

## 2 Political and cultural roots of Sino-Russian partnership

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### Historic roots of Sino-Russian relations

Forging human security cross-culturally is often challenging, no more so than where East meets West. Modern China and Russia are both cultures built less on specific foundational documents such as a declaration of independence or constitution than on long histories that stretch into prehistory and myth. The relationship between these two vast empires astride the Eurasian heartland has historically been ‘complicated’ [*fūza*], as the Chinese diplomatically put it. On the one hand, there are certain broad similarities: both were vast bureaucratic autocracies, agriculturally based, with a presumed ideological significance to the rest of the world. Each acquired a vague dread of the other – to Russia the East represented backwardness, despotism, the threat of demographic inundation; to China, the North (and the West) was the chronic source of barbarian invasions. Russia, though its imperialist thrust was toward the East and the South, was culturally oriented to the West; as Dostoevsky put it, ‘In Europe we are too Asiatic, whereas in Asia we are too European.’ China’s self-image was that of the self-sufficient ‘central kingdom’, expecting tribute from abroad with little need for international reference groups. And there are ample historical reasons for this mutual aversion. In 1223–40, Batu Khan, grandson of Genghis and leader of the Golden Horde, and his main strategist, General Subutai, invaded the Russian principalities, sacking and burning Moscow, Kiev and 12 other cities, sparing only Smolensk and Novgorod (which agreed to pay tribute). This was no mere raid: the Golden Horde built themselves a capital called Sarai on the lower Volga, where they continued to collect tribute and exercise dominion until around 1480. The impact of what became known as the ‘Tataro-Mongol yoke’ has been mythologized as one of terrible suffering, the source of Oriental despotism (as subsequently practised by Ivan the Terrible), the death penalty, long-term imprisonment and torture, even Russia’s dilatory involvement in the European Renaissance and Reformation. But the Mongols also contributed to the development of a postal road network, census, fiscal system and Russian military organization. Actually, they did not interfere much in social life; as Shamanists they were quite broadminded about other religions and permitted subject populations to retain their own customs and culture, even allowing Russian princes to collect taxes on their behalf.<sup>1</sup>

Though the descendants of the Golden Horde were swept aside in imperial Russia's expansion into Siberia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mongol heritage is still visible in that some 15 per cent of the families of the Boyars, or Russian nobility, claim Mongol descent (e.g., Boris Godunov, Bakhmetaev).

During this period, Russia clearly lagged behind China developmentally, with a population that did not reach 13 million until 1725 (compared with China's flourishing civilization and approximately 150 million people), and the first Russian visitors to Beijing in the modern era (beginning in the mid-seventeenth century) were obliged to prostrate themselves [*koutou*] before the emperor. But under the long reigns of tsars Peter I (1682–1725) and Catherine II (1762–96), Russia launched an ambitious economic modernization and Westernization campaign, consolidating the northeast upon defeating the Swedes and then pushing south to take Ukraine and the Caucasus from the Ottoman Turks. Russian industrialization following the defeat of Napoleon coincided with the decline of the Manchu Qing Dynasty in the nineteenth century, beginning with a series of domestic insurgencies in the first half and commencing the 'hundred years of humiliation' with the Opium War debacle in the second half. Russia's push eastward in quest of raw materials, trade and territory, as symbolized *inter alia* by construction of the trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1916), led to increasing infringement on imperial China amid competition with other imperialist powers. The Russian imperialist strategy was that of a 'free rider', interceding only when China was preoccupied by more urgent threats – thus while there were two Sino-British Wars, a Sino-French War and a Sino-Japanese War, there was no Sino-Russian War – yet the Russians were not to be left behind in the quest for spoils. Thus in 1854–9, while China was engulfed by the Taiping Rebellion (1851–64), General N.N. Murawjew and 20,000 troops occupied the delta and north shore of the Amur/Heilong River and the maritime provinces without firing a shot. During the second Opium War, Russian forces made further inroads, also participating in 1899 in the international expeditionary force to quell the Boxers (as a pretext for occupying Manchuria). These gains were consolidated in the treaties of Kuldja (1851), Aigun (1858) and Tarbagatai (1864); though later denounced for being 'unequal', they awarded Russia a vast swath of some 665,000 square miles of land in the region of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers in northern Manchuria to the Pacific Ocean. During the Yakub Beg Rebellion in Xinjiang, Russian troops occupied part of the Yili region, formalized in the Treaty of Livadia (later modified in China's favour in the Treaty of St Petersburg). In 1898 Russia relegated Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian to treaty port status and demanded a leasehold on the Liaodong peninsula to construct a port. Russian claims on Manchuria and Liaodong, however, fell athwart those of Japan, precipitating the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5) – and the former's defeat. Count Witte's skilful negotiations at Portsmouth, however, forestalled punitive sanctions and Moscow was back in the game, taking advantage of the 1911 Xinhai Revolution to establish a protectorate over Outer Mongolia.

## Enter communism

After the Bolshevik Revolution, the new revolutionary regime renounced its share of the Boxer reparations as well as most imperialist privileges in China in the famously ambiguous Karakhan Declaration (1919), and quickly established diplomatic relations with the short-lived Peking Republic (1924).<sup>2</sup> Moscow, however, helped to organize and advise the birth of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921, while also assisting in the reorganization of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT), along Leninist lines two years later.<sup>3</sup> After some three decades of turmoil, during which two united fronts fell apart in the process of resisting Japanese invasion – motivated in large part by Moscow’s need to protect its vulnerable eastern flank – the CCP, while continuing to accept Soviet material aid, began to sideline its advice, most decisively during the 1942–4 rectification movement [*zhengfeng*] conducted in Yanan after the Long March, wherein Mao and Kang Sheng sought to purge the party of the influence of the ‘international faction’ (also known as the 28 returned students) most loyal to Moscow and thus make way for ‘Marxism-Leninism with Chinese characteristics’, in which Mao Zedong Thought would take a leading role.<sup>4</sup> While it is true that Comintern advice during the late 1920s and early 1930s contributed to the near annihilation of the CCP by the KMT and that Mao’s subsequent adoption of guerrilla warfare waged by peasant armies proved far more successful than the Comintern strategy of urban insurrections, the adoption of ‘united front’ tactics at Moscow’s insistence in 1936 may have rescued the embattled CCP at a crucial juncture. In any case, the CCP made far better use of the anti-Japanese war than its domestic rival, using nationalist appeals to expand vigorously behind enemy lines and then out-strategizing exhausted Nationalist armies, ultimately driving the KMT into exile in Taiwan.

Having joined Stalin in his excommunication of Tito, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) ‘leaned to one side’, relying solely on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for aid in consolidating its revolution. After prolonged and delicate negotiations in Moscow, Mao and Stalin signed a thirty-year Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (14 February 1950) capitalizing on shared ideological values and a history of revolutionary collaboration to establish a Eurasian partnership. Moscow agreed to provide a loan of US\$300 million over five years at a subsidized rate of interest (1 per cent), plus construction aid, technical advisers and plans for building 50 (eventually thrice that) massive industrial projects, ceding most of the concessions it had gained in 1945 negotiations establishing a Sino-Soviet alliance with the Nationalist regime.<sup>5</sup> And Stalin’s relationship with Mao was intimate enough that he could warn him of potential dissidence within his own Politburo.<sup>6</sup> But not until Beijing sent ‘volunteers’ into the Korean War, while simultaneously underwriting the first Indochina War (playing a particularly vital role at the climactic siege of Dienbienphu), was Stalin fully satisfied with the PRC contribution. Stalin reportedly counselled the Chinese to adopt a ‘people’s democratic dictatorship’ and proceed slowly with socialization domestically, but fully endorsed Chinese support for revolutionary

movements in the Third World so long as they could not be attributed to the USSR.<sup>7</sup> Although the massive exercise in transplanting modern (socialist) industrial culture from the Soviet Union to the PRC was to end badly, for amply documented reasons, the period of cooperation made an undeniable substantive contribution to Chinese development – also establishing ‘old school ties’ of lasting value to future members of the CCP elite.<sup>8</sup>

The period of ‘friendship’ had by the end of the decade morphed into three decades of fratricidal polemics, diplomatic encirclement and counter-encirclement manoeuvres, arms race and border violence that obsessed both sides at the time and has puzzled them since. No doubt the reasons were partly personal: Mao had few laudatory posthumous words for Stalin but for Khrushchev he expressed open contempt, faulting him for unleashing revisionism by launching de-Stalinization and for craven abandonment of Third World revolution in favour of détente with the US. Yet although Khrushchev’s inept management of the relationship with China was among the reasons cited for his 1964 purge, his successors, now afraid of their neighbour’s newly acquired nuclear power, proved no more willing to make necessary concessions. The climax was reached during China’s Cultural Revolution, held in part to purge the leadership of ‘capitalist-road’ tendencies first identified during the foregoing ideological dispute with the USSR. The Red Guards besieged the enormous Russian embassy in Beijing for months, women and children were evacuated, and border friction erupted in March 1969 in armed clashes along the Ussuri and Amur (and later in Xinjiang as well). While both Moscow and Beijing solicited the assistance of the leading capitalist superpower against the other, Washington responded only to the latter, providing an implicit balance which, along with Sino-Soviet border talks, helped contain the dispute.

### **Sino-Russia reconciliation**

After Mao’s death on 9 September 1976, the ideological barriers against Sino-Soviet reconciliation gradually began to dissipate, though mutual fear of the ‘polar bear’ still provided the cement for Sino-American normalization in 1979, facilitating cooperation against suspected Soviet proxies in Afghanistan and Vietnam, for example.<sup>9</sup> The rise of Ronald Reagan, whose crusade against the ‘evil empire’ led to revived East-West Cold War and a ‘Star Wars’ arms race, shifted the triangular dynamic somewhat. In effect, the bipolar arms race relieved China of much of its defence burden: the military was listed last of the ‘four modernizations’ and PRC arms spending was reduced by some 7 per cent per annum as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1979 to 1989. From a triangular perspective, Soviet-American polarization put Beijing in a pivot position from which it could enjoy better relations with each side than each had with the other.<sup>10</sup> While quietly allowing the Sino-Soviet treaty to lapse upon its expiry in 1981, the PRC thus agreed to discuss outstanding problems with the Russians and, beginning in 1982, after transacting Sino-American normalization and extorting the Third Communiqué (limiting future arms sales to Taiwan), a

series of Sino-Soviet ‘normalization’ talks were held (while diplomatic relations had never been broken, Beijing deemed party-to-party relations ‘abnormal’), alternating semi-annually between the two capitals in the spring and fall of each year, involving the same team of officials on either side. Progress was initially glacial due to Soviet intransigence over what Beijing called the ‘three fundamental obstacles’: heavy fortification of the Sino-Soviet border and Outer Mongolia, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and support of the Vietnamese threat to China’s southeastern flank. Talks nevertheless continued on schedule, accompanied by gradually increasing trade and cultural exchanges, helping to institutionalize the dispute-settlement process during a series of post-Brezhnev succession crises.

When Gorbachev decided to cut Soviet foreign policy losses in the late 1980s to focus on domestic reform, he decided – while terminating high-risk ventures in the Third World – to try to revive the Sino-Soviet friendship, discharging an expensive defence burden and opening the way to the economically booming Pacific Rim. In speeches at Vladivostok (July 1986) and Krasnoyarsk (September 1988) he proposed a freeze on deployment of nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region, conditional Soviet withdrawal from the Cam Ranh Bay naval facility in Vietnam, and unilateral reduction of the Soviet military by 500,000 troops within two years, nearly half (200,000) of which would come from the region east of the Urals. This Soviet ‘new thinking’ [*novo myshlenie*], according to which Brezhnev’s vaunted strategic parity with the US had achieved few substantial gains at immense cost, eventually satisfied all three Chinese ‘obstacles’. Meanwhile, inasmuch as both countries’ economies were running aground on the limits of ‘extensive development’ under command planning – the Soviet Union after years of stagnation under Brezhnev, China after utopian Maoism had exhausted itself in the Cultural Revolution – fresh leadership teams in both capitals turned to ‘socialist reform’, an attempt at revitalization referred to respectively as *perestroika*/glasnost and *gaige kaifang*. There was again a sense among party cadres and policy intellectuals that both countries, with symmetrically structured and ideologically oriented economies, could learn from one another. While during the Maoist period Soviet criticism of China was taken up by Soviet liberals as an Aesopian way of criticizing analogous (i.e., Stalinist) tendencies in the Soviet Union, now the liberals rallied to China’s support. Because China had been first to experiment with reform, most of the initial learning was on the Soviet side – but China also paid close attention to Soviet experiments, and in fact the liberalization that led to the 1986 protest movement (and to the subsequent demotion of Hu Yaobang) was inspired not only by Deng Xiaoping’s Delphic early encouragement but also by Gorbachev’s prior call for Soviet political reform. Whereas such ‘learning’ was, to be sure, selective and would eventually lead in divergent directions, the fact that both countries were engaged in analogous socioeconomic experiments and interested in each other’s experience helped to orchestrate their detente. Based then on both foreign policy and domestic policy convergence, it had become possible by the end of the 1980s to hold a summit to seal the ‘normalization’ of party-to-party relations.

## **Post-Soviet relations**

This summit, held in May 1989 amid student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square – which necessitated moving all ceremonies indoors, much to Deng’s annoyance – quite unexpectedly marked both climax and terminus to this process of reconvergence around a socialist reform agenda. The sanguinary Chinese solution to spontaneous student protests, implemented within a fortnight of Gorbachev’s departure, led to international sanctions and to a quiet Soviet resolve (no public rebuke) to avoid any analogous outcome, whether domestically or among Warsaw Pact Organization signatories.<sup>11</sup> But without resort to outside force, European socialism could not stand, and by the end of 1991 all but China, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam and Cuba had succumbed to a wave of anti-communist protest movements. Throughout 1989–91, the Chinese leadership, still defending both Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the crackdown, deplored this as ‘peaceful evolution’, a capitalist conspiracy theory, but more immediately attributable to Gorbachev’s flaccid leadership, ‘deviating from the path of socialism’. In early 1990 Deng Liqun and the more ideologically orthodox wing of the CCP even advocated a public critique of Soviet errors along the lines of the ‘Nine Commentaries’ of the early 1960s, which Deng Xiaoping, however, vetoed. No sooner had Beijing become reconciled to cooperation with Gorbachev – after the defeat of a client state in the Gulf War (January–February 1991), some socialist response to the triumphalist American ‘new world order’ seemed imperative – than was Gorbachev’s own survival threatened by an August 1991 coup attempt by defenders of the status quo. Though the PRC came perilously close to supporting the coup before it was suppressed, it recovered in time to reaffirm its non-interference, only to witness (with mounting dismay) the December dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 republics, 12 of which (all but the Baltic republics) agreed to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Part of the reason for the PRC’s quick recognition of this new political reality was that if it had not, many alternatives seemed open to the former USSR: there seemed every likelihood of reconciling the old Russo-Japanese territorial dispute (involving three small islands and a tiny archipelago north of Hokkaido) and signing a peace treaty with Japan, which had trade complementarity with the Russian Far East; South Korea had just granted Moscow a \$3 billion concessionary loan (in gratitude for recognition in 1990), and Taiwan briefly established consular relations with Latvia and very nearly exchanged ambassadors with the Ukraine and Outer Mongolia before being deterred by PRC diplomats. The new line in the Kremlin under Yeltsin and Kozyrev was anti-communist and pro-Western; these were the *betes noires* of Chinese Kremlin-watchers, who in turn plausibly suspected the CCP of supporting the August 1991 coup conspirators. Beijing was also concerned lest successful reform in the new Russia lure Western foreign direct investment (FDI) away from China and thereby undermine performance-based CCP legitimacy.

Yet Moscow’s new international prospects under bourgeois democracy proved greatly exaggerated. The decisive domestic factor was that the Russian ‘double bang’ of marketization and privatization failed miserably to revive the economy,



which went into free-fall for the next decade: real GDP declined 13 per cent in 1991, 19 per cent in 1992, 12 per cent in 1993, and 15 per cent in 1994, culminating in the collapse of the ruble in 1998. The health system and transportation system collapsed; even the birth rate shrank. Under the circumstances the leading Western industrial powers, still overburdened with debt in the wake of the so-called ‘Star Wars’ arms race and world-wide recession following the second oil price hike, were far less munificent with financial support than had been expected; only Germany, now reunified thanks to Gorbachev’s refusal to invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine to defend the Berlin Wall, made substantial subventions to Russian economic development (over US\$20 billion in 1993 alone). In the West, after Russian arms were discredited in the Gulf War (in which Moscow played no role), Russia was demoted from bipolar nemesis to diplomatic non-entity, excluded from any role in resolving the Yugoslav imbroglio, finally invited to the ‘Group of Seven’ but initially only as observer. Yeltsin’s emergent political rivals, both on the left (Zyuganov and the revived communist party), the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and the right (e.g., Lebed) challenged his nationalist bona fides and urged a shift from West to East, arguing on geostrategic grounds in favour of a more ‘balanced’ international posture between East and West.

But even in the East, hopes of new breakthroughs were quickly dispelled: negotiations with Japan premised on a territorial compromise implementing Khrushchev’s (never implemented) 1958 agreement (splitting the four: two now, two later) aroused unexpectedly firm military and local opposition, leading Yeltsin to postpone his visit twice and not even to moot a proposal when he finally arrived in Tokyo in October 1993. With regard to Korea, Russia’s role as the first socialist state to abandon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea embittered Pyongyang even more than Beijing’s subsequent shift in the same direction, precluding Russian involvement in the four-power talks, and South Korean businessmen saw little intrinsic value (and considerable risk) in Siberian infrastructure investments after the disintegration of the USSR. Thus the 1994 proposal to enlarge NATO to include three former satellites in Eastern Europe, implemented in 1997 in apparent appreciation of American election-year constituency concerns (as earlier with Cuba) rather than any realistically perceived security threat, was merely a continuation of this adverse current. The West was ignoring Russia and sanctioning China (for Tiananmen), so the two turned to each other. In April 1996, the Shanghai Five (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) agreed to a set of confidence-building measures on their shared borders, including the regular exchange of information on military exercises and limits on the size of such exercises to no more than 40,000 troops. At the April 1997 summit, Russia agreed to reduce the size of its forces on the 100-metre border zone by 15 per cent and place limits on a wide range of ground, air defence and aviation equipment and personnel.

### **Whither partnership?**

Ironically, two nations that had never been able to agree on the same ideology now found it possible to agree without one. They established a ‘constructive

partnership' in September 1994, then a 'strategic cooperative partnership' in April 1996 (a month after China's confrontation with the US over Taiwan and immediately following Clinton's confirmation of a beefed-up Japanese-American Security Alliance), finally formalizing the relationship in a 'Treaty of Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation' in July 2001 (reportedly at Beijing's initiative).<sup>12</sup> A 'partnership' [*huoban guanxi*] has become a very informal, non-exclusive term of endearment in the diplomatic vocabulary of both powers, as China formed partnerships with Pakistan, France, Germany, the European Union, Japan, Korea and the US, while Russia formed partnerships with the US, Japan, Iran and India. Yet for both, the Sino-Russian partnership has remained pivotal, an entry ticket back to what Jiang Zemin called 'great power strategy' [*da guo zhanlue*], precisely because this was the only relationship with sufficient leverage to pose a credible alternative to the American superpower. Both sides stress that the partnership is not an 'alliance', with an agreement only to consult but no commitment to military engagement in case of a threat to either side, and both disavow any security implications *vis-à-vis* a third party (i.e., the US), from whom both stand to gain more in economic terms than from their relationship with each other. Without alliance commitments, without mutually agreed strategic goals or opponents, just how meaningful is this 'partnership'?

We submit that it is more meaningful than generally credited, and a good example of how traditional, top-down security arrangements can provide a sound framework for improved human security. The year 2006 was declared the Year of Russia in China and the following year the Russians declared the Year of China in Russia. Bound together by roots in an analogous political culture, by shared elite preferences for tightly monitored authoritarian order, overlapping strategic and material interests, and institutional complementarity, the new friendship has now outlasted the dispute (if the 1950s are also included). The ideological core constituency of the relationship has shifted over the years from committed socialist reformers in the 1980s to a 'red-brown' coalition of communists and anti-Western nationalists in both nations after Tiananmen, while also attracting the support of pragmatic diplomats and even some liberals. It is a top-down relationship that was slow to catch fire at the mass level: e.g., according to public opinion surveys conducted in 2005 only 8 per cent of Russians then viewed China as a friend while 45 per cent deemed it an adversary (though 47 per cent considered China a model for economic success).<sup>13</sup> But by 2011 these views had improved considerably, with 52 per cent rating Chinese influence positively while only 18 per cent viewed it negatively. The Chinese also expressed favourable views about the Russians, while containing their enthusiasm (47 per cent positive, 40 per cent negative).<sup>14</sup> Greater ambivalence among elites, Russians express wary suspicion of China's rise and a certain *Schadenfreude* about Russia's fall can be detected on the Chinese side: the Chinese complain of the negative trade balance (more recently shifting in China's favour), the Russian refusal to sell their latest weaponry or oil companies or to build long-negotiated pipelines; the Russians complain of Chinese intellectual property rights piracy (not to mention weapons smuggling), shoddy consumer exports, uncontrolled emigration or consigning their country to underdevelopment



by importing only raw materials. But at least three factors now sweeten the tie: first, the fact that Russia's embrace of capitalism was deemed by observers both inside and outside the country to be highly problematic as a solution to the problems of late socialist development has inspired the post-Yeltsin leadership to embrace a more *dirigiste* developmental programme akin to the Chinese model; second, despite its geopolitical fragmentation and decade-long economic slump, Russia remains the world's most powerful strategic (i.e., military) counterweight to US 'hegemonism'. And third, the ideological dispute has lifted, along with the chronically problematic party-to-party relationship; the Soviet Communist Party still exists but it is no longer the ruling party, and the relationship has become almost entirely state-to-state, no longer sharing the weighty responsibility of fraternal cooperation in global revolution.<sup>15</sup> In the former Soviet Union, the anti-China bloc has been marginalized into two disparate streams: on the one hand there is the radical pro-Western bloc, intellectually led by the Moscow Institute of Foreign Relations (affiliated to the Russian Foreign Ministry) and linked politically to such figures as Yegor Gaydar and the Yabloko movement; and on the other are radical nationalists such as Zhirinovskiy, who regard China as a growing security threat. The local political leaders of contiguous regions of the Russian Far East (RFE), particularly Primorskiy and Khabarovskiy *krai*, remain largely critical of the opening to China, flagging allegedly uncontrolled (and illegal) Chinese immigration, smuggling and commodity dumping – though they have become somewhat less vocal in their complaints since Putin made these positions appointive rather than electoral, and in any event the economic prosperity of their region has become interdependent with that of the PRC.

Perhaps the greatest contrast of the new relationship with the 1950 treaty of alliance (which expired in 1980) is in the departure from global strategic grand designs to an increased focus on human security, turning what is still the world's longest land border from a budgetary black hole into a thriving economic thoroughfare.<sup>16</sup> Since 1992 there have been dozens of high-level diplomatic exchanges and summit meetings (e.g., eight presidential summits during Yeltsin's tenure, and Putin visited China 13 times before stepping down as president) have been held on a regularly scheduled basis; these have resulted in hundreds of agreements, among the most important of which were the 1991 agreement to delimit the eastern borders (along the *thalweg*, or line of deepest channel) and initiate border demarcation (completed in 1997), the 1992 summit agreement gradually to demilitarize the border, the September 1994 agreement to de-target strategic weapons, mutual non-aggression and non-first use of nuclear force; and the 1997 agreements on trade, oil and gas development and cultural cooperation. The border delimitation and demarcation processes proceeded once the basic principles were agreed through the 1990s and by the beginning of the next century the western boundary had been agreed and confirmed in three treaties, while the entirety of the Sino-Russian boundaries was also covered by treaty, setting aside only a few disputed areas: Bear (*Heixia*) Island and another island on the Argun River. Then in 2004 the two announced that continued negotiations had produced solutions to the last two 'set aside' problems as well. The comprehensive agreement was

formalized in a new treaty in Vladivostok in 2005; though details have not been made public because they involve sensitive concessions, Bear Island was in effect split, a number of other islands became Chinese by application of the *thalweg* principle, and a small upstream channel of the Amur also became Chinese. The most significant developments since 1992 have been the set of two five-power agreements between China and Russia and the three bordering Central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) signed in Beijing in April 1996 and in Moscow in April 1997. In the former, both sides agreed on mutual force reduction and military confidence-building measures on their borders. The latter established a 'zone of stability' restricting military activity to a depth of 100km along the frontier and making activities along the former Sino-Soviet border more predictable and transparent.

### **Trade and economic dimensions**

Bilateral trade had long been laggard – if politics was the locomotive of the relationship, economics was the caboose. After virtual freeze during the 30-year dispute when economics was interlocked with security, there was an initial upsurge of trade in the early 1990s to fill the vacuums left by the Tiananmen sanctions (the value of all Western investment in China dropped 22 per cent during the first half of 1990) and the collapse of the centralized Russian distribution system and disappearance of subsidies; while total Soviet foreign trade dropped 6.4 per cent for 1990, Sino-Soviet trade volume increased to \$5.3 billion, a quarter of which was border trade. Several Special Economic Regions were established in emulation of China's thriving Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the southeast, more than 200 cooperative projects were initiated between localities of the two countries, and China dispatched some 15,000 citizens to the Soviet Far East for temporary labour service. But these steep early rates of commercial growth could not be sustained, despite Yeltsin's announced goal of raising it to US\$20 billion by the millennium; the 1991–92 economic crisis in the RFE left Russians unable to repay Chinese exporters, and the Russians complained of shabby product quality and disruption of their retail networks. Visa-regime negotiation in 1993 (designed to control shuttle trade, a source of underground migration and smuggling) and Moscow's subsequent imposition of border duties, cuts on transport subsidies and restrictions on organizations entitled to engage in foreign trade caused trade to plunge by nearly \$40 billion in the first half of 1994. In 1995 it began to recover, reaching \$5.1 billion that year and \$6.85 billion in 1996; but in 1997 it sank to \$6.12 billion, and dropped further in 1998, particularly after the November devaluation of the ruble. Trade began to grow more vigorously after 2000, as the Russian economy recovered as an energy exporter amid a world (including Chinese) supply shortage: though it failed to reach the goal of \$20 billion announced at the 1996 summit, by 2000 it was up to nearly \$8 billion, \$10.7 billion in 2001, \$12 billion in 2002, \$15.8 billion in 2003, reaching \$29 billion by 2005 (the Russian figure was \$20 billion, apparently due to a distaste to count shuttle trade). China by 2006 was Russia's fourth biggest trade partner while Russia was China's eighth largest. Trade fell

sharply in 2007, due in part to a lapse in weapons purchases by Beijing,<sup>17</sup> rebounded smartly in 2008, increasing by 38.6 per cent over the previous year to reach \$55.9 billion, dropping again in 2009 in response to the global financial crisis but then doubling year-on-year to reach \$60 billion in 2010, though Russia now has a sizable trade deficit (after several years of surplus).<sup>18</sup> Given the heavy state role in the economy and neo-mercantilist propensities on both sides, this remains a sensitive issue. In terms of trade composition, Russian complaints about being derogated to the position of raw material supplier seem statistically justified: the proportion of raw materials has risen from 10 per cent of Russian exports to 20 per cent in 2003, to 30 per cent in 2004, and seems likely to increase further, thanks to timely recent Chinese ‘loans’ to hard-pressed Russian energy suppliers (and to the decline in Chinese weapons purchases).<sup>19</sup>

The most immediate beneficiary of expanded trade is ironically the region that has complained most vociferously about the relationship – the Russian Far East. This resource-rich but climatically forbidding region boasts only about 4.9 per cent (6.5–7 million) of the Federation’s nearly 150 million population, most of whom live along a narrow beltway just north of the border – facing some 120 million Chinese on the other side of the Heilong/Amur Rivers. The RFE grew in the late nineteenth century when it was on the frontier, and subsequently thrived as ward of the state, with prison camps and defence installations, but has languished since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The region experienced its first population contraction of 250,000 in 1992 and has continued to shrink since, through out-migration in the context of reduced central subsidies, massive unemployment in the military-industrial sector in the wake of Russia’s peace dividend, and the collapse of the Soviet infrastructure network. Against this background, the influx of Chinese workers or traders (allegedly including large numbers of criminals, prostitutes and other riff-raff) was functionally useful but incited populist alarm. According to Chinese statistics, border crossings amounted to 1.38 million in 1992 and 1.76 million at their peak in 1993. But for the Russians, the central issue was not how many were crossing but how many stayed: unofficial Russian estimates of Chinese illegal residents run as high as 1 million in the Far East and 6 million nationally, versus Chinese official estimates of 250,000–500,000. In light of these trends, the future seems apt to consist of a dialectic between a growing Russian need for supplemental labour to realize the economic potential of the region in the wake of continuing population decline and Russian fears of a Chinese demographic inundation. For the present, the latter seems to have priority: in 2008 Russia passed laws barring non-Russians from making cash transactions in Russian markets and Beijing cooperated by enforcing tough visa requirements on Chinese shuttle traders, resulting in a sharp decline in Chinese traders (but also reported commodity shortages in Russian markets).

### **Military and strategic dimensions**

While human security has been a prime beneficiary of the partnership, it must also be conceded that there are also strategic implications in the traditional sense. For

instance, mutual gradual border demilitarization to the minimal number required for peaceful border patrol (now numbering some 200,000 troops) has permitted both sides to shift strategic priorities, as China transfers forces to Taiwan and the South and East China Seas and Russia addresses the security threat created by the expansion of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO). Bilateral arms trade has also flourished, to the strategic advantage of China and the economic advantage of Russia. Deprived of American and European arms since the 1989 sanctions, the Chinese returned to Russian arms merchants, from which much of their original hardware came and which hence offered advantages in terms of compatibility of parts. Soviet global arms sales dropped ‘catastrophically’ in the wake of the Gulf War, where Soviet equipment was seen to be completely eclipsed by high-tech American weaponry. Inasmuch as military equipment was the second largest item in the Soviet export repertory (after petroleum products), continued Chinese interest was particularly welcome at this point, and Russian strategic monitoring of arms exports seems to have relaxed accordingly.<sup>20</sup> Negotiations for the purchase of Sukhoi SU-27 fighters, under way since early 1990, culminated in the purchase of 26 at a ‘friendship’ price of more than US\$1 billion (about 35 per cent of which China could pay in hard currency, the rest in barter goods), with an option to buy an additional 48. In March 1992 China also took delivery of the highly sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missile system and SA-10 anti-tactical ballistic missile missiles. The first contingent of Chinese pilots was sent to Moscow in June 1992 to undergo an 18-month training course, and by 1993 more than 1,000 Russian experts were based in China by ‘private’ contractual arrangement, helping to modernize Chinese nuclear and missile capabilities.<sup>21</sup> The 1995–6 confrontation over the Taiwan Strait whetted Chinese appetites for further acquisitions and in November 1996 the two sides signed a bilateral defence cooperation pact, resulting in China’s purchase of 30 to 50 SU-30 multipurpose fighters, four diesel-powered (Kilo-class) submarines, and two Sovremennyi-class destroyers with accompanying Sunburn anti-ship missiles designed to counter US Aegis-equipped ships. By early 1997 China was the leading purchaser of Russian arms, machinery and equipment, rivalled only by India, purchasing nearly 70 per cent of its arms imports there (totalling \$3.3 billion from 1994–9). Upset by the private agreement to licence Chinese production of SU-27s, the Russian Foreign Ministry reportedly blocked sales of Tu-22 Backfire long-range bombers and Su-35 fighters, but the Chinese were able to purchase Russian refuelling technology to give Chinese bombers a range of more than 1,000 miles. Russian technical assistance also contributed significantly to China’s programme to launch satellites and manned space flight. As questions began to be raised (by Westerners but also by Russian strategists) of the wisdom of rearming a once and possibly future security risk, the Russians endeavoured with some success to interest the Chinese in non-lethal technology; thus some 25 per cent of the Chinese commercial aircraft pool is now Russian.<sup>22</sup> But since 2007 there has been a significant drop in arms sales: in 2005 the Chinese obtained a 15-year licencing agreement contract to produce 200 Russian SU-27SK fighters as J-11As, but the Russians subsequently discovered that the Chinese had illegally copied the design to produce indigenously as the J11B and so they cancelled the deal; for their part, the Chinese

complain that the Russians do not sell them the latest weaponry that they sell to India (Russians fear that if sold to China it might fall into Pakistani hands, to Indian distress).

The partnership also has limited multilateral ramifications. Their joint refusal to support international sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) during the early phase of the effort to prevent Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons suggests a shared concern with the crescent of nuclear threshold states (*viz.*, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) on their shared eastern rim, and the two national teams have largely coordinated their positions at the Six Party Talks. The endorsement of multipolarity and anti-hegemonism in the partnership documents clearly hints at a shared intention to balance US interests in the region, as evinced by apparently coordinated verbal support of Yugoslavia and Iraq during US bombing campaigns, as well as joint opposition to the 2003 Iraqi invasion. As the Chinese joined the Russians in opposition to NATO expansion, the Russians in turn joined the Chinese in opposition to American plans to install Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems in Japan and Taiwan. Yet two against one do not necessarily constitute a veto, only a minor impediment. In some cases, such cooperation has been reasonably effective. Thus joint Russian-Chinese opposition (*i.e.*, implicit veto threat) to UN intervention in Kosovo in 1999 obliged the US to turn to NATO. And joint Russian-Chinese opposition to escalating pressure on North Korea in 1993 or on Burma after the arrest of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi seems to have thwarted any notion of invoking UN sanctions. Yet quite often, Sino-Russian collaboration has been insufficient: joint opposition to American missile defence failed, as Bush withdrew from the ABM treaty and the Japanese have made substantial contributions to an effective TMD; joint opposition to the American invasion of Iraq (indeed, joining Western European opposition) was equally unavailing. The partnership implicitly enhances China's position *vis-à-vis* India and Vietnam by reducing the probability that Russia (their erstwhile patron) will support them in any potential confrontation with the PRC. To Moscow, perennially unsuccessful in resolving its border dispute with Japan, Beijing remains the key to entree to the dynamic Pacific Rim. The partnership has already provided access to Hong Kong (where Russia now has a consulate) and to membership (1998) in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, to the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and potentially to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Russia has played the same gate-opening role for Beijing with regard to the Central Asian republics bordering Xinjiang, all of which remain CIS members well integrated into the Russian security apparatus. In a team negotiating format arranged by Moscow, China reached border agreements (and the initiation of border demarcation) with all three. China has become Kazakhstan's largest trade partner, and in 1997 agreed to invest US\$9.7 billion (China's largest FDI project to date, the equivalent of half of Kazakhstan's gross national product (GNP)) to build oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian oilfields to the Xinjiang region.<sup>23</sup> Kazakhstan in turn has promised to control Uighur acolytes of an independent 'Eastern Turkestan' (*viz.*, Xinjiang) on its side of the border. The Chinese, who unlike the Americans have recognized



Russia's leading role in the CIS, seem to have limited their interest to trade (particularly energy), which they have continued to pursue in pipeline deals with Kazakhstan and more recently with Turkmenistan. This has resulted in a certain tension over the future role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Russia thinks the organization should focus on fighting terrorism *qua* fundamentalist religious separatism (as in Chechnya), while China's hope has been to extend it to the field of economic cooperation. In the wake of the world-wide 2008–10 financial crisis, China's offer to invest its enormous cache of foreign exchange in tied loans and joint ventures is likely to be welcomed.

From the Russian strategic perspective, Asia has gained importance since the Cold War, following secession of the protective glacis of Eastern European satellites, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belorussia: though the populace still prefers a 'Western' national identity, the Russian Federation now defines itself geopolitically as a land bridge between Europe and Asia. True, Russia must make certain concessions to Beijing in terms of refraining from human rights sermons (Moscow now uses its vote to block China's condemnation by the UN Human Rights Council) as well as non-recognition of an independent Tibet or Taiwan, yet neither represents a real departure from reigning international conventions or Soviet precedent. Like many other countries, Russia has inaugurated informal trade relations with Taiwan (Taiwan opened its trade office in Moscow in 1994, Moscow opened its office in Taipei in 1996) while formally recognizing the PRC, and trade relations with Taiwan have expanded: by 1997, Taiwan had become Russia's fourth largest Asian trading partner. Within Asia, given the intractability of the territorial issue with Japan, India and China are Russia's twin pillars – one in the South, the other in the East. Russia expressed interest in consolidating this strategic triangle but the weak leg has been the Sino-Indian relationship. On the one hand, bilateral trade has been increasing rapidly, and they coordinate to block global warming initiatives inimical to the interests of the developing world and in favour of a restructuring of the post-crisis world financial architecture. On the other hand, the territorial dispute remains rancorous and border talks have stalled, trade is imbalanced in China's favour and the two compete in both export markets and in establishing commodity import deals; while China quietly seeks to block India's application for Asian Developmental Bank loans, its inclusion (with US support) in Nuclear Suppliers Group commerce, or permanent membership on the UN Security Council. Finally, both compete for Russian weapons they may conceivably use against each other.

## Conclusions

The scholarly literature on the Sino-Russian partnership conveys two contrasting images. First, it is the image of the Sino-Russian partnership as a serious threat to Western, and specifically to American, international interests.<sup>24</sup> In the wake of the collapse of the communist bloc, the Iron Curtain and the Cold War, the partnership is conceived as a rear-guard attempt, not to salvage Marxism-Leninism but to shore up the forces of authoritarian dirigisme without clear ideological



legitimation against the forces of globalism and liberalism. This is the view from the perspective of traditional security. The second image, largely from the broader perspective of human security, dismisses the first as greatly exaggerated. The partnership is not an alliance, has no treaty obligations and is bound by neither shared interests, international strategic objectives nor even an identified common opponent. Indeed, the two countries' national interests have little in common and are likely to diverge sooner or later.

We submit that this partnership represents a confluence of both traditional and human security interests. From a traditional security perspective it is hardly the comprehensive threat to Western democracy that some imagine. It was no doubt facilitated by the power vacuum left by the dissolution of the communist bloc at the end of the Cold War, but it does bear traces of its origins in the Sino-Soviet 'normalization' that was agreed before the end of the Cold War by two avowedly socialist states. It was slowly, uneasily, painstakingly constructed out of two largely hostile political cultures, progressing systematically yet not without pauses and setbacks. The border has been comprehensively demarcated and demilitarized and remains peaceful, and although there is still tension it no longer arises from military polarization but over the very lack of border security that now allows illicit trafficking. Though this is not the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis (indeed it is not even an alliance), it does involve fairly extensive security cooperation: most of China's advanced naval and air force weaponry is now of Russian derivation, and even its most vaunted high-tech breakthroughs owe much to Russian technical assistance. There is also broad agreement on international strategic objectives, as indicated by the high correlation on UN General Assembly roll call votes as well as Security Council coordination (as in the vetoes of sanctions on North Korea, Burma or Sudan). Although trade has begun to accelerate since the millennium, it is still minor compared with, say, Sino-American or Sino-EU trade. Although it began as one of the prime foreign policy accomplishments of the revolutionary regimes in both countries, it remains an achievement that saves both sides a lot of money and security concern and that neither side would like to abandon. Both countries are developing out of the 'garrison state' tradition, and for the time being remain developmental dictatorships ruled by a hierarchically disciplined national security apparatus (while Russia broke from that tradition in the 1990s it seems to be returning to the mould), and in a post-Cold War world lacking strategic balance both feel threatened by American hegemony. Through mutual help, they form a large bloc which is sufficiently influential to impede ambitious Western foreign policy designs counter to their perceived interests. The partnership is not organized around a programmatic vision for the world, but is rather defensively oriented to the survival of the two participants. Each partner has demonstrated the capability to use demonstrative violence to suppress perceived threats to its sovereignty, but the threat to peace that this entails is for the most part (e.g., Chechnya, Georgia, Xinjiang, Tibet) localized.<sup>25</sup> Both afflicted to varying degrees by the ethnic separatism that previously dismembered Pakistan, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, both support a relatively robust response. But the potential of such crackdowns to roil international peace is probably limited to

the (far more complex) Taiwan case. And beyond their mutual endorsement of the right to use violence in such cases, neither partner feels obliged to come to the aid or support of the other. Preoccupied with mercantilist nation-building, neither partner has, nor do they share, either an ideology or a grand design for a new world order.

What is new to the relationship is the emphasis on human security, which provides it with a robust institutional backbone able to appeal to a slowly growing mass constituency. Not freedom, not democracy, but human security, as defined by two quasi-socialist developmental dictatorships. Amid tumultuous leadership successions and even regime change, the two leaderships shared the simple insight that domestic reform could proceed far more smoothly without the need to garrison millions of troops along their long and permeable joint borders. Yet at the same time they realized that after centuries of reciprocal predation followed by a twentieth century of decidedly ambivalent cooperation, building trust would not come easily. Hence the painstaking construction of bilateral leadership summitry, exchanges at all levels, joint military exercises and assorted other diplomatic rituals. Yet the recent upsurge of bilateral trade suggests that these efforts have finally flowered. The same patient, meticulous husbandry that cultivated bilateral reconciliation in the wake of bitter public polemics and border violence during the socialist era seems to have been carried through to a new, ideologically uncharted era.

## Notes

- 1 D. Ostrowski, *Muscovy and the Mongols: Cross-cultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier*, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 109–12.
- 2 On 25 July 1919 the new Bolshevik regime issued the First Karakhan Declaration in support of Chinese national self-determination disavowing all secret treaties with Japan and China and promising to return ‘to the Chinese people everything that has been seized from them by the tsarist government’, including restoration without compensation of the Chinese Eastern Railway. But later the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs argued that the text that had been wired to its Chinese counterparts was inauthentic. In a later presentation of the official text this paragraph was no longer there.
- 3 Seeking disciples on the left, Moscow provided military and financial assistance to any number of dubious confederates – to Wu Peifu, to the ‘Revolutionary Armies’ of Feng Yuxiang, and to the ‘left-wing’ KMT under Wang Jingwei. A. Lukin, *The Bear Watches the Dragon: Russia’s Perception of China and the Evolution of Russian-Chinese Relations since the 18<sup>th</sup> Century*, Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2003, p. 87.
- 4 D. Heinzig, *Die Sowjetunion und das Kommunistische China 1945–1950: Der beschwerliche Weg zum Buendnis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1998.
- 5 These negotiations are covered in replete detail in Heinzig, op. cit., pp. 97–131 et seq.
- 6 In late 1949 he passed to Mao records of Gao Gang’s conversations with a Soviet representative that contained information on the situation in the CCP leadership. N.S. Krushchev, ‘Vospominaniia, Vremia, Liudi, Vlast (Memoirs, Time, People, Power)’, in A. Lukin op. cit., p. 121.
- 7 Lukin, op. cit., p. 120.
- 8 E.g., Jiang Zemin himself was trained at Moscow’s Stalin Autoworks, a showcase of Soviet industry. Li Peng was a graduate of the Moscow Power Institute, and Liu Huaqing, a prominent advocate of increased purchases of Russian weaponry toward the

expansion of Chinese sea power, was trained at the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad. J. Anderson, 'The Limits of Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership', *Adelphi Paper*, 1997, no. 315, p. 197.

- 9 Although Washington refused publicly to endorse China's 1979 'pedagogical war' against Vietnam – a costly strategic error from Beijing's perspective, with some 20,000 casualties and an indeterminate outcome – the US did provide satellite photos of Soviet troop deployments along China's northern borders.
- 10 See L. Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992.
- 11 It is fairly clear that Gorbachev's visit played some role in stimulating the Tiananmen protest (at least in postponing its forcible suppression), but China also played an important if indirect role in the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism, essentially by eliminating mass repression as a morally acceptable option. Cf. N. Bernkopf Tucker, 'China as a factor in the collapse of the Soviet Empire', *Political Science Quarterly*, 1995, vol. 110, no. 4, pp. 501–19.
- 12 The Chinese apparently contacted Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov about a treaty shortly after the NATO bombing of their embassy in Belgrade. Cf. 'vos' maia vstrecha' (the 8th meeting), *Rossiiskaia Gazeta*, 14 July 2001, 1, as cited in J.L. Wilson. *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era*, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004, p. 37.
- 13 *RFE/RL Newswire*, vol. 9, no. 125, part 1, 1 July 2005; as cited in Wilson, op. cit., p. 114.
- 14 *World Public Opinion.Org*, 7 March 2011, <http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles>, (accessed 7 June 2011).
- 15 I owe this insight to Prof. Robert Bedeski (personal communication).
- 16 The Sino-Soviet border was some 7,000 kilometres long. Since the disintegration of the USSR, the 'Sino-Russian border' contracted to 3,484km, while the Sino-Kazakh border stretches for about 2,000km, the Sino-Kyrgyz border for 1,000km and the border with Tajikistan is about 500km long.
- 17 The sudden drop was clearly a result of a drastic reduction of Chinese imports of Russian weaponry, also reversing the previous trade imbalance in China's favour: according to Chinese figures, Russian imports increased by 12.1 per cent (since 2006) while Chinese exports to Russia increased 79.9 per cent; according to Russian figures (which exclude shuttle trade), Russian exports to China increased from \$15.8 billion to a mere \$15.9 billion while Chinese imports nearly doubled, from \$12.9 billion to \$24.9 billion. J. Garnaut, 'Russia on edge as China grows', *Sydney Morning Herald*, Business Day, 9 June 2008, p. 1. On the Chinese side of weapons export complaints, see N. Petrov, 'Chinese border action', Moscow *RIA Novosti*, 20 September 2007.
- 18 *Thaindian News*, 3 June 2011; *China Daily*, 13 April 2011.
- 19 In 2006, China's CNPC and Russia's state-run oil firm Rosneft agreed to build a 200,000 bpd refinery and jointly operate 300 or more petrol stations, and to construct a large oil refinery in Tianjin. This plan was temporarily thrown awry by Japan's bid to reroute the pipeline to the Pacific, for consumption by Japan and other East Asian customers (viz., Eastern Siberian Pacific Ocean pipeline, or ESPO). But China vigorously counterbid with a February 2009 US\$25 billion loan from the Chinese Developmental Bank to Rosneft and state oil pipeline monopoly Transneft, resulting in prior construction of a Chinese 'spur' to Daqing. The flow of oil through this pipeline was inaugurated on 1 January 2011 as the country's first oil pipeline to Asia, to supply 15 million tons of crude from Russia to China annually. The other spur, to the Pacific (and Japan), is now scheduled for completion in 2014. This is the first deal with the Russian Federation to bear fruit, driven by the exigencies of the global financial crisis. In 2006, the Russian gas export monopoly Gazprom announced it would build two major pipelines to China, though this project has been delayed due to disagreements over gas pricing. *Reuters*, 15 June 2009. M. Richardson, 'Loans-for-oil deal should seal Sino-Russian ties', *Straits Times* (Singapore), 5 February 2009; *China Daily*, 13 April 2011.

- 20 Russia's export of tanks in 1992 dropped 79-fold, sales of combat aircraft fell 1.5 times in comparison with 1990, leaving warehouses of the military-industrial complex overstocked with unsold weapons. China was the principal buyer of Russian weapons in 1992, making purchases worth US\$1.8 billion. P. Felgengauer, 'Arms exports continue to fall', *Sogodnya*, 13 July 1993, p. 3.
- 21 S.M. Shuja, 'Moscow's Asia policy', *Contemporary Review*, 1998, vol. 272, no. 1587, pp. 169–78.
- 22 Cf. P.F. Meyer, 'Russia's post-cold war security policy in Northeast Asia', *Pacific Affairs*, 1994, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 495–513.
- 23 The first, modest shipment of oil from Kazakhstan to China – a shipment of 1,700 metric tons of Kazakh crude oil by rail to refineries in Xinjiang – was sent in late October 1997.
- 24 See for example M.L. Levin, *The Next Great Clash: China and Russia vs. the United States*, Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2008.
- 25 The Taiwan issue, in the Chinese case, is a conspicuous exception, but too complex to be reviewed in this context.