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# Party Rectification in Post-Mao China

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The Party rectification campaign launched by the Chinese Communist Party in 1982 represents an interesting attempt to come to terms with several of the dilemmas that have faced the new leaders since they initiated their ambitious reform program at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (CC). First and foremost is the issue of whether a Party rectification campaign per se can be made politically viable in light of the Party's general repudiation of the campaign approach to policy implementation. On the negative side of this question are the well-known adverse features of the mass movement, which risk alienating either the masses (if the movement is too tightly regimented) or the elites (if the masses are given license to attack the elites spontaneously). On the affirmative side is the functional need for some technique to arouse apparently enthusiastic and widespread support for new policies.<sup>1</sup> Can an organization that is accustomed to a crusade mentality be placed on a more orderly and routine footing without impairing its morale? Also urgently needed is some effective way to monitor and correct cadre abuses without giving free rein to anarchic reactions against authority.

The fact that Party rectification continues to qualify as a type of campaign, however restricted in compass and tactically modified, also raises the question of the proper role of the masses—that is, the non-Party citizenry—in its implementation since in previous campaigns, the masses played an important role—sometimes lauded, sometimes deplored. The fact that the Party rectification campaign never really got into high gear until the mass movement to clear up spiritual pollution and promote a socialist

spiritual civilization gathered momentum implies that the question whether the Party can really rectify itself by itself is still moot.

The Party rectification in question has been launched only recently and is still in its incipient stages, so any attempt to answer questions about it is necessarily preliminary and tentative. But in view of the facts that this is the first Party rectification campaign to have been undertaken in the post-Mao era and that it aspires to be among the most significant of such undertakings since the Yanan Zhengfeng movement (with which it is frequently compared), it is appropriate—in fact, inevitable—that questions be asked. The following brief survey will consist of three parts: a look at the preparations for the campaign, a preliminary assessment of the progress of implementation to date, and a concluding section dealing with the campaign's broader implications.

## Preparations

The Party rectification campaign has been in the offing for some time, and preparatory measures have been unusually elaborate. The problem was discussed as early as December 1978 at the Third Plenum, and in fact, the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission was established at that time (under the chairmanship of Chen Yun) in order to take effective countermeasures against the congeries of abuses that are generally categorized under the term “unhealthy work style.” Deng Xiaoping's reform faction won a significant victory at the Third Plenum, but its position was yet by no means secure, and its members no doubt wished to consolidate their power against the prospect of a leftist counterattack. Even on the right, among their presumed supporters, they saw problems—in an infatuation with democracy and a liberalizing tendency that threatened discipline and implicitly challenged the legitimacy of the proletarian dictatorship.

Thus in February 1980, at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh CC, the Party adopted a set of “Guiding Principles for Intra-Party Political Life” in an effort to establish a normative basis for rectification, and on November 12, 1981, Deng Xiaoping made an important speech at a Politburo meeting on the rectification of work style in which he identified its principal targets for

the first time. These were the “three types of person” (san zhong ren): the remnant elements of the Lin Biao-Jiang Qing counterrevolutionary clique, those who had gained power during the Cultural Revolution through “rebellion,” and the “smash and grabbers.” It will be noted that all of these types happened to be “leftists” (bearing in mind that the Democracy Wall activists had by this time been reclassified under this epithet because of their rambunctious tactics). Deng also drew attention to the problem of serious overstaffing in the Party, citing statistics to show that there were more than 600,000 cadres in the organs directly under the central authorities of the Party and the state and more than 1,000 people at or above the vice-ministerial level.<sup>2</sup>

Party rectification was then formally announced at the Twelfth Party Congress in September 1982. In his report to this congress, Party Secretary Hu Yaobang said that the rectification and consolidation of the Party (consolidation began to receive stronger emphasis than rectification, no doubt because the prospect of the latter had alarmed some people) would begin in the latter half of 1983 and last for three years. The objective would be to achieve a fundamental turn for the better in the work style of the Party. This was only one of three “fundamental turns for the better,” the others being “turns” in the nation’s finance and economy and social customs. But the Party’s work style was given top priority: Only through Party rectification and an improvement in Party work style could a fundamental improvement in social customs or in national finance and economic matters be achieved.<sup>3</sup> At the same meeting, Deng Xiaoping also emphasized the significance of Party consolidation and the rectification of work style, calling it one of the four guarantees of China’s success in achieving the Four Modernizations, but he somewhat pessimistically predicted that such efforts would have to continue until the end of the century.

It may be surmised that the most enthusiastic supporters of the rectification at this point were still the so-called practice faction (shijian pai) led by Deng Xiaoping, which may tentatively be divided into two subgroups. Having just delivered a severe, but not fatal, setback to the “whateverists” (fanshi pai), both subgroups were justifiably concerned about a possible counterattack from the Left and united in their determination to preempt this threat. In the absence or extenuation of such a

common threat, the senior veterans—such as Chen Yun, Wang Zhen, Bo Yibo, and Deng Liqun—were primarily concerned with the restoration of order; though they were in favor of economic reform, they were concerned about the corruption and ideological confusion they perceived to be flowing in through China’s new open door and intent upon staunching it. The younger reformers—led by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and including Wan Li and Wang Zhaoguo among the civilian cadres and such recently upward mobile military cadres as Zhang Tingfa, Qin Jiwei, and Hong Xuezhi (Zhang rose after the Third Plenum; Qin and Hong were both promoted after Hu Yaobang became general-secretary)—had more ambitious career objectives that transcended the tenures of office of their superiors, in pursuit of which more thorough rectification of the veteran Left would be expedient. As group patron, Deng Xiaoping alternatively displayed sympathy for both subgroups, which resulted in an ambiguity that is typical of his position since the Third Plenum.

Throughout the winter of 1982–1983, the Party conducted experiments in preparation for the campaign; the experience gained therein would be summarized and used as guiding principles in the subsequent implementation. In the central government apparatus, ministries and commissions under the State Council conducted rotating training classes for Party members to study various documents in preparation for the campaign, primarily the new Party Constitution; by the end of March 1983, twenty-seven ministries and commissions were in the process of conducting rotational training “by stages and in groups,” and other units were preparing to do so.<sup>4</sup> The CC sent out work teams to seventeen provinces, municipalities under the jurisdiction of the central government, and autonomous regions to help solve the problems encountered in the course of experimentation. For example, Beijing Municipality selected a number of units in the municipal Party committee organs, the industries, the capital-construction system, the financial and trade system, the countryside, and urban areas as experimental places for Party rectification work and sent leading cadres down to the relevant departments of the district and bureau Party committees to participate in the process.

According to a survey and an analysis of the 3,658 Party branches in Beijing Municipality that was conducted in conjunction with this

experiment, fewer than one-third of the branches were fully satisfactory; about 60 percent were deemed average, and 10 percent were considered backward, of which some were paralyzed or semiparalyzed. The main problems encountered were factionalism, lack of a forthright ideological line, an attitude of doubt and resistance toward Party policies (particularly policies introduced since the Third Plenum), an inclination to take advantage of one's office to pursue personal privilege, and an inclination to take advantage of decentralization with respect to superiors so that each might do whatever he or she thinks is right and to take the posture of "whatever I say goes" with regard to subordinates. Of the 650,000 Party members in Beijing, 310,000, or 48 percent of the total, had joined the Party before the Cultural Revolution, 250,000 (38 percent of the total) had joined during the Cultural Revolution, and 90,000 (14 percent of the total) had joined after the collapse of the Gang of Four. The impact of the Cultural Revolution was still considered a major threat; some cadres even said, "Why should Party members have to lead in pursuing our work; why can't the masses take the lead?"<sup>5</sup>

Yet far from experiencing any such upheavals, this preparatory period appears—from the slim evidence available—to have been dedicated exclusively to the supervised study of documents, and there was considerable reluctance to air local problems. Hunan Province, for example, reported that from November 1982 until July 1983, only eight units were assigned as experimental places for Party rectification work, a process that was carried out in sequence. In three advanced units, the work of Party member registration and election of leading groups had been completed and the experience was being summarized; of the other five units, some were comparing and inspecting, some testing and evaluating personnel in the leading groups. Development of the experimental work was "not balanced," the major complaint being "slackness," not "bold enough to face confrontation."<sup>6</sup>

In any event, a total of more than 580 different types of grass roots Party organizations in the twenty-nine provinces, municipalities under direct central governance, and autonomous regions had carried out some form of Party consolidation work since the Twelfth Congress. From January to August 1983, about 92.4 percent of the Party members were reportedly sent

to receive training; in the PLA, 92.6 percent of all Party members received such training from early 1983 to September 1983.<sup>7</sup> In May 1983, the CC convoked a Symposium on the Work of Party Consolidation to coordinate these preliminary efforts. On July 1, People's Daily published an editorial, "Resolutely Overcome the Unhealthy Tendencies Within the Party," asking Party committees at all levels to strengthen their leadership of the experiments and to lay a sturdy foundation for the forthcoming rectification.

## Implementation

The next major watershed in the development of the Party rectification campaign was the Second Plenum of the Twelfth CC, which was conducted on October 11 and 12, 1983, after a two-day preparatory meeting. This session marked the passage from the experimental stage to the application of rectification to the Party at large. Both Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun gave important speeches stressing the campaign's significance. On October 11, the plenary members passed "The Decision of the CC of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation," which outlined a relatively detailed prospectus for the campaign under nine separate headings. Rectification would last for three years and be conducted in two stages. During the first stage, beginning in the winter of 1983, work would focus on the consolidation of Party organs of the leading bodies at the central, provincial, municipalities under central governance, and autonomous region levels. At the same time, provincial Party committees were to be enjoined to run experimental areas of Party rectification at the county (xian) and sub-provincial prefectural (zhou) levels. During the second stage, beginning in the winter of 1984, the work would stress the consolidation of all Party organs at the district and grass-roots levels.<sup>8</sup>

The organization of the campaign represents a contrast to (and an implicit rejection of) the campaign practices of the Cultural Revolution and, more generally, the period of Mao's ascendancy.<sup>9</sup> Thus the Decision warned against excessive zeal: "attention should be paid to guard against the erroneous practice of the past of ruthless struggle and merciless attack. It is

absolutely impermissible for anyone to take advantage of the Party consolidation to whip up factionalism to persecute others, to make false charges or to retaliate against others against whom he bears a grudge.”<sup>10</sup>

The movement is to proceed fen qi fen pi (“stage by stage and group by group”), as in the Socialist Education Campaign of the early 1960s, thereby avoiding nationally coordinated, simultaneous “wavelike advances.” It is to move “from top to bottom,” both in terms of the Party hierarchy as a whole and within each individual unit. A special central steering committee (zhongyang zhengdang zhidao weiyuanhui) was set up under the chairmanship of Hu Yaobang to lead the campaign.<sup>11</sup> It did not appear to develop a network of subordinate committees that paralleled the Party-state hierarchy, as in many previous campaigns, nor was it to send out the work teams that had become so notorious during the Cultural Revolution; it could however send out liaison teams to the various units to observe (without actively interfering) and make reports. The central steering committee was to hold meetings in the winter of 1983 or the spring of 1984 to discuss questions concerning the strengthening of work on the ideological front. In each Party organization, rectification would be carried out by the leadership of the Party unit itself, which would then report to its superior organization for official approval.

In terms of overall objectives, rectification would involve a struggle on two fronts, tacitly shifting from Hu Yaobang’s 1982 emphasis on the inherited sins of the Cultural Revolution to at least equal billing for cadre corruption (usually considered a rightist deviation). The Decision set forth four main tasks for the campaign: the achievement of ideological unity, the rectification of Party work style, the strengthening of discipline, and the purification of the Party organization.

Ideological unity would be achieved through the intensive study of designated documents, attended by criticism and self-criticism. Aside from the Decision itself, study documents would include a primer for Party members, a collection of important post-1978 documents (such as those of the Third Plenum or the constitution of the Twelfth Party Congress), a selection of Mao’s writings on the Party’s work style and organization, and The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, of which no fewer than 40 million copies have been published since July 1983 (which happens to coincide

precisely with the number of Party members).<sup>12</sup> Much was made at the Second Plenum of an article by Chen Yun, originally published in Yanan in December 1939, “To Study Is the Responsibility of the Communist Party Members”, as well as his “Comments on the Draft of the ‘Resolution on Party History’” and his speech “Concerning the Problem of Two Deviations by Party Art Workers,”<sup>13</sup> so his Selected Works will presumably be studied as well. Once the period of study and education is considered complete, each Party organization will submit to an acceptance test (a written examination, to which most cadres are hardly accustomed) administered by a superior organization.

The rectification of Party work style is to be based on the Four Basic Principles, which were first enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in March 1979. Taking a cue from Deng Xiaoping, the Decision again defined the main targets as the “three types”: those “who rose to prominence by following the counterrevolutionary cliques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing in ‘rebellion,’ those who are seriously factionalist in their ideas, and those who indulged in beating, smashing and looting.”<sup>14</sup> To the original san zhong ren, however, the Decision added an additional six candidates for disciplinary sanction: those who have stubbornly resisted the policies of the CC adopted since the Third Plenum; those who have committed grave economic crimes; those who have committed serious mistakes but refuse consistently to correct them; those who do not have a correct ideological consciousness, create splits, do not have a sense of responsibility, and are not career minded; those unprincipled “good old boys”; and those who do not have any political integrity and are in a state of inertia.<sup>15</sup>

The original three types were all leftists, whereas the additional six might be assumed to be more broadly distributed, perhaps including many of the veteran cadres who composed Deng’s core constituency of Cultural Revolution victims. The last-named category might be expected to be particularly ubiquitous; of the 21 million Party and government cadres, it is estimated that only about 20 percent have a college education and 30 percent some professional competence.<sup>16</sup> For those cadres whose cultural level is low, organization departments at all levels are urged to work out training programs that are in line with the practical conditions and requirements of their local areas.



The third task, strengthening Party discipline, involves an attack on economic criminals. For those cadres whose unhealthy work style is manifested in such traits as bureaucratism, seeking private gain at public expense by exploiting one's office, or committing economic crimes, severe sanctions are in order. According to the "Report on the Attack on Serious Criminal Activities in the Economic Field" issued by the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, a total of 192,000 cases of economic crime were exposed and investigated between January 1982 and April 1983. These cases involved 71,000 Party members, about 8,500 of whom have been stripped of Party membership.<sup>17</sup> In addition to Party disciplinary actions, sanctions include criticism and self-criticism, administrative measures, and legal sanctions.

The final task, purification of the Party organization, involves reregistration of all 40 million Party members. Some Party members will be permitted to reregister, some may have their registrations postponed pending further educational efforts, and some will not be allowed to register and will have their names removed from the Party entirely. It has been widely anticipated that reregistration will involve a sweeping purge of people who moved upward during the Cultural Revolution as they compose the "three types of person" categories that are designated as prime targets.

There are at present about 40 million Party members, attached to 2.5 million Party organs from the grass roots level to the CC, of whom about 9 million are cadres. About 18 million were recruited before the Cultural Revolution, and 4 million have been recruited during the post-Mao period, which leaves 18 million who were recruited during the Cultural Revolution decade. Although all in this group must be considered vulnerable, their liability has been somewhat extenuated by certain passages in the Decision. When rectification was first broached in 1982, its political aspect was quite prominent, but in 1983 it was stipulated (in the Decision) that the criterion for determining whether someone was one of the "three types" is the actual damage done to the Party and the people in the case at hand, not the historical background of the person (i.e., membership in a particular faction during the Cultural Revolution). In contradistinction to previous movements, there would be no quotas for the number of either punishments

within or expulsions from the Party. All disciplinary measures must be approved by the Party's organization at the next highest level.

In the course of implementation, the rectification campaign has thus far proceeded through two phases. The first phase, initiated at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth CC, lasted through the end of 1983. In addition to the Decision, the work of this phase was defined by Central Document no. 1, issued October 24, 1983, which contains various study materials, and by Central Document no. 4, issued on December 12 to the various liaison groups (lianhuayuan xiaozu), the leaders of which were called to a high-level conference with the steering committee.

Inasmuch as this phase of the campaign coincided with a campaign to clear mental pollution, which was also formally launched at the Second Plenum, many of its themes were drawn from this simultaneous mass movement. In fact, although the Decision indicated that rectification would be pursued without mass involvement<sup>18</sup> (whereas in some previous campaigns, such as the Hundred Flowers or the Cultural Revolution, the distinction between “inner” and “outer” had been lost), there was some tendency to merge the two movements. This inclination, for example, was evident in the speeches given at a forum for democratic parties that was convened by the CC from October 21 to October 26, which solicited the views of these non-Party notables on both Party rectification and spiritual pollution. Luo Qiong put the two campaigns in tandem in a written statement to veteran cadres on November 24, and even Bo Yibo, vice-chairman of the Standing Committee of the Central Steering Committee, indicated that the clearing of mental pollution was part of the work of inner-Party rectification.<sup>19</sup>

The second phase of the campaign began in early 1984. Hu Yaobang, who had been in Japan at the time of the initiation of the Spiritual Pollution Campaign, and had been conspicuously silent about it after his return, signaled the shift as early as October 25 when he defined the rectification in terms of promoting good things and overcoming the current negative side. What was the current negative side? Ignoring the “three types of person,” he defined the negative side in terms of economic criminals, lawbreakers, those who abused power for selfish reasons, and followers of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing.<sup>20</sup> At the session of the Standing Committee of the National

People's Congress held in early December, the Spiritual Pollution Campaign aroused strong controversy and was not brought to a vote. In an interview with French journalists on January 25, 1984, Hu again discussed his view of the purpose of the rectification movement, and the newspapers correspondingly shifted their emphasis from spiritual pollution to “bad Party work style” (bu liao zuofeng, bu zheng zhifeng). Also in January, when People's Daily reported on the progress of the campaign at various levels, the emphasis was almost entirely on study documents, with no indication of any personnel changes. The main objective of the rectification campaign was now defined as ensuring that cadres work conscientiously and competently—with increasing emphasis on the latter, more apolitical, criterion.

How can this apparent moderation of the campaign be accounted for? One possibility is that the lower-level cadres, who may be assumed to comprise most of the “three types of person” eligible for purge in the first instance, were simply too skillful in redefining campaign objectives, mobilizing local support, etc., to be dislodged. There is some question as to what proportion of the 18 million Cultural Revolution recruits were really devotees of the Gang of Four and what proportion were simply politically ambitious and upwardly mobile; there is also some question how many radical loyalists managed to survive the three-year campaign against them in 1977–1980. Another possibility is that Hu Yaobang simply wished to avoid a struggle that might quickly become a generation conflict between veterans and youth, thereby adversely affecting the recruitment base of this erstwhile chairman of the Communist Youth League.

## Implications

Both outside commentators and the responsible authorities themselves have often compared the current rectification to Mao's original Zhengfeng movement at Yanan in 1942–1944. In many ways, the analogy is apt. Both campaigns were launched to consolidate a major shift of Party line and to build political support for a new regime—Mao Zedong's at Yanan and that of Deng Xiaoping and (more pertinently) Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in

the present instance. Whereas the Yanan movement anticipated the seizure of power on the mainland, the current campaign looks forward to the realization of the Four Modernizations. Publication of Deng's Selected Works on July 1 recalls the heavy reliance on Mao's writings (for the first time) in the 1940s.

Although too little is really known about the Yanan movement, let alone the ongoing one, to permit a tenable comparison, it seems to me that the present campaign is essentially different. Zhengfeng seems to have been the first concerted rectification campaign, and the technique was still sharp at that point, so it could be pushed ruthlessly ahead without all the trepidations that seem to burden the current program. The regime is now attempting to embark on reform in a context in which reform, because of its inherently incalculable consequences, evokes fears of a resurgence of radicalism. Thus, the regime proceeds only with extreme caution, moving ahead only to backtrack at the first sign of adverse consequences.

The regime confronts a series of dilemmas and problems to which traditional expedients provide no fully satisfactory solution and for which the suitability of untried new proposals is quite uncertain. These problems range from quite practical political problems to more abstract developmental dilemmas. Among the former is, How should the young people who participated in the Cultural Revolution be dealt with? The current consensus is that the Cultural Revolution was an unmitigated disaster, which has commonly been translated to mean that all the people who rose against the "Party persons in authority taking the capitalist road" are now considered villainous. The "three types of person" category abets this construal. And yet the young people whom Mao inspired to overthrow evil and make way for a brave new world were unquestionably political idealists whose ideals were then seasoned by their experiences in the factional wars or during their tenure in the countryside. For all they lack in formal education, they do tend to make up contemporary China's most politically sophisticated generation since the revolution. They were at Tiananmen to honor the memory of Zhou Enlai, and they provided vocal mass support for Deng Xiaoping during his rise against the "whateverists" in 1978–1979. Now that Deng's position is secure, it might be possible to suppress this troublesome constituency without adverse consequences, yet there is certainly a need for youthful enthusiasm in a system that still

operates on the seniority system, if only to exert pressure on entrenched bureaucrats.

Which brings us to the second practical problem: How can the venality that is inherent in any large-scale bureaucracy be rectified? To rely on internal controls such as criticism and self-criticism seems to be inadequate, and even the attempt to construct an external control hierarchy (viz., the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission [CDIC] and its subordinate agencies) has not yet had impressive consequences. The notion of a “campaign” to correct bureaucratic abuses is very unpopular because of the havoc campaigns wreak without permanently solving problems, and yet, if there is no means whereby the people can monitor the bureaucracy, it seems unrealistic to expect the bureaucrats to keep their own house in order. There have been some encouraging efforts to utilize letters to the editor in newspapers and letters to the CDIC to bring attention to conspicuous abuses, and perhaps more will be done along these lines.

The more general problem is, of course, how to make the transition from a revolutionary, charismatic regime to an institutionalized, “routinized” modernizing system without a crisis of confidence. Although perhaps economically ineffectual, Mao Zedong thought has been linked with public morality in China so long and so well that to repudiate it is fraught with more risk to the system’s legitimacy than Khrushchev’s repudiation of Stalinism. The leaders are accustomed to implementing those policies they deem important through crusadelike movements, in which a constantly evolving consensus is generated by an evolving repertoire of slogans; for them to shift abruptly to a bureaucratic proceduralism, based on rule-governed implementation with a relatively fixed, codified consensus means risking apathy, loss of political momentum, elitism, and corruption. Such a dilemma had not yet emerged at the time of Yanan. The flaws in the campaign approach were then not yet apparent; even more important, there was no bureaucratic alternative.

It is the presence—indeed, the inescapability—of this alternative that is so decisive at this stage in China’s development. Implicit in the Deng Xiaoping “reform” regime’s criticism of the late Maoist era and in the whole thrust of its plans for the future is the assumption that institutional vested interests must not be incautiously assailed. They may be expediently rearranged, but the interests and functions they serve must still be taken into

account. This assumption has given rise to a sort of cryptopluralism that promises to change the face of Chinese politics. The actors will still be a small group of elites in Beijing, but their political power will be defined, not by their ties to an ideologically defined informal network (faction), but by their links to a functional system in the division of labor. The way politics will be conducted is by “floating” or attempting to “capture” already available issues by preemptive definition. The way one can determine whether an issue has been effectively captured or not is whether the particular definition imposed generates a politically influential constituency. Rather than actively mobilizing mass support an elite will now “angle” for such support in much the same way that someone angles for fish, trying one rhetorical lure after another.

Perhaps the most effective practitioner of this technique in recent Chinese politics has been the PLA. Six weeks before the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh CC, at which Hua Guofeng was to officially lose his chairmanship of the Party, Liberation Army Daily published an article criticizing Bai Hua by name for the filmscript “Bitter Love.” This article was scrupulously ignored (as far as outsiders can determine) during the plenum, but shortly afterward a campaign was launched against Bai Hua, and it was followed by other campaigns against bourgeois liberalization and in favor of building a socialist spiritual civilization. Again in 1982, on the eve of the Twelfth Party Congress, a military propagandist named Zhao Yiya published an article simultaneously in Liberation Army Daily and Shanghai’s Liberation Daily entitled “Communist Ideology Is the Core of Socialist Spiritual Civilization,” in which he argued that ideology was of more importance than culture or education. This attempt to preempt the Party “line,” coming even after the latter had been ratified by the Politburo at the Seventh Plenum of the Eleventh CC, was too bold and was met with sharp criticism, but it fits the emerging pattern.

The “struggle between two fronts” format provides a rich field of ambiguity for these politics of rhetorical preemption, for it places the correct “line” between two forbidden alternatives, leaving unclear which poses the greater danger. Representatives of either side will attempt to preempt the particular rhetorical formulation that best approximates their interests and turn it against its logical antithesis. Thus, during the opening phase of the Party rectification movement in the fall of 1983, the two fronts

consisted of spiritual pollution on one side, which implies an attack against the Right (against the intellectuals), and Party rectification on the other, which originally implied an attack against the Left (against the cadres). Struggle on both fronts was launched concurrently, and the relationship between these two struggles is complex and obscure. The two struggles are at once compensatory and competitive, as higher cadres try to use Party rectification to purge younger radicals and the latter emphasize the struggle against spiritual pollution. One possible interpretation is that Deng Xiaoping launched the campaign against spiritual pollution as a sop to the Left in order to generate sufficient support to pursue Party rectification. But such an interpretation is only preliminary, and any final reckoning must await the conclusion of the two campaigns. What seems interesting at this point are the emergent patterns.

## Notes

1. See the vindication of the campaign approach in Shen Baoxiang, "Do Not Exaggerate the Concept of 'Political Campaign,'" Jiefang ribao [Liberation daily] (Shanghai), November 21, 1981, p. 4.

2. Chang Chen-pang, "Peip'ing's Rectification of the Party Work Style," Issues and Studies (hereafter IS) 18:5 (May 1982), pp. 1-5.

3. Ming.pao, November 30, 1982, p. 5.

4. Guo Xuan, "Strengthen the Education of Party Members and Do a Good Job of Preparing for Party Rectification," Renmin ribao [People's daily] (hereafter RR), April 22, 1983, p. 3.

5. See note 3.

6. Ming.pao, July 7, 1983, p. 5.

7. New China News Agency report, October 13, 1983, and October 18, 1983.

8. "The Decision of the CC of the Communist Party of China on Party Consolidation," Beijing Review 26:42 (October 17, 1983), p. 2.

9. See David S.G. Goodman, "The Second Plenary Session of the 12th CCP Central Committee: Rectification and Reform," China Quarterly, no. 97 (March 1984), pp. 84-91.

10. Beijing Review 26:42 (October 17, 1983), p. 9.
11. Important members included Bo Yibo (vice-chairman), Deng Liqun, and Wang Zhaoguo.
12. Beijing Review 26:28 (July 11, 1983), pp. 5–6, and New York Times, September 30 and November 20, 1983.
13. Guangming ribao [Enlightenment daily], July 25, 1983.
14. See note 8.
15. “To Accelerate the ‘Four Modernizations’: Construction of the Leading Body with the Spirit of Reform,” RR, July 22, 1983, p. 1.
16. RR, December 11, 1983, and January 6, 14, 21, and February 7, 1984; Far Eastern Economic Review 122:50 (December 15, 1983), p. 23.
17. Chang Chen-pang, “Party Consolidation and Work Style Rectification,” IS (August 1983), pp. 1–5.
18. The Second Plenum stated that “on no account should the past erroneous practices of ‘letting the masses consolidate the Party’ or letting non-Party members decide issues in the Party be repeated” Beijing Review 26:42 (October 17, 1983), p. 7.
19. RR, January 6, 1983, p. 1. To be sure, Bo may have been trying to damp down the campaign against spiritual pollution rather than heat up the Party rectification campaign.
20. RR, October 25, 1983, p. 1.