a

different aspect of "bureaucratism": during the campaign against Wu Han (November 1965-May 1966), P'eng Chen was guilty of "independent kingdom" building; during the "50 days" between June and July 1966, Liu Shao-ch'i practiced "bourgeois dictatorship."

P'eng Chen's error, familiar to Western organization theorists as the displacement of leadership goals to the maintenance and enhancement needs of the implementing organization (Banfield, 1964; Warner and Havens, 1968; Simon, 1964; Mohr, 1973), was a logical culmination of the form of bureaucratic *immobilisme* that had frustrated Mao's attempts to reform the various "cultural" sectors in 1963-1965. Mao told P'eng in October 1965 that he wanted his vice mayor, Wu Han, to be publicly criticized for his earlier satires on the Chairman, but P'eng failed to act, so Mao moved to Shanghai and supported publication of Yao Wen-yüan's trenchant criticism in the army's news organ, *Liberation Army Daily*. Thereupon P'eng finally followed suit by reprinting the criticism in the Peking papers, still consistently endeavoring to restrict participation in the campaign to a narrow sphere of academics who would engage in genteel debate without demanding full exposure or purge. Though Mao made clear his dissatisfaction with the campaign's failure to deal with the "key issue"—the relationship between the dismissal of the sixteenth-century Ming official Hai Jui for daring to criticize the Chia-ching emperor and the 1959 dismissal of P'eng Teh-huai for criticizing the Chairman—P'eng Chen misrepresented Mao's position in later accounts of the meeting, telling subordinates: "Chairman Mao agrees with my viewpoint that Wu Han is not a political question" (JPRS, n.d.: 5). In January 1966, P'eng induced the Peking media to suppress discussion of Wu Han; in February he drafted an "Outline Report," whose import, most clearly indicated in paragraph two, was to limit debate to Wu's academic peers and avoid any "political conclusion." When Liu Shao-ch'i recommended that he clear the report with Mao, P'eng flew to Hangchow and spoke with the Chairman without actually showing him the draft, then called Peking and had the Report disseminated under the CC's imprimatur by claiming

Mao's endorsement (Akahata, in DSJP, 1967). Based on interlocking interests between P'eng's municipal Party committee and the CC Propaganda Department (and an outright deception), P'eng had organized a coalition "so tight you couldn't stick a pin in," as Mao later put it,[4] and when the mass criticism campaign was launched on April 1 that finally brought him down, it resulted in a sweeping purge and reorganization of the entire Peking Party committee.

News of P'eng Chen's fall coincided with the nationwide broadcast of Nieh Yüan-tzu's first big-character poster, and the synchronicity of these two events seems to have led students to impute exaggerated potency to spontaneous acts of protest. Schools were closed in early June and students throughout China began to post wall posters and to criticize local Party and educational authorities, whom they now perceived to be local counterparts of P'eng Chen, Lu Ting-yi (purged CC propaganda department chief), and Lu P'ing (purged president of Peking University). As local Party committees and school administrations came under criticism, the CC was deluged by requests from local Party organizations and activists for help in containing the situation. The CC, under the acting leadership of Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing (while Mao remained in Shanghai and Hangchow), complied in dispatching CC work teams. The "crimes" that were to trigger the mass criticism and eventual purge of Liu and Teng were defined by the actions of the work teams acting under their supervision during the next fifty days.

In fairness to Liu, we should concede that he *was* operating under unusual handicaps. Upon his return from a four-week tour of South and Southeast Asia on April 19, he suddenly found himself in charge of a movement he neither understood nor could fully control.[5] In response to the controversies that arose among the students in their reaction to the media criticism campaign, a latent cleavage gradually became apparent between the organization men who supervised the work teams and the "comrades of the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG)," who subscribed to a radical interpretation of Mao's

Thought which emphasized that "it is necessary to trust the masses, rely on them, and respect their initiative." To foster this "initiative," the CCRG seized control of certain key national publicity media (e.g., *Red Flag, People's Daily, Liberation Army Daily*), through which they preached the legitimacy of rebellion against all "bourgeois" authorities without specifying their identity, stimulating suspicion among the masses of all representatives of authority.[6] Thus intraelite cleavage was transposed to the masses through alternative avenues of mobilization, where it became articulated with preexisting interfactional cleavages among the masses. By lending ideological support to a more inclusive mass constituency than the work teams were willing to organize, and by focusing suspicion on bourgeois elements "within the Party," the CCRG unquestionably exacerbated the socially disruptive consequences of the work teams' errors.

Later polemical oversimplifications to the contrary notwithstanding, the error of the Party leadership was not simply in the *dispatch* of work teams, an organizational response to lower-level leadership crises which "had been recognized as the proper means of organization in every movement since liberation in 1949";[7] the essence of the Liu-Teng error, according to their own later analyses, was to place a higher priority on order than on spontaneous mass self-expression, to put adherence to procedural norms of discussion and debate before Mao's desire to maximize the participation-mobilization aspects of the movement. "Shanghai is very orderly. There is no disruption," Liu complimented Mayor Ts'ao Ti-ch'iu on his way through the city in July 1966. "This shows that your Municipal Committee enjoys a high prestige and commands the obedience of the masses" (in Hunter, 1969: 42). Indeed, Liu's notion of "authority" seemed to equate "prestige" with "obedience" and give rather short shrift to participation, and he viewed the demonstrations inspired by the CCRG not as encouraging manifestations of revolutionary élan, but as signals of a crisis of authority demanding immediate countermeasures. "We consider it an extremely bad situation," confessed Teng Hsiao-p'ing three

months later. "Confounded by the so-called 'chaos' and putting fear above everything else, we were in a hurry to find medicine and hastily sent work teams to control the movement in the name of strengthening leadership. This actually had the effect of strangling the movement" (CLG, 1970: 84-90). The Liu-Teng error may be subdivided into three aspects for closer scrutiny, all motivated by obsession with *control* to the neglect of participatory and expressive values: (1) blocked lateral communication, (2) "commandism" and severe negative sanctions, and (3) blocked vertical communication. The cumulative effect of these three aspects of "bureaucratism" was to create a polarized situation at the grass roots which mirrored the alienation between elites and masses that obtained on the national level, and which seemed to be intrinsic to the structure of the Liuist organization system *tout ensemble.*

The most fundamental impediment to *lateral communication* was in the organization's application of discriminatory criteria for participation in the movement, which created the basis for enduring factional cleavages. The first demonstrations occurred within a Party-Youth League framework in late April in connection with the campaign against Wu Han and the "three-family village." Upon its dissolution in early June, the CYL divided its members into two categories: those with "five good" class backgrounds (worker, peasant, cadre, soldier, revolutionary martyr) were released and urged to participate in the GPCR; those in non-five-good categories ("free professions," including doctors, shop clerks, teachers, technicians, and middle peasants) received no definite assignment, but were allowed to participate; children of the "five black" categories (landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and Rightists) were categorically excluded from either CYL or GPCR (Blumer, 1968: 197-204; Montaperto, 1972). This initial organizational segregation formed a basis for two opposing factions to arise which were to maintain a perceptible continuity throughout the movement. The "five good" rebels were active during the initial stage when the attack was centered against Wu Han and other "bourgeois academics" but became

conservative when the "spearhead" turned against the Party (children of high cadres often led these "five good" groups), and eventually regrouped around PLA units following the collapse of the Party; children of the "free professions" and some children of the "five black" classes who were denied active participation in the movement and often persecuted by work teams later led the radicals' attack on the Party Center for sending the work teams.

Just as participants in the movement were segregated from nonparticipants, both were strictly confined to the campuses and barred from recruiting expeditions among the populace. The students were treated like the bottom level of the bureaucracy and expected to conform to the procedural rules of inner-Party struggle. In early June, Liu hurredly convened a Central Work Conference in Peking to formulate the "8 articles of the CC," which stipulated: (1) no big-character posters in the street, (2) no rallies in the street, (3) no parades in the street, (4) no encirclement of residences, (5) drawing a clear distinction between the inside and the outside, (6) guard against sabotage by bad elements, (7) manhandling and insulting others is forbidden, (8) prevent the undesirable development of the movement (JPRS, n.d.: 14). The work teams conducted "anti-interference movements" to catch those "wandering fish" (i.e., outside agitators) who defied prohibitions against communication between schools; Liu subsequently insisted that such actions were undertaken at work team initiative without his knowledge, but a work team representative pointed out that it was "not only tacitly accepted but also arranged for" by the Peking municipal committee (Liu, 1969: III, 341-345). Of course, all of these barriers on lateral communication impeded the sort of extensive mobilization Mao had in mind, and created friction between students and work teams.

The apparatus was shocked by the strength and tenacity of student resistance to the work teams, and registered its shock by invoking *punitive sanctions* of Draconian severity against all troublemakers, whatever their ideological bent. On July 3, Lio told his daughter T'ao that "he regarded all students opposed to

the work teams as bourgeois elements and gave them no freedom and democracy," on the contrary proposing that they should be "shot at as living targets" (Lio T'ao, 1966, in CB, n.d.e). Most of the work teams had been formed during the Socialist Education Movement in 1964; certain of them remained in the same place and resumed their activities in 1966, and others were freshly constituted and sent into a situation utterly foreign to them under the leadership of high-ranking cadres (Daubier, 1970: 70-80). The teams were usually comprised of uneducated basic-level cadres who were not accustomed to trouble-shooting in educational institutions; conscious of status differences between themselves and the students and hypersensitive to any challenge to their authority (like American policemen dealing with campus radicals), they resorted to ill-advised and ill-considered tactics upon encountering resistance. The application of coercive sanctions and a general witch-hunt atmosphere was fostered by CCRG sloganeering on the one side and by Liu's references to "counterrevolutionaries" and "back-stage backers" on the other. If Red Guard reports may be believed, the actions of the Tsinghua work team (which included Liu's wife Wang Kuang-mei, operating under the cover name "Hou P'u") set forth a disciplinary regimen that was particularly drastic. The work team promptly dismissed the president and replaced the Party committee; all lower-level cadres were challenged to present comprehensive self-criticisms to the students in a special meeting called for this purpose and thus "pass the test"; higher-ranking cadres were spared public self-criticism and referred to higher authorities for disciplinary action. Student resistance to the work teams was rewarded by wholesale dispensation of "counterrevolutionary" labels; a few people were "struggled to death," and a number of others reportedly committed suicide (Liu, 1970: 721-738).

The application of severe coercive sanctions created an implacable opposition to work teams. The anti-work-team Red Guards later pursued responsibility for dispatching work teams up the chain of command right to Liu and Teng, and eventually

"toppled" them. As Red Guards vengefully noted in an accusation attached to the copy of Liu's first self-criticism that was published on December 26, "When work teams oppressed the revolutionary masses, we were forced to write self-criticisms 10,000 characters long. Liu Shao-ch'i writes only a short one; can this be considered adequate (Fan, 1967)?"

Liu and Teng acknowledged the Party as the only legitimate avenue of *vertical communication,* deliberately isolating the Center from alternative viewpoints. In Liu's later analysis of his errors, he considered the organizational block on vertical communication his "most fundamental problem": "I could not go deep into the midst of the masses and learn from them, nor did I make reports to Chairman Mao" (Liu, 1970: 624-625). When K'uai Ta-fu, a spirited Tsinghua rebel, tried to appeal his conviction as "counterrevolutionary" to the CC, Liu refused to see him; and when K'ang Sheng protested that this was "at least not in correspondence with state law and is in contravention to the Constitution," Liu told K'ang he "failed to understand the situation" (JPRS, n.d.: 14). By limiting their sources of information to what was filtered through the bureaucratic apparatus, which became more slanted and self-vindicating as the struggle polarized, the Liuist Center reinforced its commitment to originally misconceived policies. Liu did counsel flexibility and tolerance in dealing with dissidents, but he did not, until Mao requested it, withdraw the work teams; even when he counseled greater latitude in dealing with the rebels, he did so as a tactic for more effective control: "Let them dominate for a period of time and then put Communist Party members under rectification; they will betray themselves" (SCMM, n.d.).

From Liu's point of view, the monopolization of vertical communication by the Party was necessary to preserve its structural legitimacy, which was based on a hierarchical relationship of democratic centralism between the Center and the branch rather than on each individual branch's claim to ideological legitimacy. The Party was the organizational embodiment of Mao's Thought and sole legitimate mediator of the

mass line, and could not tolerate autonomous political organizations. Liu referred to the Red Guards as an "illegal organization": "Teachers and students are not permitted to hold meetings in secret. The Red Guards is a secret organization and illegal." He called for prompt restoration of the leadership functions of the Party branches and foresaw early termination of the movement: early in July, Liu and Teng ordered one-third of the middle-schools to end the movement in mid-August and the remainder by October 1, to be ready to reopen school on September 1: "Further discussion of it will be tasteless" (JPRS, n.d.: 24). Liu thus identified himself from the outset as the chief foe of the organization of autonomous Red Guard units and of the interpretation of Mao's Thought that legitimized their existence.

In its contumacy, Liu's error resembled that of P'eng Chen before him; like P'eng, who committed himself to Wu Han at the outset and then found it impossible to abandon him when the conflict intensified, finally coming into direct confrontation with Mao himself, Liu initially backed the Party organization, his support was then fortified by the opposition the work teams precipitated, and ultimately he found his position polarized to that of a "bourgeois dictator." However, while P'eng knew as early as November 1966 that Mao was behind the criticisms of Wu Han and still chose to protect Wu,[8] Liu seemed to have no inkling who was behind the student radicals opposing the work teams until Mao personally interceded on their behalf in late July;[9] in Camus's (1959: 182) terms, P'eng's error was an error of passion, wheras Liu's was one of logic. This makes his later condemnation for deliberately perpetrating a "counter-revolutionary revisionist line" ethically problematic, but in a study of Chinese organizational behavior it becomes even more interesting than P'eng Chen's, for while P'eng knowingly violated an organizational norm (namely, democratic centralism), Liu was consciously obeying norms that were fundamentally misconceived. In short, Liu's was an error of "line" that was connected with certain structural propensities inherent in the organizational machine he had built, particularly when

that machine was confronted with a challenge "from below." This may be illustrated by two examples from his earlier career: the land reform campaign at P'ingshan in 1947 and the Socialist Education Movement in 1963-1964.

Liu's February 1948 "Summary of Experience"–an extremely insightful self-criticism–indicates that at P'ingshan, just as in the work team episode, the masses rose against the organization, causing "panic": "The masses rose to struggle against the bad Party members and cadres. In many districts Party members and cadres were arrested and beaten, causing panic among other members and cadres." Like the work teams, the organization reacted punitively: "the work teams insisted, rather mechanically, on hitting the landlords first and solving the cadre question afterwards. They arbitrarily separated land reform from the democratic movement of Party rectification; they restrained the masses from carrying out struggles against Party members and cadres, or removed large groups of Party members and cadres whom the masses opposed like 'stones.' " Like the work teams, they also attempted to divert the wrath of the masses to innocuous scapegoats: "the work teams abused their power by compelling the masses to carry out struggles against the landlords who had already been struggled against in an effort to whip up a high tide." In his analysis of the reasons for these blunders, Liu (1970: 188-189) pointed again to the same blocked communication patterns we have observed in the case of the work team incident:

> Hence it is not simply a technical but a serious political problem for the rural Party branches to accept openly the masses' views and to reform and educate Party members. It was the mystery *[shen-mi]* of the rural Party branches in the past that made it possible for the bad elements to isolate the Party from the masses. Today we have opened the doors of the Party to the public in the old liberated areas.

In the P'ingshan incident, the evidence indicates not only that the organization committed errors remarkably similar to those imputed to it during the GPCR, but that Liu Shao-ch'i bore "command responsibility" for those errors. In the SEM,

Liu's responsibility for organizational errors is somewhat clouded by the fact that several elites participated in formulating policy, including Mao, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and P'eng Chen. Due to the turnover of "responsible persons," there are contradictions among the criticisms, some of them attacking Liu for permitting capitalist tendencies to develop in the countryside among rich peasants and cadres rather than jeopardize production, others attacking him for excessive harshness in managing the rectification campaign designed to *correct* capitalist tendencies among basic-level cadres ("hitting hard at the many [lower level cadres] in order to protect a handful"). It is now possible to infer on the basis of authorship of the respective documents that the responsibility for the former tendency probably rests with P'eng Chen, who formulated the "second 10 points" (September 1963), and that the responsibility for the latter tendency rests with Liu Shao-ch'i, author of the "revised second 10 points" (September 10, 1964; see Baum and Teiwes, 1968b). Those criticisms which can reliably be taken to refer to Liu's role in the movement give a picture of the same sort of polarization that occurred at P'ingshan and in the GPCR. As at P'ingshan, he placed the organizational integrity of the Party before the rectification of a deteriorating Party-mass relationship, transferring unpopular cadres about like "stones": "All rotten ones must be transferred away first," he said in a talk on October 7, 1964. "After that, it will be easy to mobilize the masses" (SCMP, n.d.d). He placed reliance on cadre professionalism rather than on arousing the spontaneous enthusiasm of the masses: "The masses are like wild horses and will cause trouble when mobilized," he warned. "It is better to make concentrated use of a superior force to fight a battle of annihilation, operate on a smaller scope, make concentrated use of the strength of the cadres, and wait for the training of one group to finish before we train another group," he said in July 1964. "This is not a question of one or two groups to work for several months. It is a question of several years and even several decades until work is finished. We must have some professional revolutionaries. There are three types of forces for the prosecution of the four-clean movement: (1)

professional revolutionaries; (2) work teams; and (3) those under training" (PD, 1967b; in SCMP, n.d.d). Liu's emphasis on the Party's monopoly of information led him to propose a replacement of Maoist open investigation techniques with long-term "squatting on a point" *(tun-tien)* by clandestine Party agents, a policy associated in CCP historical experience with clandestine operations in wartime "White areas." Liu justified such tactics by the tendency for information to become distorted when peasants reported directly to local authorities who might later retaliate. "The poor and lower-middle peasants have a lot of misgivings," he pointed out, and "would not tell us the truth." Be that as it may, to his critics Liu's proposal to "rely on a few hand-picked activists to collect information through secret contacts" (PD, 1969a; in SCMP, n.d.a; PD, 1967a; in SCMP, n.d.c) sounded suspiciously like a secret police system.

Again, the cumulative impact of Liu's policies seems to have been a polarization of conflict between elites and masses: poor and lower-middle peasant associations launched severe attacks on lower-level cadres throughout the fall of 1964; the authority of the cadres was undermined and they became demoralized (Baum and Teiwes, 1968a, 1967). Following Mao's introduction of the "23 articles" in a January 1965 work conference, criticism of cadres diminished abruptly (Baum and Teiwes, 1968b: 39-41).

Liu Shao-ch'i's error was indeed "not fortuitous," as his daughter saucily pointed out to him in one heated exchange (Liu T'ao, 1966; in CB, n.d.e). In his theoretical writings he has consistently leaned toward an "elitist and centralizationist" position which stressed hierarchic command and organizational discipline, exhibiting a "constant preoccupation with the unity, predictability, and effectiveness of organization" (Kau, 1972). In more than two decades of dominant influence over the administrative apparatus, Liu constructed an organizational machine remarkably similar to Weber's ideal-type of "rational-legal bureaucracy," replete with salaried, career officialdom which had acquired the technical competence to fill func-

tionally specific roles, routinization of official business on the basis of files and written documents, and a hierarchical structure of authority. The only noteworthy distinguishing characteristic was the existence of "dual rule" consisting of parallel Party and government hierarchies (personal communication from Peter N.S. Lee). Usually without taking exception to Weber's conclusion that such a organization offers "precision, stability, stringency of discipline, and reliability," later analysts of organizational behavior have detected major structural flaws in such "tall" monocratic hierarchies, among the most relevant of which are their tendency to stifle feedback, their rigid inability to adjust to innovation or structural alteration without crisis, and their consequent propensity to exacerbate friction between the organization and its lay clientele (Argyris, 1962: 43; Crozier, 1964: 198; Thompson, 1969: 17-27).

In subtle contrast to Liu, Mao's writings on organization tend to stress "operational flexibility, organizational decentralization, and the active role of the rank and file" (Kau, 1972)—a contrast which may have previously eluded Mao because of Liu's subordinate role in the authority structure and his unquestioning loyalty to Mao. In the division of jurisdictions within the Politburo, Mao seems to have concerned himself primarily with broad policy questions while leaving discretion over details of implementation (which did not greatly concern him) to his administrative staff, devoting his attention to organizational issues only when episodic crises convinced him of the need for structural reform. He has been acutely sensitive to alienation or antagonism between masses and elites, however, and has raised sharp objection each time signs of this appeared, though his earlier criticisms were moral and personalized, neglecting to attack the organizational system that produced the error. His critical response to the P'ingshan episode is preserved in *Selected Works* (Mao, 1965: IV, 231-232). His repudiation of Liu's errors during the SEM is contained in his "23 articles," which explicitly repudiated covert investigation tactics and made the first accusatory allusion to "Party persons

in authority taking the capitalist road" (Baum and Teiwes, 1968b: appdx. F). His response to the errors of the "50 days" was nationally broadcast in his "first big-character poster" of August 5, 1966, which contained a fairly explicit indictment of Liu Shao-ch'i (Fan, 1972: 179-180):

> Taking the reactionary bourgeois stand, [certain leading comrades at the Center] exercise bourgeois dictatorship, put down the vigorous movement of the proletariat . . . launch concerted attacks on the revolutionaries from all sides, repress dissident views, and impose a White Terror. . . . Putting two and two together and recalling to mind the Rightist tendency in 1962 and the erroneous tendency in 1964 that was "Left" in form but Right in essence, do we not find something that should wake one up?

Given the context—an open-ended criticism movement—its authoritative source and national circulation, this poster contributed perhaps more than any other single factor to the identification of Liu Shao-ch'i as the main target of the movement. With him were eventually purged about two-thirds of the officials of the Central bureaucracy, including 68.5% of the 169 living members of the Eighth CC, 73.8% of the Politburo, and 86.2% of the provincial first Party secretaries (Hsiang, 1971). The way seemed clear for a fundamental restructuring of the Chinese organizational system.

RECONSTRUCTION OF A "MASS LINE" BUREAUCRACY

According to the norms reflexively implied in the Maoist critique of bureaucratism reviewed in parts one and two of this paper, an improved bureaucracy should differ in two seemingly contradictory respects from the old: first, the critique of P'eng Chen implies that it should have higher responsiveness to directives from the Center. Second, the critique of Liu Shao-ch'i implies that it should be more responsive to corrective feedback from the grass roots, and avoid reactions which would tend to polarize antagonisms between the leadership and the masses. In the years following the GPCR, the regime has experimented with a number of measures designed to alleviate bureaucratism,

some of which have stood the test of time, some of which have subsequently been modified or dropped. They may conveniently be summarized under three headings, which are analytically distinct but overlap somewhat empirically: (1) structural organizational reforms, (2) rerouting of communication patterns, and (3) democratization of authority.

(1) Structural reforms of the organization include a general increase in its informality and flexibility, the simplification of procedure and retrenchment of redundant staff personnel, and decentralization of political powers.

The post-GPCR organizational structure is based on vague, elliptical written documents and is generally more informal and ad hoc than its Liuist predecessor, in keeping with the Maoist desire to increase flexibility and prevent the recurrence of goal displacement ("independent kingdoms") or bureaucratic *immobilisme.* In contrast to the detailed provisions of the Eighth Party constitution, the Ninth provides for no fixed meeting times for conferences at any level, no exact delineation of the functional relationship between the "three basic organizations"--namely, "basic committees" *(chih-tseng (tang) wei-yüan-hui),* "general Party branches" *(tsung chih-pu),* and "Party branches" *(chih-pu)*--and no stipulated number of Party committee secretaries (Weggel, 1968: 88-89)--as a result of which there is no fixed ratio between Party membership and number of Party secretaries on provincial Party committees, nor between party members and Standing Committee members; some provinces have no deputy secretaries at all, others one or three. (Ninth National Congress of the CPC, 1969: 109-129). Whereas the Eighth Party Constitution stipulated that the leadership should be selected by secret ballot, the new constitution employs the more nebulous term "democratic consultation." The elaborate formality of the earlier organization has given way to task-oriented "groups" at various levels. At the provincial level, Revolutionary Committees (RCs) are now subordinate to the Party committees, but there is in addition a hybrid structure of functional "groups" which merge

both Party and government tasks. At the Central level, Barnett (1973) reported that roughly a third of the national ministries still had no permanent ministers, but that their functions were also being filled by such groups: education is being administered by the Scientific and Educational Group under the State Council for instance, and the Ministry of Culture has been replaced by the Cultural Group of the State Council *(kuo-wu-yüan wen-hua tsu),* coordinated by Chiang Ch'ing (Barnett, 1973: 106-129).

The movement initiated in 1968 for "better troops and simpler administration" *(chin ping chien cheng)* was apparently stimulated by Mao's July 22, 1966 remark, "the more people there are, the more they telephone and issue orders, so all private secretaries should be done away with" (CNS, n.d.h). The rationale for the wholesale dismissal of secretarial and staff personnel is not economic retrenchment, but the reduction of bureaucratic estrangement between leaders and masses: line officials must now open and read their own mail, answer their own phones, and go down to the grass roots to conduct on-the-spot investigations without relying on staff reports. The resulting simplification has been both horizontal—in the unification of parallel hierarchies at each level into "unified leadership" in the RCs, and the elimination of the "branch" principle which divided committee members on the basis of functional specialization in favor of the "committee" principle (Weggel, 1968: 88-89) and vertical—in the elimination of superfluous adminstrative levels and other organizational impediments to communication between elites and masses (NCNA, 1967; SCMP, n.d.b: 21-23; PR, 1968a). In a talk with Snow in 1970, Chou En-lai said that organs of the State Council had been reduced from 90 to 26, with a corresponding cut in staff from 60,000 to 10,000; the reorganization involved extensive mergers of ministries, staff officials and so on (Epoca, 1971). The usually skeptical Durdin visited a plant which had previously been run by a director, deputy director, 31 section chiefs, and a staff of 500; after simplification, it was run by an RC in charge of four groups responsible for production, political affairs, administration, and logistics, comprising only 96 employees

(Ching, 1971: 186).

Together with and complementary to the movement to simplify administration has been a drive to decentralize administration to economically "self-reliant" local units. This involved the devolution of certain major fields of responsibility—education and medicine in particular—and a range of routine decisions to lower levels and the introduction of new procedures to keep the level of routine decision-making at as low a level as possible, largely by keeping a significant number of cadres at basic-level units at any given time. The emphasis on self-reliance and local initiative gave the greatest impetus since the Great Leap to local (*hsien* or commune) level investment in small-scale industry producing for local needs (Riskin, forthcoming).

The cumulative impact of administrative simplification, deformalization, and decentralization has been to foster an organizational structure in which policy-making power is concentrated at the top and administrative power is decentralized to the provincial and local levels, in keeping with Mao's dictum, "concentrate the great authority, diffuse the small authority" (in Schurmann, 1961: 29-30). This arrangement stands in diametrical contrast to Liu Shao-ch'i's system of open discussion at the top levels followed by strict execution of the ensuing decision: "Leaders in the Party and higher-level organizations should pay more attention to democracy, and subordinates in the Party and lower-level organizations . . . to obedience" (Liu, 1969: I, 397). At the Center, policy-making power has become concentrated in the hands of a small palace guard: the Ninth Party Constitution omits all mention of a CC Secretariat, General Secretary or Honorary Chairman, leaving power which had previously been distributed among the CC, the Secretariat and the Politburo concentrated in the Standing Committee. The GPCR inflicted severe attrition upon middle administrative echelons, sparing only 6 of 29 provincial first secretaries and eliminating 6 regional Party bureaus altogether. The changing structure of authority in China may be illuminated as in Figure 1. The apparent intention of the purge of the

Before 1966



1967-1970:



After 1970



Line of Command: ————————————

Line of Control: — — — — — — — — — —

Line of Command, only conditionally effective: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Line of Control, only conditionally effective: — • — • — • — • — • —

SOURCE: Von Groeling (1972: 106-107).

Figure 1.

middle levels of the bureaucracy was to eliminate "sectors of the administration where bureaucracy has made its nest" and create a more hourglass-shaped distribution of power, reducing the organizational distance between policy makers and policy implementers at the grass roots. This rearrangement may well function to enhance solidarity among cadres at each administrative level, but it also seems to have resulted in an attenuation of hierarchical control, reflected in recurrent press complaints of indiscipline, inaccurate or boastful reporting ("lying"), cadre corruption, and so on. (CNA, n.d.a, n.d.b, n.d.c; CNS, n.d.f, n.d.g). The power vacuum left by the purged Party and government officials also resulted in a militarization of the middle levels, as PLA officers seized most of the chairmanships of the provincial RCs and Party committees, increased their representation within the CC, and the Ten Great Military Areas became to some extent functional equivalents for the disbanded regional Party bureaus. One of the reasons for proceeding so rapidly with the reconstruction of the Party in 1970 was probably to provide a counterbalance to the PLA.

(2) Rerouting of communication patterns was apparently intended to make communication more public (to avoid official secrecy or the development of hierarchy based on monopoly of information), and more immediate (to avoid bureaucratic distortion). The implication of these changes, insofar as they have been achieved, is a departure from the Weberian emphasis on written files in the direction of a more open, dynamic, oral communication system which is less "administrative" and more "political."

The most striking impact of the GPCR on communication was to destroy the Party's monopoly on authoritative information and permit the construction of a nationwide alternative media system (e.g., wall posters, Red Guard tabloids, "liaison stations") dedicated exclusively to polemics. This emancipation of ideology from its formal organizational context enhanced the political competence of the "revolutionary masses" (or at least those masses with the requisite communicative competence)—this is what is meant when it is said that the masses were "armed" with the "invincible weapon" *(chan-wu pu-sheng ti*

wu-ch'i) of Mao Tsetung Thought. Unfortunately, once "armed," the masses failed to heed Central directives with predictable uniformity and splintered into myriad internecine factions, with the ultimate result that the alternative press was suppressed and an attempt was made to reincorporate ideology within some organizational framework, such as the "Mao Tsetung Thought Study Classes" *(Mao Tsetung ssu-hsiang hsueh-hsi pan).*

Nonetheless, it seems clear that political communication continues to take place outside regular organizational channels. The media through which this occurs include big-character posters *(ta-tzu pao),* which anyone is permitted to write, as well as various quasi-autonomous, semiformal groups of workers or peasants. Within the factory, "investigation groups" of workers launch investigations, write reports, and submit proposals to the RCs which may in some cases be used against cadres at the higher levels—or even in the RCs (e.g., CNS, n.d.a). The "short criticism" *(hsiao p'ing-lun)* has been widely instituted; there are "criticisms in the fields, criticisms on the spot, criticisms within the family and inter-family criticisms"; "short criticism" columns are put out at irregular intervals and given repeated propagation over the local broadcast network, for study in the fields or in large or small meetings (RF, 1970a; in CNS, n.d.e)

The attitude of the regime toward continuing extra-Party political communication is equivocal, attempting to discredit controversies which impede or distort the implementation of Central directives while still coopting mass initiatives which complement their purposes. Thus on the one hand a tendency has been apparent since 1970 to designate the Party as the sole incarnation of correct political information ("the leadership of the Party Center is inseparable from that of the Party organizations at the basic levels") and to revive the organizational tenet of democratic centralism, "the individual must obey the organization, the minority must obey the majority, the lower level must obey the higher level and the Party must obey the whole" (PD, 1971; in CB, n.d.b: 27-38). On the other hand, the press continues to feature anecdotes illustrating how

some spontaneous mass initiative circumvents the objections of inept local authorities to enhance efficiency within the production unit, resulting in its adoption everywhere. (RF, 1970a; in CNS, n.d.d; PD, 1972b; in CB, n.d.a). The distance between these two possibilities leaves leeway for controversy, with both masses and cadres coopting Central slogans to translate their interests into the abstract language of universal values: "class conflict," for example, is a slogan raised by the masses to request greater popular control over policy and an easing of cadre pressure for increased production; references to the "interests of the whole," on the other hand, are more frequently used by cadres to push through Central directives at variance with the inclinations of their local constituency. Though the masses have learned to speak the language of politics well enough to articulate their grievances, the Party is still assumed to have privileged information about what is in the interest of the "whole"–an assumption that indeed seems warranted, in view of the rudimentary and fragmentary supply of news from outside the immediate locality (Tuchman, 1972: 38-42). A court of last resort in such controversies is provided by the integral link between ideology and Supreme Leader; on the rare occasions since the GPCR when Mao has interceded, he has however ruled in favor of the local authorities (CNS, n.d.c; CNA, n.d.a).

The second change in communication patterns is the reduction of "social distance": it seems to be more often oral than written, more frequently through mass communications media than through internal organization channels. It seems to have become a fairly regular procedure for cadres to send fact-finding teams or personally to go down to consult with the masses before making a decision, particularly when the leadership is stalemated or the issue seems pivotal; by generating a consensus among his constituents, the cadre also purchases insurance against mass criticism in case the policy is later considered mistaken and repudiated (PD, 1971; in CB, n.d.b: 44-45; PD, 1972a; in CB, n.d.a: 39-41). Perhaps the most prominent exception to the more immediate relationship between elites

and masses is Mao himself, who remains as mysteriously isolated as any emperor; but even in his case, the Ninth Party Constitution provides for appeals to be made directly to the Chairman without prior review by intermediate organs (Article 5, Paragraph IV).

(3) Democratization of authority—efforts to democratize the legitimation of political power in China include changes in elite recruitment, elite socialization, and elite control.

The GPCR contributed two innovations to elite recruitment procedures: the introduction of the "general election" of cadres, and the concept of mass representation to policy organs. The original reference to "general elections" was contained in Point 9, Paragraph 4 of the August 1966 "16-point decision" of the Eleventh Plenum, which stipulated that leaders in the new "revolutionary" organizations should be chosen through such elections. This provision has been honored more in the breach than in the observance, however. Occasionally news of an "election" appears in the press, but candidates are selected or approved in advance by the Military Control Commission for the RCs, or (later) by the "Party Core" of the RC for the Party committees (SWB, n.d.e; CNS, n.d.b). This resulted in extensive overlapping membership between the RC and the Party committee leadership (of the 158 appointed First or Second Secretaries of the provincial Party committees, 120, or 77% were former members of RCs, and 30% were former provincial or regional Party office holders; only seven had close links with mass organizations), and the provincial People's Congresses which were constitutionally authorized to "elect" the Party committees at each level were usually chosen after the Party committee had already been set up.

The concept of mass representation fared only slightly better. No "mass representatives" ever became RC chairmen (though some civilian cadres became chairmen with Red Guard support), but by July 1968, 42 of 120 vice-chairmen (32%) in 24 provinces were mass representatives (Weggel, 1968: 50-54). The number of mass representatives tends to decline absolutely with

time and proportionately as one ascends the hierarchy of power, with the RC plena (where mass representation was always strongest) rapidly degenerating into forums for the acclamation of decisions by the Standing Committee. Increasingly, mass representatives have been encouraged to return to their schools or work units and participate only in "important" decisions; contending against their exclusion, the mass representatives in turn demand more "enlarged" sessions in which they have votes (Weggel, 1968: 53). With the reconstruction of the Party, the progressive denial of mass representation has proceeded apace. The Party committees are no longer based on a "three-way alliance" of PLA men, cadres, and mass representatives, but one of "old, middle-aged and young"—a formula apparently designed to stress the nonsectional nature of the committees and deny claims for representation by veterans of the mass organizations.

One of the GPCR's more noteworthy achievements has been to change the content of elite socialization. In striking contrast to the specialized technical training for an official "career" described by Weber, which enforced a sharp distinction between an official's formal office role and his private role—not merely to enhance objectivity, but to raise the status of the office (following the concept of *Ehrenamt*)—the entire animus of cadre socialization is now aimed at breaking down such invidious distinctions. Liu Shao-ch'i's professional cadre schools have been replaced by "May 7 Cadre Schools," the first of which was set up on the second anniversary of Mao's 1966 letter to Lin Piao after which it was named. By the beginning of 1969, cadre schools had been established by RCs at the *hsien* level and above in most parts of the country; Heilungkiang had 180 by August 1969, with an enrollment of 30,000, and in Kwangtung, there were 300 at the beginning of 1969. The training emphasizes keeping cadres in regular contact with the "three things": labor, the masses, and reality. A "minimum requirement" put forward to facilitate elite contact with the masses is that cadre schools "invite in" peasants from nearby communes to help with the "reeducation" of cadres and "send

out" cadres to "go amid the broad masses . . . and receive a course of education and training not available in the cadre schools" (PD, 1969b). During the first year of their existence, the majority of the clients seemed to be GPCR purge victims or redundancies of the "simplification of administration," sent to undergo "tempering" lasting a year or longer before being reassigned to administrative posts or resettled on communes; beginning in August 1969 there has been a reorientation toward short-term (three to six month) retraining of active-duty cadres whose tenure is not necessarily in jeopardy. Some cadres attend on rotation according to the "3-3-3 system," whereby one-third of the administrative personnel of a unit is responsible for routine office-work, one-third carries out inspections of basic-level units, and the remaining third engages in labor at May 7 Cadre Schools (SWB, n.d.b, n.d.d; Weggel, 1970: 76).

The GPCR has had an equally profound effect on patterns of *elite control* where it has produced a shift from external to internal control, and from organizational to community control. External control, which is conducted through a hierarchically organized and independent apparatus, was formalized in Articles 52-54 of the "Liuist" Eighth Party Constitution, which set up a control network parallel to all Party committees and stipulated its jurisdiction and sanctions. The GPCR destroyed both the Control Committees and Public Security Bureaus (neither of which find mention in the Ninth Party Constitution) and brought about a transition to internal control, which consists of a system of prophylactic supervision through permanent indoctrination (e.g., posters, letters, intensive group work, criticism and self-criticism meetings, activist congresses, "4/5 good" congresses). Liu's "work teams" were replaced by "Mao's Thought Propaganda Teams," which emphasize indoctrination ("Mao Thought Study Classes") and thorough integration with the local masses. Primary reliance is now placed on ex ante rather than ex post sanctions (*chien-tu* rather than *chien-ch'a*) and on positive rather than negative sanctions (praise, persuasion, and education rather than threat or punishment). The internalization of control entails greater

stress on "consciousness" *(chüeh-wu)* in contradistinction to Liu's emphasis on "absolute and unconditional obedience" once a decision was reached. Correct consciousness is in turn formed through obligatory routine participation in "Party life": discussion *(shang-liang)*, exchanges of experience, and daily meetings in "small study groups" *(hsüeh-hsi hsiao-tzu)*, whose intensity and frequency increases during campaigns (Weggel, 1971).

Vertical control through parallel hierarchies has concomitantly given way to lateral control by local committees *("t'iao-t'iao fu-ts'ung kuai-kuai")*; this reflects a general shift from clear, formal lines of command and control to "collective leadership" at all levels. The point seems to be to encourage participation in decisions and thus foster a sense of "responsibility" and commitment to the group project without yet abandoning elite discretion in the decision-making process.[10] Lo Jui-ch'ing's highly professional Public Security Bureau, for example, with its "efficient network of informants and collection of detailed dossiers," has been parceled out to a congeries of "amateurish" groups without a trace of clearly defined spheres of competence: Party committees at all levels have a PLA-organized "Mao Tsetung Thought Propoganda Troop"; "neighborhood committees" have "neighborhood security troops"; factories have "workers' economic control committees" to oversee bookkeeping and finances, as well as "economic advisory committees" and "report groups." In addition, the "mass trial" has been widely revived for the first time since the 1955 movement against counterrevolutionaries (after which it had been phased out in favor of the formal legal system). The non-Party "activist" seems to play a more integral role as a "mediator" *(niu-tai)* between elites and masses in the new control system (Weggel, 1971; Powell and Yoon, 1972).

Community control of elites is visible primarily in two institutions which blur the distinction between elites and masses through periodic role reversals: the "transfer down" *(hsia-fang)* of elites to production units, and the "open-door rectification" in which masses are invited to participate in elite discussions. Hsai-fang preceded the GPCR by seven years, but has since

become many times more extensive, as well as being routinized on a rotation basis. Cadre labor periods range from half a day per week to more than half the daily work period to a three-shift system in which cadres return to production units every three months (SWB, n.d.b, n.d.c, n.d.d). Special offices have been created to implement "hsia-fang" according to plan": entire ministries, schools and RCs are thus sent down and "plugged in" to production brigades, workshops, and so on (CNA, n.d.d; SWB, n.d.a; PR, 1968b). The transferred functionaries are instructed to "share 5 things" with their fellow workers: they should work with them, live with them, eat with them, and spend leisure time with them (PD, 1969c; in CB, n.d.c). The purpose seems to be to homogenize life styles, and even cadres still functioning as leaders are expected to intermix freely with workers to dispel jealousy (see Meisner, 1972).

"Open-door rectification" has been instituted at the local levels to give the masses greater access to political decisions immediately affecting their lives and provide a channel for venting grievance (Pfeffer, 1972). During these "rectification" sessions, the masses may go so far as to demand that their leader "stand aside" *(k'ao p'ang chan),* whereupon the immediate superior will typically launch an investigation, convene Mao's Thought Study Classes, transfer the cadre down to work among his prospective constituents to see whether he can ingratiate himself with them, and finally arrive at a verdict (PD, 1972b; in CB, n.d.a: 29-32). Open-door rectification was most extensively promoted during the reconstruction of the Party in 1970, but it is clear from continued press reports that controversial sessions continue to be held frequently (CB, n.d.b). The cumulative effect of this, along with the other changes in elite control mentioned, has been to extend the principles of the "mass line" from their original locus within the Party to include elite-mass relations.

CONCLUSION

We have seen how Mao's critique of bureaucratic embourgeoisement gradually became radicalized and systematized in

the 1956-1966 decade, and how this critique was confirmed by the nature of the bureaucratic resistance to the GPCR, under P'eng Chen and Liu Shao-ch'i. P'eng Chen's "independent kingdom" and Liu Shao-ch'i's "bourgeois dictatorship" both in their own ways stymied his attempt to lead a voluntarist movement to revolutionize the "cultural superstructure," and so the "spearhead" was turned from the movement's original cultural objectives to the bureaucracy itself, resulting in virtual dismemberment of the Party organization, and in minor damage to the economy. The reconstruction of the bureaucracy has visibly been guided by the norms implied in the GPCR critique: the new "mass line" bureaucracy is meant to be more responsive to the leadership and offer safeguards against goal displacement, and at the same time to be "responsible" and more closely integrated with the local community.

These norms stand in a dialectical tension with each other, and efforts to implement them have been mixed in their results. To recapitulate, they have included the following: (1) Structural reforms of the organization, which were successful in simplifying and decentralizing administrative authority, but unsuccessful in that they permitted militarization of the middle echelons of the bureaucracy and greater attenuation of Central control than the regime deemed desirable. (2) Rerouting communication patterns succeeded in promoting a communications system more immediate and more public, hence more open to feedback and adaptable to innovation or mass mobilization. These changes were certainly effective at the local and perhaps at middle levels, while leaving the Center even more isolated from the public than before. (3) Attempts were made to democratize the legitimation of political power through innovations in elite recruitment, elite socialization, and elite control. The legitimation of power at the Central level has been democratized in theory, but in fact remains the object of inner-Party power plays. At the middle and local levels, changes in elite recruitment have been almost totally ineffectual (with "90 percent" of former cadres being reinstated, according to Chou En-lai), but reforms of elite socialization and elite control

seem to have been far more effective. Moreover, an effort has been made to institutionalize these innovations in the form of such devices as the May 7 Cadre School, routinized downward transfer of various categories of cadres, and the establishment of numerous informal, extra-Party investigation and report teams. Certainly there has been a trend since 1970 to reassert authority against disruptive indiscipline, but the important feature of this new system is the allowance for popular participation in the decision-making process even if the decision itself is made by those in authority (Dernberger, 1972). To speak of co-optation would be unfair to the organizational purpose of the mass line, which aims at such a thorough interpenetration of masses and elites that *mutual* co-optation becomes the normal operating procedure.

What we call "mass line bureaucracy" is neither as centralist as the Soviet administrative system nor as democratic as the quasi-autonomous workers' councils of the Yugoslav system, but a combination of an activist Central organization and extensive mass participation, the two coordinated by an evolving ideological consensus. It is based on a conception of political power which is not "zero-sum" ("It means I have the power; you do not," Liu once said in outlining his plans for "socialist trusts"), but "organic": any increase in participation is thought to enhance the power of the entire group. The relationship of mass line bureaucracy to previous Chinese authority systems is depicted in Table 1.

TABLE 1
MASS LINE BUREAUCRACY AND PREVIOUS AUTHORITY SYSTEMS

		Elite Power	
		High	Low
Mass Participation	High	"Mass Line" Bureaucracy	Red Guard "Paris Commune"
	Low	Rational-legal "Liuist" Bureaucracy	Traditional Mandarin Bureaucracy

The future of mass line bureaucracy is for the Chinese to create and for us at this point only to conjecture. The Maoist attempt to emancipate China from the "iron cage" of rational-legal organization has had profound but not unmixed results, and a cogent argument can yet be made that economic exigencies of large-scale production, the principle of comparative costs, the benefits of specialization and a division of labor will impose constraints on organizational policies (Donnithorne, 1972; Baum, 1972). "Convergence" theories of both Marxists and bourgeois varieties are often based on the technological determinism that underlies this argument, but just how compelling are the constraints technology imposes upon organization remains a controversial question. To take but one example, the functionally specific division of labor is an acknowledged prerequisite of large-scale production, and post-GPCR Chinese managerial personnel show no aversion to this principle in their factories (PR, 1966), but there is conflicting evidence as to (1) how much of this division is technologically necessary and how much is culturally or politically inspired, (2) to what extent a horizontal division of function logically entails a vertical division of power, status or wealth (see Dreyfus, 1938: I, 1-18; Blauner, 1964: 55). The future is perhaps more open than we social scientists care to admit, for us as well as for the Chinese.

NOTES

1. According to Downs (1967: 164), "this rigidity cycle is much more likely to appear in communist countries than in most western nations for two reasons. First, most bureaus in non-democratic societies receive weaker feedbacks. Second, the bureaucracies in at least two communist nations–China and Russia–are vastly larger in absolute size." Ellul (1971: 160) has taken this generalization much further: "Each successful revolution has left the state enlarged, better organized, more potent, and with wider areas of influence; that has been the pattern even when revolution has assaulted and attempted to diminish the state."

2. Abbreviations used in citations of periodicals are as follows: CNA (China News Analysis); CNS (China News Summary); CLG (Chinese Law and Government); CB (Current Background); CS (Current Scene); DSJP (Daily Summary of the

Japanese Press); NCNA (New China News Agency); PR (Peking Review); PD (People's Daily); RF (Red Flag); SCMM (Selections from Chinese Mainland Magazines); SCMP (Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press); SWB (Short Wave Broadcasts of the World); JPRS (U.S. Joint Publications Research Service). Although specific issues of these journals are cited, all issues are applicable to this research.

3. E.g., the system of "production responsibility"–output quotas based on individual households *(pao-ch'an tao hu)*–which had been introduced in the spring of 1959.

4. "Chen shih shui p'o-pu-t'ung, chen ch'a-pu-chin," he said, using an idiom without precise English equivalent (Ming Pao, 1968).

5. "To tell the truth, I myself do not know and understand either," he admitted as late as July 29 (SCMM, n.d.). "Nor do the personnel of the other organs of the Party Center."

6. According to Dai Hsiao-ai (in Montaperto, 1972), "After the first week in June, our ideas began to change. . . . It seemed to us that, if the national leaders were guilty of mistakes and crimes, their counterparts in our school were equally guilty. . . . It was the information from the CCRG about the mistakes of the national Party leaders that enabled us to see this."

7. In an editorial note to his 1965 article, "Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside" (in Schram, 1963: 321), Mao already indicated reservations, however: "Work teams must be sent, but it must be stated very clearly that they are being sent to help local Party organizations, not to replace them."

8. According to a Red Guard report (in Hunter, 1969: 21), "A few Shanghai Municipal Committee Secretaries, . . . as soon as the article was published, they warned P'eng Chen . . . of his danger." On November 28, 1966, P'eng called a meeting at which he asked Teng T'o, "How is Wu Han now?" "Wu is nervous, for he is aware that this criticism [sc., Yao] originated from a source," Teng replied. "Source or not, we seek only the truth," P'eng reassured him. "In truth, everyone is equal" (JPRS, n.d.: 3).

9. "Who is behind all this? Why do they refuse to listen to the work teams and the Party?" Liu wondered at a public reception on June 22 (JPRS 42349: 22-23). He suspected backstage provocation by "high-ranking cadres of the former Municipal Party Committee" (i.e., P'eng Chen).

10. Thus one Party committee member recounts his misconceived attempt to act as a "transmitting station": "I always spoke according to the No. 1 and No. 2, and seldom bared my own mind. . . . To my surprise, I was criticized by other comrades for having no sense of responsibility in upholding the collective leadership" (PD, 1972a; in CB, n.d.g).

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