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China's search for its place in the world

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The premise of this chapter is that at least one of the factors affecting China's (often unpredictable) foreign-policy behavior since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized power in 1949 has been an attempt to find a suitable place for itself in the modern world, a national identity. Approaching the modern international system with memories of a glorious traditional status as regional hegemon, followed by the humiliation of defeat and parcelization at the hands of perceived inferiors, China was accustomed to a position of international leadership that it could not sustain in the face of its political decay and scientific-economic backwardness. That sense of sudden degradation of national status gave rise to an ambiguous attitude of admiration and indignation vis-à-vis the *arriviste* Western powers, in addition to inhibiting adaptation to the hard rules of *raison d'être* qua *realpolitik* that had come to apply to the post-Westphalian "international system." For much of the first half of the twentieth century, China was "in" but not really "of" the world.

The communist victory made it possible for China to "stand up," as Mao put it in 1949. Denouncing the past century of national humiliation in the Marxist vocabulary of imperialism, the evils of China's own regional hegemony could also be forsworn under the rubric of feudalism. Yet that left a conceptual hiatus. Although the communists in fact tapped the animus of nationalism by mobilizing the Chinese people against Japan (and then against America, in Korea), any serious discussion of China's national interests and role or mission in the world was inhibited by the Marxist denial of nationalism's theoretical legitimacy – and by a leadership posture of dogmatic certitude. Instead of publicly debating their options, the new leadership fell into the ingrained cultural practice of patterning their behavior on external role models.

I wish to thank Samuel Kim, Suzanne H. Rudolph, and Brantly Womack for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

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To orient themselves in the modern world, Chinese leaders affiliated with two international “reference groups,” identifying on the one hand with the communist bloc, and on the other with the Third World. From the CCP perspective, the bloc represented ideological legitimacy, a sense of community with the elect, a promise of collective historical vindication. Identification with the Third World provided not only a chance to associate with countries that shared China’s developmental status and difficulties but also an opportunity to exercise international leadership – an opportunity not at hand within the communist bloc. As the largest and most populous of the new nations, it seemed quite plausible for China to claim a “leading role.”

Thus, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) identified with both groups, without apparently being aware initially that any contradiction was involved. After all, the communist world represented the Third World’s future, as mediated through the Chinese model of peasant revolution, followed by high-speed industrialization. In the course of time, however, as the relationship between the second and third worlds came to seem less straightforward, the dialectical interplay between those two reference groups grew exceedingly complex. We shall first examine China’s evolving role within the communist bloc, then turn to the PRC relationship with the Third World. For those countries (other than the PRC itself) that might be subsumed by either category (e.g., Vietnam, Albania), bloc affiliation is assumed to take precedence.

CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The communist bloc first became a geopolitical reality in the post-World War II period, when the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to install communist parties in the power vacuum left by the retreating Axis forces in Eastern Europe, and the CCP seized power from the tottering Guomindang (GMD) in China. Altogether, that constituted a rather impressive international empire. The CCP had consistently adhered to the discipline of international democratic centralism, despite occasional misgivings during the revolutionary era (e.g., agreeing, at Moscow’s behest, to release Chiang Kai-shek from house arrest when he fell into their hands at Xian), and after the revolution had triumphed, the PRC submerged its national identity relatively completely in the socialist community.

During the depths of the cold war (and American nuclear first-strike capability), tight bloc alignment was deemed de rigueur by most bloc members, and discipline was taut. The Eastern European countries, having been devastated by the Nazi invasion and the Soviet counterattack, presented a temporary power vacuum, into which the Communist Party

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of the Soviet Union (CPSU) quickly inserted emigre communist leaderships more beholden to Moscow than to indigenous constituencies. The highly centralized power structure within the Soviet Union during the late Stalinist period thus found its echo in similar relationships among “fraternal” parties within the bloc. The CCP leadership, having come to power on the strength of its own resources, with little indebtedness to outside aid, nevertheless accepted and even reinforced such an asymmetric distribution of power. The CCP fully endorsed the excommunication of Tito, for example, and party theorist Liu Shaoqi devoted a long article to the rationalization of that decision as early as 1948.¹ Sino–Yugoslav relations were to remain strained for many years thereafter (much longer than Soviet–Yugoslav relations); Beijing and Belgrade did not even exchange ambassadors until January 1955, and by fall 1957 party-to-party relations had been severed, not to be restored until 1980.

Once Stalin’s initial suspicions had been overcome, the CCP was thus accorded special deference within the bloc as its largest constituent party, with jurisdiction over the world’s biggest population and third-largest land mass. Stalin’s death in March 1953 enhanced China’s status, as symbolized by a doctored photograph appearing in *Pravda* just five days after his death, showing Malenkov with Stalin and Mao.² Indeed, during the period from October 1954 to the first half of 1956, the Soviets began to regard the PRC not so much as a satellite but as a relatively equal partner.³ The Soviets frequently cited with pride Lenin’s several references to the importance of China, such as the following passage from an article first published in 1923:

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, and China, etc., constitute the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority of the population that during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for its emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be. In this sense, the final victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.⁴

By the latter half of the decade, however, China’s sense of having its identity securely anchored in the socialist community and value system had become unhinged. The seeds for that alienation were sown in the famous “secret speech” that Khrushchev delivered to the CPSU Twentieth Congress in February 1956. Although Khrushchev recalled that Mao’s initial reaction was favorable – that Mao, too, began to criticize Stalin⁵ – in the long run the Maoist leadership found that Khrushchev’s bold departures took international communism in a direction inimical to Chinese interests. Khrushchev introduced three important ideological innovations at that conference that were to set the parameters for the conflict that would rage for the next twenty years. Those innovations

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signaled what Zagoria has termed a shift from *continental* to *global* strategy: Rather than focusing on consolidation of the bloc countries in the Eurasian heartland, Moscow turned its attention outward toward the rest of the world, attempting to foster détente with the developed countries and to solicit clients among the developing nations in Asia and Africa, whose decolonization struggles had given rise to a certain sympathy for anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist perspectives.⁶

First, Khrushchev introduced the theoretical possibility of establishing “peaceful coexistence” with the capitalist world, particularly the United States. (At the CPSU Twenty-second Congress in 1961, he would extend that doctrine further, saying not only that “capitalist encirclement” was at an end but also that the danger of global wars would cease within a generation.) Ideologically, that entailed what Chinese polemicists would deride as the “extinction of class struggle”: Because of the development of nuclear weapons, war between blocs would annihilate people of every class background, making no distinction whether a country was socialist or imperialist.

Second, Khrushchev supported nationalist struggles among the decolonizing new nations that were not yet under the control of communist parties but had evinced a certain sympathy for Soviet foreign-policy objectives and/or some inclination toward a Soviet pattern of domestic economic development.

Third, Khrushchev liberalized socialist authority relationships, both among member parties of the bloc (by endorsing “many roads to socialism”) and between masses and party elites domestically (by renouncing the “cult of personality”). In the same context, he endorsed a “transition to socialism by parliamentary means,” in an evident play for nonruling communist parties endeavoring to compete in democratic electoral contests.

So far as China’s attempt to resolve problems of national identity via identification with the international communist movement is concerned, this theoretical reorientation posed both short-run tactical difficulties and long-term systemic problems. The tactical difficulty was that the leader with whom Mao had personally identified in order to bolster his ascendancy within the CCP had been shorn of his legitimacy. The central thrust of Khrushchev’s speech, explicitly in point three, but implicitly in points one and two as well, was to repudiate the Stalinist personality cult. Although that served Khrushchev’s immediate interest in discrediting his (Stalinist) rivals within the Soviet Politburo, it also had the troublesome side effect of splitting all the satellite leaderships between those who had identified with (thereby benefiting from) Stalin’s personal ascendancy and those who had suffered under Stalin or his local surrogates. In Eastern Europe, that led to the rehabilitation of leaders who had been

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victims of Stalinism and to demands for political and economic reforms of Stalinism as a system.⁷ In China, it undermined the leadership of Mao Zedong. At the CCP's Eighth Congress (held only a few months after the CPSU Twentieth Congress), not only were all references to "Mao Zedong thought" deleted from the party constitution (at the motion of Peng Dehuai, promptly endorsed by Liu Shaoqi), but also a new position of "honorary chairman" (for which there could be but one conceivable candidate) was created. The provision contained in the 1945 (Seventh Congress) constitution permitting the party chairman to hold concurrently the post of chairman of the Secretariat was rescinded, and a separate Secretariat was created under a new secretary general named Deng Xiaoping, who was authorized not only to handle the daily work of the Central Committee but also to convene Central Work Conferences – ad hoc convocations with the functional competence to displace Central Committee plenums (which could be convened only by the chairman) during the 1962–1966 period.⁸ That cleavage would endure at least a decade, emerging clearly in the purge pattern of the Cultural Revolution. Its mimetic pattern illustrates one of the perils of such intense identification with another national leadership.⁹

The systemic problem with Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations, together with the dissolution of the Cominform in April and his meeting with Tito in June, unleashed fissiparous tendencies throughout the bloc: The community into which the PRC was trying to integrate began to disintegrate. In March 1956, one month after the secret speech, riots erupted in Soviet Georgia, Stalin's birthplace; in June, civil unrest broke out in both Poland and Hungary; by October, a much more sweeping insurrection had swept through Hungary, the suppression of which would require Soviet military intervention.

The CCP leadership seems to have played an equivocal role in those developments. Susceptible to the same nationalist impulses that roiled Eastern Europe, the Chinese initially welcomed a more loosely integrated bloc, maintaining through the end of 1956 that "a serious consequence of Stalin's errors was the development of dogmatism."¹⁰ Mao advocated that the relationships among socialist countries be regulated on the basis of his own theory of contradictions among the people and the "five principles of peaceful coexistence," rather than the principles of proletarian internationalism emphasized by the CPSU, even going so far as to urge Khrushchev to withdraw all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.¹¹ Then an uprising broke out in Poznan, Poland, resulting in election of a new Politburo, from which all Stalinists were excluded, and the release from prison and meteoric rise (to the position of party first secretary, without Soviet approval) of reformer Wladyslaw Gomulka. Rubbing salt in the wound, the Poles further demanded the removal of Marshal Kon-

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stantin Rokossovsky, a Russian who had been installed as Poland's defense minister in 1949. Zhou Enlai intervened to mediate Polish–Soviet tensions, helping to prevent armed Soviet intervention or ideological ostracism à la Tito. During Edward Ochab's visit to Beijing for the CCP Eighth Congress in September 1956, Mao expressed sympathy for the liberal faction of the Polish Communist Party (rechristened the Polish United Workers' Party, PUWP), advising Moscow against intervention in a personal letter early the following month.¹² A Polish observer reported that during the tense Polish–Soviet negotiations of October 19 (when Khrushchev flew to Warsaw, with Soviet troops ringing the city), CCP support during and after its Eighth Congress helped the Poles sustain their will and not make concessions under duress.¹³

The Chinese also at first opposed the intervention into Hungary, hoping that the Polish compromise had definitively solved the “many roads” problem – the Chinese press hailed the October 18 Polish–Soviet agreement with the prediction that it also would correct “whatever was wrong with relations between the Soviet Union and Hungary.”¹⁴ The CCP leadership hesitated so long to condemn the reformers that the rumor flourished in Budapest that “the Chinese are with us.”¹⁵ When the situation in Hungary nonetheless got out of hand, the Chinese changed course 180 degrees and actively advocated intervention, even adjuring an allegedly uncertain and vacillating Khrushchev to “go to the defense of the Hungarian revolution.”¹⁶ The deciding factor for the CCP seems to have been Imre Nagy's announcement on November 1 of Hungary's unilateral withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, declaration of bloc neutrality, and endorsement of multiparty democracy. All mention of Hungary was removed from an October 31 Chinese government commentary when it was published in *People's Daily* on November 2, and an editorial the following day roundly denounced the rebellion.¹⁷ In early 1957, Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union, Poland, and Hungary in an effort to restore bloc unity. (Those broad shifts of “line” at the intrabloc level would have their subsequent domestic echo in the CCP's decision in the spring of 1957 to “let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend,” followed shortly by the repressive “anti-Rightist movement.”)¹⁸

Those experiments with liberalization seem to have frightened the leaderships of both countries, while at the same time unveiling the unpopularity of unreconstructed Stalinism.¹⁹ However abortive, they were not to prove politically fatal to either Khrushchev or Mao, though the two reacted quite differently to their failure. In the case of the former, the uprisings in Poland and Hungary gave birth to an opposing coalition of strange bedfellows, ranging from unreconstructed Stalinists such as Molotov and Kaganovich to erstwhile liberals such as Malenkov, in the face

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of which Khrushchev at first had to give ground, declaring in December 1956 that “we are all Stalinists now.”²⁰ It is even conceivable that Khrushchev’s opponents had been encouraged to challenge him by Mao’s increasingly leftist stance, as Medvedev has surmised, though no conspiratorial contact has been established.²¹ Having, however, disarmed his opposition by firmly repressing the Hungarian uprising and restoring bloc unity under Soviet leadership, Khrushchev was able to purge the “anti-Party group” (viz., Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Marshal Zhukov) in the summer of 1957 and seize the premiership (while retaining the position of party first secretary) by March 1958. He then proceeded to sanctify his reforms by rewriting the official history, in three documents – “Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism” (October 1959), the “Declaration of 81 Communist Parties” (December 1960), and the new “Soviet Party Program” (the first new program since 1919), endorsed by the CPSU Twenty-second Congress (October 1961) – thereby, however, also formalizing his doctrinal differences with the CCP.

To Mao Zedong, on the other hand, the emergence of a rightist opposition critical of his radical policies and his somewhat autocratic leadership style had hardened his conviction that the need for “class struggle” still existed (contrary to some prematurely optimistic observations by Mao and other CCP leaders at the Eighth Party Congress in 1956), and he turned sharply to the left (the right had in any case been discredited by the Hundred Flowers campaign). Despite his previous (privately expressed) misgivings about Stalin and Stalinism, Mao publicly came to Stalin’s defense, reflexively shifting to the critique of “revisionism” that would preoccupy him for the next two decades.²² In that context he introduced the theory of “continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat,” developing the notion that the seizure of power marked the beginning rather than the end of the revolution and that the superstructure tended to lag behind the base, the relations of production behind the forces of production, rather than the other way round. Those class enemies still extant after socialization of the means of production had been completed were labeled “rightist,” “bourgeois,” or “revisionist,” not necessarily because they had a bourgeois class background but because they opposed Mao’s “socialist revolutionary line,” making them “objectively” bourgeois. That (plus the discrediting of the right in the Hundred Flowers episode) freed him to undertake far more radical domestic programs – notably the “Three Red Flags” of 1958–1959 (the “Great Leap Forward,” the “people’s commune,” and the “general line”). When early opposition to that utopian experiment surfaced under the leadership of Peng Dehuai, Mao denounced (and purged) it under the ideological epitaph of rightist revisionism.

The CCP’s post-Hundred Flowers turn leftward would put it on an

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eventual collision course with Khrushchev's CPSU, but for the moment, China's rejection of "revisionism" propelled it toward reintegration of the bloc under strong Soviet leadership. The CCP became during that brief hiatus puritanically orthodox, endorsing a laager mentality that would subordinate the interests of contending bloc members to those of the bloc as a whole. Thus, during what would be his last visit to Moscow (to attend the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution, November 14–16, 1957, followed by a conference of leaders from socialist countries and an international conference of communist parties, the reports of which have not been published), Mao declared not only that the Soviet Union was head of the bloc but also that it was absolutely imperative to "strengthen international proletarian solidarity with the Soviet Union as its center."

Our camp must have a head, because even the snake has a head. I would not agree that China should be called head of the camp, because we do not merit this honor and cannot maintain this role, we are still poor. We haven't even a quarter of a satellite, while the Soviet Union has two.²³

"Bourgeois influence constitutes the domestic cause of revisionism," he inscribed into the text of the conference declaration, "and capitulation to external imperialist pressure constitutes the external cause."²⁴ Gomułka, to whom support had been extended only the previous year, was criticized for being "too weak" vis-à-vis revisionism; Yugoslav revisionists were denounced in a series of widely publicized articles for having refused to sign the 1957 Moscow declaration of the communist parties of the socialist countries, for "following the imperialist reactionaries," and for "venomously" attacking the "proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."²⁵ Criticism of the Yugoslav League of Communists (YLC) intensified following its publication of an April 1958 congress program forecasting a world "evolution" to socialism. Whereas the crisis in Hungary previously had been attributed to the failings of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) leadership, it had recently become possible to attribute it to the pernicious influence of Yugoslav revisionism. That new Chinese line was not well taken by fraternal parties in either Eastern or Western Europe, where it stultified an incipient freedom of movement.²⁶

The moment when Beijing and Moscow could stand together on a platform of unquestioned Soviet bloc hegemony was to prove fleeting, however. When Mao's strategy for the realization of national identity premised on rapid, simultaneous achievement of nationalist and communist aspirations ran aground – efforts toward completion of national unification were frustrated by the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits,

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and the Great Leap Forward foundered on organizational disarray and inclement weather – he refused to relinquish his dream, reasserting its essential correctness in the teeth of adversity, blaming failure on class enemies foreign and domestic.²⁷ As if abruptly thrown back by those losses to an earlier stage of development, PRC politics underwent re-radicalization. Diplomatic overtures to the West (cf. Zhou Enlai's polished performance at Geneva in 1954) gave way to provocative challenges, as in the repudiation of Soviet–American talks on nuclear-arms limitation, support for the reviving Vietnamese insurgency, and public derision for Khrushchev's embarrassing setback in the Cuban missile crisis. Revisionist tendencies were found to be ubiquitous; deviation from orthodoxy was soon discovered in the sanctum sanctorum itself (first in Moscow, then even in Beijing). Meanwhile, Khrushchev took Soviet foreign policy precisely in the direction most apt to excite Chinese apprehensions: toward détente with the West. Just two years after restoring unity to the bloc at the 1957 Moscow conference, Khrushchev became the first communist leader to visit the United States, amid considerable fanfare.

That fateful parting of ways was partly attributable to the different menu of opportunities and dangers posed by the international system at the time, and partly to the different developmental backgrounds from which the two states were emerging. The Soviets, having precariously consolidated their power over forty tempestuous years, despite the sacrifice of some 9 million lives in the revolutionary civil war and more than 20 million in the Great Patriotic War (not to mention millions more in self-inflicted catastrophes such as collectivization, forced-draft industrialization, and the great purge), had finally arrived at the status (symbolized by *Sputnik*) of a leading world power. Proudly looking back on an economic growth rate that averaged 7.1 percent per year between 1950 and 1958 (a growth rate nearly 50 percent higher than that of the United States during the same period), and sitting on a (somewhat illusory) lead in the arms race, they had every reason to be confident in their economic future and, by the same token, chary of risking conflict with a still-formidable military adversary.²⁸ Increasingly they turned their attention to the United States, not only as principal adversary but also as a role referent for the USSR's emerging national identity as a global “superpower.”²⁹ Khrushchev's 1959 trip to Camp David was in that sense a turning point in Soviet history, visible recognition that the USSR ranked with the United States as a joint arbiter of world affairs. The Chinese, on the other hand, despite an impressive beginning at socializing and modernizing their country, still saw the world very much from the perspective of a “have-not power” (whereas the Soviets had a multiethnic empire and a host of satellites, the PRC had not yet recovered its former territories), with less to lose and more to gain from provoking strategically

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superior opponents. That its strategic and economic inferiority was accompanied not by humility and patience but by militant self-confidence and even occasional rhetorical bravado may perhaps be attributed to the unlikely victory of CCP arms over vastly superior forces during China's revolution.

The CCP's deviation had the effect of obliging the CPSU to pay more attention to the bloc over the next several years, which became the audience before which an increasingly vitriolic polemic was played out. Following dissolution of the Comintern (1943) and Cominform (1956), the Soviet Union began to try to coordinate and control world communism by organizing conferences of the international communist movement (ICM). They were intended to function analogously to national party conferences: The CPSU would act as the leading party among leading parties, setting the agenda, selecting participants, prefiguring policy outcomes. There were, altogether, three world conferences of the ICM, held in Moscow in 1957, 1960, and 1969. Their final documents are still accorded the status of binding agreements by the CPSU and its loyal followers. But the CPSU's ability to control the agenda diminished over time, as we shall see. Indeed, the ideological controversy became so effervescent that it tended to overspill the designated forum, as member parties availed themselves of courtesy invitations to various national conferences to attend and rejoin the fray. The CPSU Twenty-first Congress (January 27 to February 5, 1959) was still relatively civil; though Zhou Enlai made no mention in his address of Khrushchev's innovative proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and Pacific, no outward sign of tension appeared. In retrospect it seems clear that an ideological cleavage had already emerged, though it was successfully veiled by goodwill on both sides.

The first visible break emerged at a meeting held in June 1960 in conjunction with the Romanian Communist Party Congress, where Khrushchev (fresh from the failure of the Paris summit) clashed with the Chinese delegation (led by Liu Shaoqi) concerning the inevitability of war. The Soviets (promptly rebutted by the Chinese) had already breached etiquette by sending documentation to all communist parties outlining their ideological positions on the eve of the conference. Practically all the attending communist parties took the side of the CPSU. (That conference was immediately followed by the unilateral Soviet decision to withdraw all 1,600 Soviet advisors from China.) The dispute resumed at the second conference of representatives of all communist parties (except the Yugoslavs) held in November 1960. Although the Soviet perspective prevailed on most issues, Khrushchev's attempt to isolate China was frustrated, as Albania supported China to the hilt, while the Indonesian, North Korean, and North Vietnamese delegates remained neutral, in-

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clined toward the Chinese point of view. The final declaration bore the stigmata of the dispute, awkwardly combining divergent positions on peaceful versus nonpeaceful paths to socialism, peaceful coexistence versus class war, and other central issues. In October 1961, at the CPSU Twenty-second Congress, to which the Albanians had not been invited, Khrushchev attacked Albania (read: China) for opposing the line agreed upon by all at the Twentieth Party Congress. Zhou Enlai objected vociferously, walked out, laid a wreath on the tomb of Stalin (whose body was removed a few days later from the Lenin mausoleum), and left Moscow.³⁰ Only two-thirds of the parties represented at the congress endorsed the attack on Albania; all the Asian parties remained mute.

Until the end of 1962, each side refrained from attacking the other directly, instead “pointing at the mulberry bush while cursing the locust” (to use a Chinese expression): The CCP directed its thrusts against “revisionism” in general and Yugoslavia in particular, sometimes also assailing the Italian Communist Party (at that time led by Palmiro Togliatti). The Soviets attacked “dogmatists” in general and (after the breach with the Albanian Communist Party in 1961) the Albanians in particular. The issues remained basically those defined in Khrushchev’s 1956 speech: the question of war or peace (with the Chinese still insisting on the inevitability of international class war), the approach to the Third World (with the Chinese espousing national-liberation war, the Soviets urging communist parties in the developing countries to form a united front with the postcolonial “national bourgeoisie,” as they had once urged the CCP to form a coalition government with the GMD), and the possibility of a “parliamentary road” to socialism (the Soviets in support, the Chinese remaining firmly opposed).

The heat of the ideological exchanges at these interparty forums, combined with the inability of the dominant side to prevail conclusively and ostracize the defeated minority, eventually led to paralysis. Proposals for a new international conference were put forth at the beginning of 1962 by the communist parties of Indonesia, North Vietnam, Great Britain, Sweden, and New Zealand (with Soviet endorsement), but the CCP killed the motion by proposing numerous preconditions: the cessation of public polemics, the holding of bilateral talks between parties, and the restoration of normal relations between the Soviet and Albanian parties (which had been broken off in 1961). During the fall and winter of 1963–1964 Khrushchev called for an end to public polemics and convocation of a “world communist conference”; if there were still differences between the Soviet and Chinese parties, “let us allow time [for each] to have its say as to which viewpoint is more correct” – implicitly suggesting (in Chinese eyes) an imminent showdown, in which the CPSU was confident of a majority.³¹ After protracted stalling, resumed polemics,

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and a futile Romanian attempt at mediation, that meeting also had to be abandoned (in 1965) because of Chinese rejection and the consequent inability to reach preliminary consensus.

Not until June 1969 did the Soviet Union finally succeed in holding the long-deferred third international conference, in the shadow of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. By that time the nonparticipation of China could be assumed. Moreover, there were no representatives from Albania, Japan, Indonesia, North Korea, or indeed from any East or Southeast Asian communist party, and some of the delegations that did attend defended the Chinese/Czech right to dissent.³² Although Brezhnev attacked Mao by name for violating the principles of scientific communism and struggling to gain hegemony within the world communist movement, there were no critical references to the CCP in the basic joint document issued by the conference.³³ As of this writing, that remains the final meeting of the “communist world movement”: Moscow proposed a fourth conference in 1981, but that idea was rejected by the Chinese, Yugoslav, Vietnamese, North Korean, Italian, Spanish, Japanese, and other communist parties. Beijing rejected a CPSU call for a world conference of communist parties in January 1985, and in June 1986 Jaruzelski (presumably acting for Gorbachev) revived a proposal to convene a conference on the themes of “peace and disarmament,” but it has gone nowhere.

Given the paralysis of world communist party conferences, the CPSU turned to the international organizations of the bloc that it still controlled, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or COMECON), as well as summit meetings with individual communist party leaders. That permitted a distinction to arise within international communism between Soviet-controlled and non-Soviet-controlled networks, which we shall refer to respectively as the internal and external blocs. After the CCP rejected an invitation to join, in 1961–1962 the Soviets moved to transform the CMEA into a supranational planning organization (COMECON had been dormant until roused to handle economic aid to Hungary in 1957). In 1965, they likewise reorganized the WTO to permit the coordination of foreign policies, as well as joint security planning. The comprehensive program agreed upon at the July 1971 meeting of the CMEA, with its stress on voluntary coordination of national economic plans and joint economic forecasting, was an important step down the road toward economic integration. Gorbachev initially endeavored to continue or even accelerate that movement, as indicated in the “Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Technical Progress” adopted in December 1985, which attempted to include scientific as well as economic and cultural integration. He also dramatically increased the number of CMEA and WTO meetings

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convened, as well as summit meetings with various party leaders; since his succession, he has visited every one of the Eastern European states, some more than once. Finally, on April 26, 1985, the WTO was extended for another twenty years, plus a further ten after that unless notice of withdrawal is given a year before expiry.³⁴ (Of course, the apparent end of communist party hegemony in the front-line East European states in the fall of 1989 will require a major reconceptualization of both WTO and CMEA, if they survive.)

Despite incapacitating the (external) bloc, the CCP's principled dissent may paradoxically have expanded its own influence within that bloc: "In retrospect, one may say that it was from 1960 to 1965 that China experienced the greatest influence within the socialist camp."³⁵ Difficult as it is to measure influence, in view of the fact that previously the CCP had subordinated national demands to international solidarity, its willingness to disagree, even to campaign for leadership of the bloc (claiming the CPSU had betrayed socialism, and indeed was no longer a socialist country), seems to have enhanced its ideological status, even among those who disapproved – meanwhile also greatly impressing both superpowers.³⁶ Although remaining a minority, the Maoist faction split the bloc ideologically and to some extent geographically, gaining the occasional-to-regular support of Albania, Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam; even Poland opposed its expulsion. While sharing the ostensible interest of the CPSU in greater intrabloc pluralism and a less confrontational approach to the noncommunist world, many smaller parties were loath to support excommunication of the second most powerful bloc member, whose unpunished assertion of dissident views eroded the ideological authority of the CPSU and tacitly enhanced their own margin for maneuver. Thus, in the early 1960s, many Soviet troops and advisors were withdrawn from Eastern Europe, leaders were no longer appointed directly from Moscow, and more balanced cultural and economic ties were developed.

The schism also had spillover effects beyond the bloc, spreading to nonruling communist parties in Europe, Japan, and the developing countries. In 1963 the CCP began to call for the formation of pro-Chinese fractions in all countries where the local party leadership supported the CPSU. Thus, for example, in their "Proposal for the General Line of the International Communist Movement" (June 1963), the CCP articulated twenty-five points to define the world movement in what it considered an ideologically correct way, challenging communist parties throughout the world to overthrow the existing leadership and avoid revisionism. In Belgium, the party was "reconstituted on a national level on the basis of Marxism-Leninism"; pro-Chinese parties or factions were also organized in Spain, Italy, Austria, France, Great Britain, West Germany, Switzer-

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land, Holland, Ireland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.³⁷ In the Third World (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, India, Chile), pro-Chinese parties were formed to parallel and compete with pro-Soviet parties. Those “Maoist” fractions were, to be sure, of dubious diplomatic value, their radical orientations as likely as not reflecting domestic political issues rather than a conscious ideological choice between rival worldviews, and the CCP was unable to control them. It was at that time that the CCP also left most of the international communist-front organizations because they were under firm Soviet control.

By the late 1960s, China seemed in any event to have lost its bid for ideological leadership of the bloc. China’s bout with foreign-policy radicalism during its Cultural Revolution reduced China’s stature among all but the extreme left wing of the ICM, at the same time eviscerating the PRC’s own diplomatic cadre structure. During that period, the Maoist leadership repudiated the existence of a socialist camp and depicted the Soviet Union as what Mao called a “negative model” of socialism, thus, for example, linking the highest CCP purge victims, Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, and Lin Biao, with alleged pro-Soviet conspiracies. As West Germany’s *Ostpolitik* matured in the late 1960s under Brandt, the Soviets shifted the role of scapegoat and bogeyman from Germany to China in their efforts to maintain discipline within the WTO.³⁸ The PRC thus functioned no longer as an outer limit for permissible dissent, but as an *exemple terrible* to preclude the slightest deviation. Most important, the suppression of the Czech “socialism with a human face” experiments in August 1968, and Brezhnev’s ensuing declaration of his doctrine of “limited sovereignty,” had a pervasive chilling effect, and China came closer than ever before to complete excommunication. It was in response to that threat that the PRC broke out of the bloc in a search for geopolitically useful support. The ensuing attempt to build an international united front against the Soviet Union was ideologically eclectic, even promiscuous, tending to detract from China’s credibility. The opening to the United States was difficult to comprehend even for those communist parties still friendly to the CCP, further reducing Chinese influence within the ICM.

As China emerged from self-imposed isolation to bid for new allies under the stimulus of Soviet nuclear threats in the early 1970s, the split came to revolve around concerns of power politics rather than ideological considerations. At the CCP Tenth Congress in 1973, the leadership announced that “the socialist camp has ceased to exist,” labeling the Soviet Union a “social imperialist super-power.” The CPSU’s forcible reassertion of hegemony in Eastern Europe in 1968 brought out the geopolitical dimension of the schism: By the end of the 1960s, aside from Albania and Romania,³⁹ most supporters of the CCP line (the Cambodian, Thai, Malaysian, Indonesian, and New Zealand communist parties) were in

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East Asia. The CCP's 1974 inauguration of its "Three Worlds" schema exacerbated that regionalizing tendency by, in effect, dissolving the socialist "camp" (an ideologically based category) in favor of the Third World (a more regionally based, ideological catch-all category) as the main revolutionary axis in the struggle against the superpowers. It was over that reconceptualization that the Albanians chose to split with the "revisionist" CCP, though they did not announce their disagreement until several years later.⁴⁰ Seven further parties took advantage of the dispute to declare their neutrality, including, in addition to the Yugoslavian, the North Korean, Japanese, Vietnamese, and Laotian parties – the regional trend is also noticeable here.

While attempting to preserve their regional hegemony over the Asian communist movement, the Chinese adopted a policy toward Eastern Europe analogous to that of the Americans, encouraging any tendency toward greater autonomy in foreign policy regardless of its ideological thrust. Between 1968 and 1971, Sino-Yugoslav relations gradually improved, though not until Mao's death could that bitter enmity be fully reconciled; in August 1977, Tito visited Beijing, and in March 1978 party-to-party relations were restored (further exacerbating Sino-Albanian difficulties). In 1971 it was revealed that Romania had functioned as a diplomatic channel for contacts leading to the Nixon visit (at American, rather than Chinese, initiative), and in June 1971 Ceaușescu himself became the first Warsaw Pact member to visit the PRC since the Sino-Soviet rift.⁴¹

While the Chinese were thus nurturing their garden of Asian socialism and cultivating outposts of resistance in the Soviet backyard, the Soviets were no less assiduous in courting defectors on the Chinese periphery. Geopolitically considered, the growing warmth between China and the Western capitalist countries (particularly the United States) had placed the smaller socialist countries on the Asian rimland (viz., North Korea, Vietnam) in a tenuous position. Already exposed to American naval and air power from the Pacific, they suddenly felt their continental rear area being undermined. The Vietnamese were first to experience that type of geopolitical squeeze in the early 1970s – indeed, that was one of Nixon's major goals in his opening to China. As far as China's support of Vietnam was concerned, his efforts were not without impact, having an alienating effect on Sino-Vietnamese relations. In the case of North Korea, the PRC's growing involvement in sub-rosa trade with South Korea in the 1970s and 1980s (by 1989, Chinese trade with South Korea amounted to more than U.S. \$3 billion, ten times more than that with North Korea) was acutely resented by North Korea, as was the waning of Chinese military support (moral or material) since the Rangoon attentat against Doo Hwan Chun. In both cases the political impact was a shift

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of patronage from Beijing to Moscow – emphatic and public in the case of Hanoi, more subtle and tentative in the case of Pyongyang.

The CCP discovered Eurocommunism toward the end of the 1970s, its own incipient domestic reform program helping to arouse mutual interest, again, however, focused primarily toward outflanking the CPSU, rather than any deep ideological affinity. The first representative of Eurocommunism to visit Beijing was Jiri Pelikan, a Czech dissident and member of the European Parliament. That visit took place shortly after the invasion of Afghanistan and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia (October 1979), when Chinese sensitivities about encirclement had been aroused. It was at about the same time that Chinese news media began to refer more neutrally to the communist parties of Italy (PCI) and Spain (PCE) and to suspend their polemic against “revisionism.” A major benchmark was the visit of Enrico Berlinguer in April 1980, who was warmly received and had numerous meetings with Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Yaobang. In his April 16 speech at Peking University, Berlinguer denied the existence of a unique model for all communist parties; each had to find its own individual road, based on different historical backgrounds; nonetheless, certain ideals were shared by all communist parties, the most important of which were peace and justice. The renewal of interparty relations between the CCP and PCI, Berlinguer insisted, should not be directed against any third party. Hu Yao-bang, an advocate of Marxist renewal who took his doctrine seriously, could not entirely agree at the time, insisting on the need to “mobilize the working class in the struggle against the hegemonists.” Echoing Mao’s original critique of “revisionism,” the Chinese also professed their belief in the inevitability of war and their reservations about the “parliamentary road.” Whereas Berlinguer (along with most Eurocommunists) had abandoned the concept of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” in favor of “structural reform,” the CCP still deemed the former indispensable.

Since the beginning of the Sino–Soviet “thaw” (particularly since the cooling of Sino–American relations in 1981–1982), the PRC has accelerated efforts to make new friends in the international socialist movement. The major innovation has been that the search for coalition partners no longer so obviously pivots on an anti-Soviet axis – indeed, the Sino–Soviet rapprochement now often opens the door to reconciliation. Although China has no further illusions of driving a wedge between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Beijing is not above taking advantage of the nationalism of these countries to score some points, particularly regarding Cambodia and Afghanistan, pointing out that “socialist fraternal assistance” to these countries entails opportunity costs for their own economies. Santiago Carrillo and B. Drakopoulos, general secretaries of

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the Spanish and Greek parties, visited Beijing in November 1980 and restored party relations. A French Communist Party delegation visited in 1982, followed by Georges Marchais six months later, restoring the party relations that were broken in 1965; the (likewise pro-Soviet) Dutch party restored relations the same year. The following year the CCP established relations with the Belgian, Swiss, Mexican (Socialist Unity Party), and Swedish parties, delegations traveling in both directions to formalize ties. In April 1983 relations were established with the Communist Party of India (Marxist), when its general secretary, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, visited the PRC, followed by the parties of Australia, Norway, Portugal, Austria, and Finland. China refrained from condemning Jaruzelski's December 13, 1981, imposition of martial law in Poland; instead of joining the West in imposing sanctions, China signed a trade agreement with Poland in early February 1982 (in 1987 Deng Xiaoping made clear his support for Jaruzelski's crackdown, when faced with an analogous situation in China). Since the Sino-Soviet trade agreement was signed in July 1985, each Eastern European country has signed a similar long-term trade agreement with the PRC, together with inter-governmental commissions and agreements for exchanges of films, cultural shows, scientific/technological cooperation, and reciprocal opening of consulates. It was at that point that Sino-East European trade first began to revive after its long hiatus. Though the USSR remains the principal communist trade partner, PRC trade with the bloc countries since that time has also waxed, maintaining a consistently favorable balance.

Broadening its ambit beyond those East European states that had pursued an independent foreign policy, China normalized relations with Hungary in 1984 for the sake of "exchange of experience in the construction of socialism."⁴² With the visits of Honecker and Jaruzelski to Beijing in the fall of 1986, and the visits of several vice-premiers from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, China resumed official contacts with the East German and Czechoslovak parties and official relations with the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP), thereby moving decisively toward normalization of political relations with even the most loyal satellites – still insisting that that had "no direct links" with Sino-Soviet relations.⁴³ In 1987 the PRC received Czechoslovakian premier Lubomir Strougal, Hungarian party secretary Janos Kadar, and Bulgarian party secretary Todor Zhivkov; Premier (and acting party secretary) Zhao Ziyang reciprocated in June with a tour of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. China remains closest to its earliest and hence "special" friends Yugoslavia and Romania, but has shown keen interest in Hungary, East Germany, and Poland – Hungary because of its reform experience, East Germany because of its economic efficiency,

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and Poland because its economy is perceived to be complementary to that of the Chinese (and perhaps its experience with riot control and martial law).

As a theoretical criterion for establishing party-to-party relations, the leadership has replaced anti-hegemonism with the "Four Principles," first set forth in the section on interparty relations in Hu Yaobang's report to the CCP Twelfth Congress in 1982, and reiterated in the new party constitution: (1) independence of each party, (2) complete equality among parties, (3) mutual respect, and (4) noninterference in each other's internal affairs.⁴⁴ Their basic assumption is that the tendency toward independence among communist parties has become the mainstream in the international communist movement (Marx and Engels were retrospectively found to have opposed attempts by German social democrats or French socialists to impose their views on other parties). Not only was the Brezhnev doctrine thereby repudiated; Deng Xiaoping even went so far as to disavow the universality of the Chinese "model." The Chinese revolution had succeeded by applying universally valid principles of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete reality of China, but that should not lead to the expectation that "other developing countries should follow our model in making revolution, even less should we demand that developed capitalist countries do the same."⁴⁵ Socialism has no unified pattern; each nation must determine its own road of development.⁴⁶ The value of socialism is in practice, as Hu Yaobang put it in a speech to a PCI conference in June 1986 in Rome, and thus it is necessary to respect and learn from one another's practical experience.⁴⁷

This latitudinarian Chinese redefinition of socialist internationalism also permits the opening of relations with all types of "worker parties," spanning the ideological spectrum. The CCP has established relations with some 80 communist parties and with more than 200 vaguely leftist parties and organizations in other countries, including socialist, social-democratic, and labor parties, and various associations in the Third World (political parties and national liberation movements). Relations have been taken up with the French Socialist Party, the German SPD, the British Labour Party, and the Italian Socialist Party. During Willy Brandt's May 1984 visit to China, he was asked (and agreed) to give the CCP observer status at meetings of the Socialist International. The CCP has begun to send delegations to selected meetings of international front organizations, as observers. Former Maoist splinter groups were not forsaken in that eclectic reconciliation: The French Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) received notice two months after the Marchais visit that they, too, were invited to Beijing, and a half year later (July 1983) a delegation of the French Revolutionary Communist Party was received in Beijing by Hu Yaobang. In March 1988, the CCP's relations with the

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Communist Party of India were restored after a twenty-five-year break. Only the Japanese Communist Party has remained in the cold, largely because it has shown no interest in reviving relations (for doctrinal reasons); the CCP, however, does have good relations with the Japanese Socialist Party.

In Southeast Asia, the CCP continued to balance its relations with the nonruling parties there against its diplomatic ties with the indigenous governments, as well as competing bids for control by the CPSU or the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV). In 1974 the PRC normalized relations with Malaysia, and in 1975 with the Philippines and Thailand – without, however, renouncing support for the (illegal) communist parties in those countries. In his 1978 tour through Southeast Asia, Deng Xiaoping, while refusing to abandon relations with the local communist parties, nonetheless made a slight concession in declaring that China would not allow party-to-party relations to interfere with improvement of state-to-state relations.⁴⁸ Zhao Ziyang went somewhat further during his August 1981 visit, emphasizing that his concern was with strengthening state relations and that China's relationship with local communist parties was only "political and moral." The Chinese have, however, been loath to sever all ties to the Burmese, Malaysian, and Thai communist parties, no doubt anxious lest they shift allegiance to Hanoi/Moscow. Thus, for example, the PRC-based Voice of People's Thailand and Voice of the Malayan Revolution radio stations, longtime supporters of guerrilla insurgencies in those countries, were shut down in July 1979 and June 1981, respectively, only to be succeeded by new, albeit less powerful, transmitters no longer on Chinese soil.

In sum, the CCP has provided a model for an alternative form of cooperation within the world communist movement, a "new unity" that acknowledges differences as unavoidable and even useful and denies the concept of a "center of leadership" or "leading party," thereby minimizing the possibility of hegemonism and even making "joint action" problematic. The paradoxical consequence is that the more the CCP integrates itself into the bloc, the more its inclusion tends to dissolve the bloc. In fact, the CCP, unlike the CPSU, no longer attributes priority to cooperation or solidarity between communist parties as a privileged group. Whereas Hu Yaobang had reaffirmed (in his 1982 report to the Twelfth Party Congress) the CCP's "adherence to proletarian internationalism," that concept is now extended to all forces that advocate national independence and progressive change on the basis of equal rights. "We no longer use the term of fraternal party relations in reference to other communist parties," party spokesman Wu Xingtang told a news conference in October 1986. "Our relationship with the other communist parties is one of moral relationship."⁴⁹

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This notion of proletarian internationalism tends to disregard the nature of the social and class structures in other countries, but is rather (like the recent practice of the CPSU) a function of Beijing's national interests and objectives. The bloc and its meaning are interactive with China's foreign-policy behavior. While retaining the term "international communist movement," the Chinese avoided any organizational solidarity on the international or regional levels, limiting relations with other parties to a series of bilateral ties. On questions involving previous debates within the world communist movement, the CCP has only seldom and quite vaguely taken a position – partly, no doubt, in order to avoid publicly contradicting (and thereby calling attention to) previous positions that have come to be embarrassing.

This new Chinese bloc policy has many points of tangency with that of other communist parties that have sought autonomy from Soviet guidelines – though there are also differences among them. The Romanians join the Chinese in placing the main emphasis not on class relations but on defense of the national interest. The Yugoslav and Italian communist parties are like the CCP in attempting to articulate a conception of international relations that goes beyond the confines of the international communist movement, in fact tending to negate that movement.⁵⁰ The French Communist Party, although tending to gear its foreign policy relatively closely to Moscow's line, nevertheless has come out in favor of a "new internationalism," the essence of which it sees in each party's right to self-determination.⁵¹ All of these tendencies objectively undermine Moscow's attempts to enforce a stricter alignment of the ICM with the CPSU, but the CCP line is perhaps more vexing than those of other dissidents because of its size (with some 43 million members, the largest in the world). The CCP maintains a distinction between internal and external bloc policies, and within the former it distinguishes between Soviet and Eastern European policies – sometimes inciting Soviet accusations of pursuing a "differentiated policy," like the United States, in order to undermine the unity of the bloc.

Although the Soviets have chosen to take no official notice of recent Chinese ideological pronouncements and activities in the field of inter-party relations, since the accession of Gorbachev there have been efforts to permit greater leeway within the bloc in the hope of reactivating the involvement of the CCP and other apostate parties. By replacing Comintern veteran Ponomarev with the diplomat Dobrynin as head of the International Department, Gorbachev first signaled his intention to rely on diplomacy and avoid sterile ideological disputes about first principles. The program of the Twenty-seventh Congress (February 1986) attempts to preserve an "international communist movement," but makes no claim that the CPSU is the center of orthodoxy in world communism. Although

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initially most concerned with halting tendencies toward bloc fragmentation and promoting further integration in economic, cultural, and scientific/technological spheres, since the spring of 1987 Gorbachev has emphasized intrabloc tolerance: "Each individual country can act independently," as Yegor Ligachev put it during an April visit to Hungary. In April and November 1987, Gorbachev endorsed "unconditional and full equality" among communist parties and claimed that there was "no 'model' of socialism to be emulated by everyone."⁵² The latest edition of Deng Xiaoping's *Selected Works* (published in late 1987 and immediately translated into Russian) was reviewed favorably and at considerable length in Soviet journals. The reformist newspaper *Moscow News* carried a particularly laudatory review praising Deng's effort to combine the universal truths of Marxism with "China's specific features" and implicitly criticizing the (previous Soviet) effort to hold up the experience of a particular country as universally relevant.⁵³ Finally, in a March 1988 visit by Gorbachev to Yugoslavia, the two countries issued a formal document enjoining the USSR from undertaking the kinds of invasions it conducted in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁵⁴

Though leery of Western reactions, the CCP had begun to evince a cautious interest in international communist gatherings in the middle and late 1980s. True, the CCP declined to send a delegation to the CPSU Twenty-seventh Congress on grounds that "there are no interparty links between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties."⁵⁵ When Mongolia invited China and other Asian communist parties and working-class parties to a meeting in Ulan Bator in 1987, the CCP again declined, explaining that they deemed any multilateral meetings among communist parties inappropriate at that time. But the CCP did send a delegation to the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1987, and when Gorbachev invited the delegation to an informal meeting, promising that "the meeting will be attended by communists as well as the representatives of other political parties. The meeting will not pass any document and will draw no conclusion," the CCP delegation accepted and attended.⁵⁶ When the CPSU sent a message of congratulations to the CCP on the occasion of the Thirteenth Congress (November 1987) – the first such message since the CCP Eighth Congress in 1956 – it received honorable notice in *People's Daily*.

This brief review of the vicissitudes in China's relationships with the socialist community leads one to doubt that anything about it is fixed. What is needed to reintegrate the bloc (if indeed it can now be reintegrated) in view of the declining credibility of authoritative command by a self-appointed bloc leader is a revival of its collective mission that would inspire categorical identification. Only then might closer affiliation with the international communist movement regain the domestic legitimating

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function it once provided. The socialist reform movement may offer such a common program, once it becomes clear that it can succeed and what policies and consequences it entails. At present, the CCP's affiliation with international communism is so loose that it is questionable to what extent it serves its function of legitimizing the "leading role" of the party domestically.⁵⁷

Since Tiananmen, complete fulfillment of China's stated preferences for Soviet noninterference in the domestic affairs of fraternal communist party-states has ironically redounded adversely to perceived CCP political interests, bringing China's relations with bloc countries to a temporary crisis point. As the masses in various Eastern European countries took to the streets in protest (in part reflecting the impact of China's democracy movement), Gorbachev replaced the Brezhnev doctrine with his own "Sinatra doctrine" (Gerasimov's term), not only refusing to intercede with Soviet troops but implicitly encouraging the demonstrators by telling incumbent leaders that they had to reform. The resulting upheavals in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and especially Romania excited alarm and consternation in CCP leadership circles, as the dramatic political changes they unleashed proved that what had been sanguinarily prohibited in China was not impossible per se. If Tiananmen was the future of reform, Gorbachev wanted nothing to do with it; if Eastern Europe is the terminus of reform, the CCP would prefer to bail out. Each represented the other's worst nightmare. Thus, the initial impulse of the hard-line faction that had achieved primacy in Beijing was to launch another polemical assault against Moscow for "subversion of socialism" and allowing "peaceful evolution"; indeed, intraparty documents were circulated to that effect. In the end, however, cooler heads prevailed. Notwithstanding the repudiation of the leading role of the communist parties by the former Eastern European "satellites," followed by elections in many of them in which the communist parties dwindled to minority status, Beijing retained amicable diplomatic relations with all – perhaps inspired by fear that otherwise they would recognize Taiwan, as they had just recognized South Korea. And although the Chinese made it clear that they differed with Gorbachev's "new thinking," Beijing has returned to its *modus vivendi* with Moscow.

CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD

From the very beginning, the CCP has considered itself especially well qualified to promote the cause of socialism in the developing countries. Emerging from a background of relatively egregious imperialist deprivations ranging from the Opium War through Japanese invasion, a party that miraculously snatched victory from the jaws of annihilation with

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relatively little outside aid, the CCP was proud of having achieved victory via “people’s war,” a form of guerrilla warfare based on indigenous martial traditions. The Chinese revolution did not immediately lead to a proletarian dictatorship, but to “New Democracy,” implying completion of the bourgeois-democratic revolution under communist leadership. The CCP took that to be a relevant model for the phased but uninterrupted transition of other pre-capitalist, pre-industrial societies from colonialism to socialism. In adjacent countries with strong indigenous communist movements, the CCP thus adopted a posture of militant activism, sending “volunteers” to fight “American imperialism” in Korea and also providing crucial moral and material support to the Viet Minh in their national liberation war against the French.

Even in countries with relatively weak communist parties, the Chinese enthusiastically propagated their own “model” of revolution. In the report to the Seventh Congress in 1945 in which he so lavishly praised Mao’s contributions to the Chinese revolution, Liu Shaoqi contended that “Mao’s thought” had relevance for the emancipation of people everywhere, “particularly the peoples of the East.”⁵⁸ Marx and Lenin were Europeans, who wrote about European problems and seldom took China or Asia into account, Liu observed in the spring of 1946, whereas Mao was an Asian who had transformed Marxism “from a European to an Asian form.”⁵⁹ And it was also Liu Shaoqi who made a famous statement in November 1949 outlining the CCP claim that “the path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People’s Republic is the path that should be taken by the people of various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and people’s democracy.”⁶⁰

Nor did the CCP’s claims to relevance go unheeded by communist parties in neighboring new nations. In India, the pro-Soviet communist leadership was overthrown in early 1948 by a pro-Chinese faction led by B. T. Ranadive, and the Maoist strategy of a multiclass (united front) alliance for a two-stage revolution (New Democracy, followed by a transition to socialism) was accepted.⁶¹ The Malayan Communist Party praised the Chinese revolutionary strategy, and the Indonesian, Japanese, Burmese, and Thai communist parties were also influenced to some degree by the Chinese model. The Soviets, however, were loath to accept such an abridgment of the relevance of the classic Leninist model of proletarian revolution to the developing countries. Ranadive was obliged to recant in 1949, and in 1950 an editorial in the Cominform journal, while conceding the relevance of the Chinese revolution, advised the CPI to formulate a strategy that would “draw on the experience of the national liberation model of China and other countries.”⁶² That November, at a conference at the Soviet Institute of Oriental Studies, the principal

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speaker, one Y. Zhukov, said that “it would be risky to regard the Chinese revolution as some kind of ‘stereotype’ for people’s democratic revolutions in other parts of Asia.”⁶³

Over the next several years, after the Chinese intervened in the Korean War and subsequently became domestically engaged in socialization of the means of production and simultaneous economic reconstruction, all of which sorely taxed domestic resources and required Soviet assistance, the CCP became less outspoken concerning the special form Marxism must take to deal with the problems of Asia and the Third World. All discussions of “Mao’s road” ceased by late 1951, and the flow of Soviet arms aid rose markedly thereafter.⁶⁴ To be sure, that retreat may have been merely tactical, as Khrushchev suggested in writing about his first encounter with Mao in 1954:

Ever since I first met Mao I have always known – and also said to colleagues – that he would never reconcile himself to another Communist Party being superior to his within the Communist world movement. He would never be in the position to tolerate that.⁶⁵

Following the cease-fire in the Korean War (July 1953), the CCP soon reasserted its special calling to lead the Third World. However, the Chinese opening to the Third World shifted from emphasis on propagating its revolutionary model to united-front-style diplomacy. Actually, as early as 1946, Mao had made a seminal contribution to the Marxist conceptualization of the Third World, referring to the developing countries as a nonhostile buffer zone rather than a part of the capitalist encirclement.⁶⁶ At that time, he introduced the notion of an “intermediate zone” between the two camps, characterizing it as a “vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonialist and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa.”⁶⁷ He said that the United States would first have to subjugate that zone before threatening the Soviet Union, implying that the zone’s current status was undecided, not necessarily anti-communist. China dropped that line of interpretation in 1947 in the light of Zhdanov’s more militant “two-camps” worldview, but returned to it after Zhdanov’s (and Stalin’s) departure from the scene.

The Korean War ended in July 1953, only a few months after Stalin’s death. The PRC, exhausted and drained by some thirty years of virtually incessant strife, subdued its emphasis on people’s war in favor of a more discreet approach to the prospect of revolution in the “intermediate zone.” Zhou Enlai’s evident objective was to establish a “neutral belt of states as the ‘zone of peace’ between the Western coalition and China,”⁶⁸ accordingly endeavoring to redefine “neutrality” as opposition to U.S. influence and rejection of anti-Chinese alliances, rather than anti-communism. Lenin’s phrase “peaceful coexistence” was first revived not

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by Khrushchev but by Zhou Enlai in his political report to the national committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in February 1953. Having finally negotiated a cease-fire at Panmunjon, the PRC also sought truce in Indochina, which was achieved in April 1954 at Geneva, the first time the PRC was represented in an international conference. Thanks largely to the diplomatic efforts of Zhou Enlai, the Viet Minh (whom the PRC had previously aided in their insurgency) acceded to a compromise settlement in Geneva that it would subsequently regret.

Following the close of the Geneva meeting in June, the PRC delegation visited India and Burma on its way home. (India had been the first "capitalist" country to recognize China, in April 1950, the leading non-bloc proponent of immediate seating for the PRC in the United Nations, and China's only available channel to Washington and other Western powers during and after the Korean War; relations were at that time quite cordial.) As a result of Zhou's talks with Nehru and Burmese prime minister U Nu, joint communiqués were issued emphasizing that relations between the PRC and those two countries would be based on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence": mutual respect for territorial sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-intervention in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Those principles were further propagated at the April 1955 Conference of Asian Countries in New Delhi, followed by the Conference of Asian and African States at Bandung, Indonesia. On his June 1954 journey to New Delhi to sign the understanding, Zhou appealed to Nehru to exclude the United States and the Soviet Union from Asian affairs; Chinese leaders also successfully opposed Soviet participation in the Bandung Conference. At Bandung, Zhou called upon all overseas Chinese to adopt the citizenship of their resident countries (which was particularly appreciated by Jakarta), pledged peaceful coexistence with Laos and Cambodia, and offered direct negotiations with the United States (which began at the ambassadorial level in August 1955 in Warsaw). From November 1956 through January 1957, Zhou visited eight Asian states, further extolling the Five Principles. The Third World, Asian states in particular, greeted "new China's" bid to seek peaceful solutions to common problems (rather than sponsoring revolution) with great relief.

Alert at that time for promising innovations to distinguish his leadership from the Stalinist policies to which his Politburo rivals remained wedded, Khrushchev moved quickly to co-opt that Chinese initiative, not only generalizing the principle of peaceful coexistence to the United States and other developed capitalist countries, but adopting non-militant, gradualist tactics to promote (Soviet) communism among developing nations. As a result of the emergence of the communist camp and the weakening

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of colonialism, he maintained (borrowing Mao's concept of an "intermediate zone") that "a vast 'zone of peace,' including both socialist and nonsocialist peace-loving states in Europe and Asia, has emerged in the world arena," which might play a "progressive" role in weakening "imperialism" and strengthening the communist world. Thus, the neutralist, even capitalist, nations on the periphery of the communist bloc were not to be treated as objects of fear and suspicion, but as opportunities to be exploited by a more flexible foreign policy. Beginning in 1955, Soviet theorists began to redefine Soviet doctrine on the role of the bourgeoisie in "bourgeois nationalist" revolutions and the possibility of nonalignment in states without communist governments.⁶⁹ To be sure, the CCP was duly credited for its contribution to that reorientation of socialist policy toward the Third World.⁷⁰ In one section of his report to the CPSU Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev said that:

the great historical significance of the famous Five Principles, put forward by the PRC and the Republic of India and supported by the Bandung conference and world consensus, lies in that they have provided the best form of relations among nations with different social systems under the present situation. Why should not these principles become the basis of peaceful relations among all nations in all parts of the world? If all nations accept these five Principles, it would be in the self-interest and at the desire of the people of every nation.⁷¹

And in November 1957, the Five Principles were formally endorsed by the Conference of Twelve Nations' Communist and Workers Parties, which convened in Moscow. At that meeting, Khrushchev recalled,

I think during the Moscow conference . . . we suggested that the task of the international communist movement would be more readily accomplished if we adopted some kind of division of labor. Since the Chinese Communist Party had won a great revolutionary victory in Asia, we thought it would be a good idea for the Chinese to concentrate on establishing closer contacts with the other Asian countries and Africa. We were primarily concerned about India, Pakistan, and Indonesia – three nations with economic conditions similar to China's. As for our own Party, it seemed to make more sense for us to be responsible for keeping touch with the revolutionary movements in Western Europe and the Americas.

Yet according to Khrushchev, Mao just as graciously declined that invitation:

When we presented this idea to the Chinese comrades, Mao Tse-tung said, "No, it's out of the question. The leading role in Africa and Asia should belong to the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the Party of Lenin; its cadres understand Marxism-Leninism more profoundly than anyone else. We of the Chinese Communist Party look to the Soviet Union for guidance. Therefore

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I think the CPSU should be the one and only center of the international communist movement, and the rest of us should be united around that center."⁷²

Apparently taking Mao at his word, Khrushchev resumed what seemed at the time to be a highly promising Soviet demarche toward the Third World. Soviet theoreticians went beyond Mao's Five Principles in hypothesizing that pre-industrial societies not only offered favorable conditions for socialist inroads but also might become socialist without having to pass through the successive stages prescribed by orthodox Marxist stage theory. Such an evolution was feasible if the countries in question first opted for a "noncapitalist" route of development, moderately socialist and nationalist in character.⁷³ Not foreseeing the divisive impact it would have on the Soviet empire, nationalism was coming to be deemed "progressive," in the hope that it might undermine the Western alliance structure (à la de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO).

Under the protective cover of a policy of détente with the West, Soviet diplomatic and technical advisors of various types fanned out into the Third World, focusing on those regimes that seemed to offer the best prospects for "noncapitalist" development. Did they practice land reform? Were they "progressive"? The visits Khrushchev and Bulganin made to India, Burma, and Afghanistan in 1954–1955, where they repeatedly emphasized Soviet friendship with those nations that took a neutral position in world affairs, marked the beginning of both the Soviet foreign-aid program and the Soviet Union's special relationship with India. The arms deal with Egypt the same year was the first to be concluded as part of a new policy of military aid to noncommunist countries.⁷⁴ By the end of 1956, no fewer than fourteen economic and military assistance agreements had been signed with various new developing nations, often on terms more generous than those granted the PRC. Thus, by 1961 Soviet non-military loans to India amounted to more than twice the total amount given China from 1949 to 1961.⁷⁵ It has been estimated that by the time of Khrushchev's fall in 1964, about \$3 billion (U.S.) worth of arms had been delivered to thirteen noncommunist developing countries in the preceding decade, amounting to nearly half of total Soviet aid during that period.⁷⁶ Several Third World regimes (e.g., Egypt, Algeria) declared themselves to be socialist, welcoming Soviet advisors (e.g., the engineers who constructed the Aswan Dam), along with arms and developmental aid.

Although the CCP might thus be said to have originated the first concerted communist campaign to win the allegiance of the Third World, Chinese support for the program did not survive the radicalization of "Mao's thought" that followed the abortive Hundred Flowers campaign. From Mao's impatient perspective, Bandung had not borne fruit: Only

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four nations established relations with China between 1955 and 1957, the most important of which was Egypt; meanwhile, the United Nations embargo ensuing from the Korean War remained intact. In its newly discovered concern for the perils of revisionism, the CCP suddenly began attaching much more stringent criteria to underwriting proto-socialist regimes, groups, or tendencies in the Third World. Instead of concerting foreign policy with moderate leaders such as Nasser or Nehru, the PRC began promoting violent national liberation movements and supporting radical programs for international reorganization (e.g., following Sukarno's indignant 1965 withdrawal from the United Nations, Foreign Minister Chen Yi called for a "revolutionary United Nations"). There are at least three conceivable reasons for that shift.

First, according to the "theory of uninterrupted revolution" adopted in that more radical phase of "Mao Zedong thought," revolutions were expected to move more quickly from the national democratic to the socialist phase than previously assumed, while under the leadership of a communist party. That meant that bourgeois nationalist regimes such as the United Arab Republic (UAR, then including Egypt and Iraq, under Nasser and Kassem, respectively) were unworthy of assistance, not to be trusted. The China-India-Egypt alignment was soon replaced by the so-called Beijing-Djakarta-Hanoi-Pyongyang axis, as the PRC shifted from a policy it had come to scorn as "class collaboration" to a policy of internationalized class war. It was also at that time that China articulated its "intermediate-zone theory,"⁷⁷ according to which imperialist attacks would not be directed against the formidable socialist camp ("The East Wind prevails over the West Wind."), but concentrated against the vulnerable "intermediate zone." It was hence incumbent upon socialist countries to support anti-imperialist, anti-colonial struggles in the "intermediate zone."

Second, although Nehru was first to endorse PRC entry to the United Nations, even in the context of the Korean War, India's surge to the forefront of the nonaligned bloc and emergence as China's main rival for Soviet patronage in Asia seems to have awakened a Sino-Indian rivalry and perhaps a competitive differentiation of platforms in a campaign for leadership of the nonaligned bloc, with the CCP perforce advocating the more militant strategy, while the Indians maintained their insistence on nonviolent resistance. As early as 1958 Beijing was annoyed to find that when Khrushchev proposed a five-power summit to devise ways of relieving international tension, China was not included.⁷⁸ That rivalry was exacerbated by Indian support for Tibet in its 1959 insurrection against Chinese occupation forces, and its granting of sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and his followers when the PRC crushed that uprising; that, in turn, precipitated intense border friction.

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Third, there seems to have been a serious disagreement over the likely imperialist response to the instigation of relatively low level violence in the Third World. Although the Chinese flaunted their endorsement of class war to an exaggerated degree, reaching an eventual rhetorical zenith with Lin Biao's extrapolation of the Chinese civil war to the entire world,⁷⁹ experience proved them to be correct in assuming that socialist states could venture more support for national-liberation wars without touching off massive and instant nuclear retaliation. China thus supported the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with large amounts of military and economic assistance, also offering rhetorical support and smaller amounts of material aid to communist movements in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines. Beyond Asia, the PRC supported liberation struggles in Guinea-Bissau, Angola (UNITA during the 1960s, then to the FNLA through 1975), Mozambique (FRELIMO), Zimbabwe (ZANU), and southwest Africa (SWAPO), as well as the PLO in the Middle East and the Naxalite movement in India. In Algeria, Beijing was the first to extend official recognition to Ben Bella's insurgency. Khrushchev had warned against that line, arguing that such brushfires might escalate into nuclear conflagration devastating the East as well as the West (not to mention inhibiting neutralism and leading to the polarization of the Third World).⁸⁰

The militant revolutionary phase of Chinese Third World policy, which lasted, with some variations, from the late 1950s through the late 1960s, had mixed results. It certainly seems to have impressed both superpowers, leading the United States to overestimate the Chinese military threat, and causing the USSR gradually to shift its own Third World policy in the direction of tendering military aid to national-liberation wars.⁸¹ In Africa, the PRC managed to establish diplomatic relations with about ten new nations, the most important of which were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, the UAR, the Congo (Brazzaville), and Somalia – cultural agreements were signed, trade developed, and economic assistance was given (the Chinese showed skill in allocating their limited funds and technicians to maximum public-relations advantage). Zanzibar, Tanzania, and Zambia turned increasingly to Beijing for support and assistance, and the construction of a few high-profile projects, such as the Tan-Zam railway, paid high dividends in goodwill. In Latin America, the PRC established relations with Castro on September 2, 1960, also setting up a Xinhua press office (with branch offices in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela).

The adverse consequences of the Chinese pursuit of international class struggle began to become apparent just before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, just when that line had become most radicalized. Zhou Enlai undertook a tour of Africa in 1964, which seemed to be proceeding

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successfully until he declared that “revolutionary prospects” were “excellent” in Africa, whereupon he began to encounter such a frosty reception that his travels had to be prematurely concluded.⁸² A number of African countries decried China’s policies, including Niger, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, and Madagascar, while some even broke diplomatic relations (e.g., Ghana, Burundi), reducing the total number of African states with which China maintained ties from eighteen in 1964–1965 to thirteen in 1969. The second Conference of Nonaligned States in Algeria had to be canceled in 1965 because of an irresolvable rivalry between China and the USSR (each of which wished to attend, but the PRC only if the USSR were excluded – which India resisted). In Latin America, China’s stock declined when Castro opted to side with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Even in Asia, China suffered a setback when the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was brutally suppressed following an ill-advised and abortive coup attempt (in which the CCP may have been implicated), decimating what had been the largest party outside the bloc and poisoning Indonesian–Chinese relations for the next two decades. Even the three contiguous socialist states (Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam) began to lean, more or less, toward Moscow rather than Beijing.

Nevertheless, the initial phase of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1968) was characterized by a heightening rather than a curtailment of radical tendencies: Beijing increased its support for a variety of Maoist groups and organizations seeking revolution in various parts of the world, also engaging in vicious assaults on various Third World countries previously deemed special friends, such as Burma; there were also more concerted attempts to manipulate overseas Chinese communities on behalf of revolutionary objectives (as in Hong Kong). By late 1967, China had become entangled in controversy with more than thirty countries.⁸³

Soon after the Red Guard phase of the Cultural Revolution had been terminated in 1969 and the foreign-policy apparatus reconsolidated, China hastened to establish relations with the Third World on a more ecumenical basis – greatly encouraged in that effort by border fighting and nuclear blackmail from the Soviet Union. Its efforts were again greeted with great relief, and rewarded by prompt diplomatic recognition from a veritable wave of Third World countries. China’s successes were facilitated by the decline of American prestige among the new nations of Asia and Africa due to its involvement in Vietnam, as well as the unease among many smaller Third World states about the USSR’s expansionist proclivities (e.g., Soviet advisers were expelled from the Sudan in 1971, from Egypt in 1972) – all of which fostered a certain mistrust of both superpowers. Also, China was the first Third World country to acquire a nuclear deterrent, and whereas many were frightened and re-

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pelled by the Cultural Revolution, it should not be forgotten that many were also impressed at the time – the claims of Chinese propagandists to have eradicated poverty, corruption, and inequality received widespread credence.⁸⁴

Thus, when China opened the door, the response was surprisingly forthcoming. Dropping all ideological prerequisites to political normalization except “anti-hegemonism,” skillfully using banquets and tourism as well as conventional diplomacy, the PRC achieved almost universal diplomatic recognition in the early 1970s – but the real breakthrough was achieved in the Third World, with which China reaffirmed its identification as never before.⁸⁵ In addition to renouncing most ideological prerequisites for normalization, the PRC at least nominally abandoned its pretensions to lead the Third World toward revolution, claiming only fellowship in that group. “Like the overwhelming majority of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, China belongs to the Third World,” announced Qiao Guanhua, head of the Chinese delegation to the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly on November 15, 1971. Mao confirmed (on June 22, 1973) that “we all belong to the Third World, and are developing countries.”⁸⁶

To ascribe greater significance to the Third World, China also reconceptualized the theoretical context in which it was embedded. During the 1950s and 1960s, the Third World had been a mere “intermediate zone,” characterized by its nonmembership in either of the two “camps,” rather than by any positive attributes. A slight modification was introduced in late 1964, when, apparently encouraged by Gaullist France’s recognition of the PRC in January, that intermediate zone was perceived to be subdivided into two. “At the present time, there exist two intermediate zones in the world,” Mao maintained to an audience of Japanese socialists. “Asia, Africa and Latin America constitute the first intermediate zone. Europe, North America and Oceania constitute the second. Japanese monopoly capital belongs to the second intermediate zone, but even it is discontented with the United States, and some of its representatives are openly rising against the US.”⁸⁷ Because the “second intermediate zone” was “subjected to US control, interference and bullying,” it had something in common with the socialist countries and the peoples of various countries.⁸⁸ The definitive reformulation of that worldview was articulated in Deng Xiaoping’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly in 1974, which perceived not one world but three: The two superpowers composed the First World, having in common their attempts to seek world hegemony, bring the developing countries under their control, and “bully” the other developed countries. The superpowers were the “biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today,” sharing a form of “monopoly capitalism” as the basis of their respective social

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systems. Developing countries were adjured to maintain “equidistance” from the two superpowers.⁸⁹ The Second World consisted of the other developed countries of both the East and the West, which exploited the developing countries but were in turn exploited and bullied by the two superpowers. The Third World, consisting of the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, was exploited and oppressed by both of the other groups, but nevertheless held the key to the future.⁹⁰ With three-fourths of the world’s population, three-fifths of its area, and a large share of its natural resources, markets, and investment opportunities, the Third World was Mao’s “blank sheet of paper,” on which the most beautiful characters could be written.

That was the first time that the Third World had been recognized for its own distinctive properties, rather than as an intermediary zone or hotbed for socialism. Aside from permitting a harsher critique of the Soviet Union than before (as not only nonsocialist but also “capitalist-roaders” and “social imperialists”), that formulation permitted the theodicy and eschatology of Marxist salvationism to be projected internationally, to China’s symbolic advantage.⁹¹

Since the launching of China’s reform program in late 1978 and the commencement of Sino–Soviet normalization talks soon afterward, China’s overtures to the Third World have continued, but with three modifications. First, the PRC has suspended or at least drastically curtailed its own foreign-aid program: Chinese aid commitments dropped from \$366 million in 1975 to less than \$200 million for 1976, 1977, and 1978, declining further since then.⁹² There has been a limited revival of Chinese military and developmental assistance to Africa since 1982–1984, focusing particularly on Zambia, Tanzania, and Zaire.⁹³ Second, Deng’s market reforms have facilitated China’s integration into the international trading and financial systems, a tendency that has continued even after the early enthusiasm for the American connection cooled. In its role as active participant in the international (Western-dominated) economic system, the PRC has tactfully opted to play down the three-worlds theory, with its implications of international class war. That has been particularly true since proclamation of China’s “independent” foreign policy at the Twelfth Party Congress in 1982, which brought with it a revival of appeals to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Third, Sino–Soviet normalization talks have permitted China to drop anti-hegemonism as a prerequisite for normalization with various socialist Third World countries. The functional extinction of the anti-hegemony plank was confirmed by its mention in the communiqué of the May 1989 Sino–Soviet summit – if the Soviet Union also agrees, the epithet has no empirical referent.

China’s continued identification with the Third World has now shifted

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to the international legislative forums. Analysis of China's roll-call votes in the United Nations General Assembly shows the PRC to have voted much more frequently against the U.S. position than in favor, probably in deference to its Third World reference group, which now holds a clear majority in the General Assembly.⁹⁴ In 1983, China voted for the draft resolution of the General Assembly condemning the invasion of Grenada, for example, and abstained on the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution condemning the Soviet downing of the KAL airliner (in the other nineteen Security Council resolutions of 1983, China voted with the United States). In 1983, China voted against the United States almost 80 percent of the time; in 1989, China voted with the United States only 11.1 percent of the time (contrasted with 98.4 percent agreement with the Soviet Union), just below Burkina Faso.⁹⁵ In October 1981 at the Cancun conference, Zhao Ziyang proposed an ambitious plan for the creation of a new world economic order, according to which the developing countries should have full access to Western markets without protectionist barriers or disadvantageous terms of trade; indeed, the distinction between North and South in the international division of labor should be eliminated altogether, and the developing countries given "full and eternal sovereignty" over their own natural resources. In 1982, China publicly associated itself with the basic principles espoused by the "Group of 77." (China has not, however, joined the group, nor has it joined the nonaligned movement, determined as it is to adhere to its "independent" – not merely neutral – foreign policy.)⁹⁶ Nor has it chosen a significant leadership role in any of the international governmental organizations (IGOs) that service Third World demands and needs. It has, rather, sought to join those IGOs still assumed to be under the control of the First World. By 1983, the PRC had joined some 340 international organizations, tacitly underlining its commitment to the international organizational status quo.⁹⁷ From 1977 to 1988 China's membership in nongovernmental international organizations increased nearly eightfold, from 71 to 574.⁹⁸

The leadership's apparent purpose in becoming such an avid "joiner" has been to facilitate access to credit, capital, and technology markets. China's memberships in, and applications for aid and concessionary loans from, various international eleemosynary institutions have placed the PRC in direct competition with other members of the Third World. Like many developing countries, China is a net exporter of primary products, including cotton, rubber, and wood. Indonesian oil has been squeezed out of Japan by Chinese oil exports, for example, because of Beijing's pressure on Tokyo to maintain a balance of trade. Growing concern (particularly in regions on China's periphery) about Chinese competition in traditional markets has thus to some extent qualified general Third World approval of China's self-appointed role as their advocate:

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As China modernizes, there is a growing tendency throughout the Third World to view Beijing in South–South terms as an economic competitor and ascendant great power. In North–South terms, however, China is increasingly viewed as a champion of Third World views on economic and financial issues. Moreover, the success of its economic reforms, in the face of many Third World economic failures, makes China something of a role model.⁹⁹

By dint of its size and market potential, China receives better credit and terms of trade than do many developing countries, and its call for capital investment and technology in the early 1980s soon attracted more offers than the Chinese bureaucracy could process expeditiously.

Throughout the 1960s, Cultural Revolution China had criticized the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while the country's relationship with the United Nations *per se* (from which it had been excluded) remained generally hostile. In 1971, making skillful use of a compromised American position,¹⁰⁰ China gained entrée to the United Nations General Assembly, whereupon it automatically acquired permanent membership on the Security Council and gained entrée to other UN or UN-affiliated organizations, including exclusive (i.e., excluding Taiwan) seats on the World Bank's board of governors and the IMF's board of executive directors; more recently, China has also joined the BRD, IDA, IFC, the Multi-Fibre Agreement, and the Asian Development Bank; it has applied for membership in GATT (had it not been for Tiananmen, membership probably would have been granted in 1990). Less than six months after China had been officially granted seats on the governing boards of these leading financial organizations, China succeeded in doubling its own quotas (which determine borrowing rights and voting power) in both institutions, therewith abandoning in practice its traditional advocacy of international financial self-reliance (e.g., in 1976, Maoist China had in principle refused all aid from foreign governments and international organizations in the wake of the devastating Tangshan earthquake). By releasing for the first time its "complete national income statistics" to the UN Committee on Contributions in 1979 and to the World Bank in 1980, China reduced its assessment rate (and required contribution to the United Nations) from 5.5 percent before 1979 to 1.62 percent in 1983 and finally to 0.88 percent by 1989 – based on what many believed to be a deflated per capita gross national product (GNP) of only \$152 (U.S.) (the World Bank's own estimates placed China's 1978 per capita GNP at \$460).¹⁰¹ China has since 1979 requested long-term low-interest loans from Japan's Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (which really amounts to foreign aid, correspondingly alarming South Korea and others) and has garnered small amounts of technical aid from West Germany and Belgium, as well as substantial assistance from the World Bank (becoming by the mid-1980s its largest bor-

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rower).¹⁰² As with private investment, however, Tiananmen and the associated Chinese misgivings about political reform seem to have had at least a temporary chilling effect on governmental grants and subsidized loans.

Inasmuch as China's economic relationship with the Third World is now an economically competitive one, it has been argued that its real interests lie with the First World, with the industrially developed countries, rather than with the Third World. China's trade with advanced industrialized countries rose from 46 percent in 1966 to 64 percent in 1975 and over 70 percent in 1979. Its large merchant marine gives Beijing a common interest with the United States and Japan in defending freedom of the seas. Its offshore oil deposits give China an interest in extended territorial limits, rather than an internationalized seabed.¹⁰³ According to the Chinese timetable, the PRC's sojourn in the Third World is in any case only temporary, as China is scheduled for arrival in the developed world by 2050 at the latest. Whereas the composition of China's trade with the First World parallels that of other developing nations, the composition of its growing trade with the Third World is analogous to that of other First World countries. The latter trade balance has consistently been favorable to the PRC, averaging some \$5.9 billion (U.S.) per year through the 1980s. Among other things, the PRC has become the world's fourth leading arms merchant (in contrast, during the Maoist period China would only give, never sell, weapons – and only to ideologically “correct” beneficiaries), plying this trade almost entirely with other developing countries.¹⁰⁴ Beijing has also begun to send tens of thousands of contract workers abroad, especially to Iraq and other oil countries, where remuneration for their services helps generate needed foreign exchange.¹⁰⁵ China also seeks to attract investment capital from the more prosperous Third World countries – Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates – to prospect and drill for oil in China and on its continental shelf, for instance. According to incomplete data, more than ninety economic-cooperation projects involving capital from Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia had been built by the mid-1980s, including both jointly operated enterprises and those wholly owned by Third World businessmen.¹⁰⁶

China's growing integration into world markets is justified à la neo-functional theory in terms of its positive political spillover effects. This functionalist perspective on the international system is inconsistent with the class struggle still implicit in the three-worlds model, and accordingly the latter has fallen into desuetude. The PRC has, since 1983, descried a “new era” in world affairs in which countries with “various social forms” become increasingly interdependent within “one world market,” improving the prospects for peace.¹⁰⁷ In place of the (not yet explicitly

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repudiated) theory of three worlds, a “peace-and-development line” has emerged, according to which all nations may rise to full development according to their merits.¹⁰⁸ In this connection it is interesting to note that since 1984, the PRC has taken a more favorable view of the “Pacific Basin” concept, which it had in 1982 dismissed as a mask for North–South exploitation.

China’s relationship with the developed First World is one of would-be exporter to import markets, precisely analogous to the relationship between the other successful East Asian developing countries (“NICs”) and the West over the past two decades or so – but at a time when there is enhanced concern in the developed countries (particularly in the United States) about a structural trade deficit with the NICs. The PRC’s ambition is to follow the trail blazed by the NICs toward wealth and power, at a time when that trail has become crowded and perhaps more difficult to traverse. Under the circumstances, future relations with the advanced industrialized countries seem apt to be delicate, necessitating occasional-to-frequent political negotiation. The Chinese have tended to inject the same nationalist intensity into mundane economic matters such as the balance of trade or tariff barriers that are more typically associated with symbolic issues.

By embarking on its long march toward normalization with the USSR, the PRC has suffered no real losses in the Third World (where only one or two ideological confreres had been able to seize and retain power anyhow), while in effect disarming the gatekeeper to the harem of socialist or proto-socialist developing nations. During his December 1982–January 1983 visit to eleven African countries, Zhao Ziyang thus announced that the PRC no longer necessarily opposed Soviet policy on that continent; he also met with PLO chief Yasir Arafat, with representatives of SWAPO, and with leaders of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress, thereby demonstrating China’s continuing support for those liberation movements enjoying wide support in the region. In May 1983, Zhao withdrew Chinese support for the National Liberation Front guerrilla movement of Holden Roberto in Angola and officially recognized the (Moscow-backed) MPLA government of that country. In January 1983, China established diplomatic relations with Luanda, and in October 1983 Beijing even received the foreign minister of Cuba, the first time since the days of “Che” Guevara that a high Cuban official had been received in China – the Chinese later explained that “Cuba has gradually readjusted its foreign policy” and was no longer deemed a dangerous accomplice of “social imperialism.”¹⁰⁹ In 1986, the PRC established diplomatic relations (in return for diplomatic recognition) with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The way seems clear to improved relations with various other previously shunned Soviet

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clients, such as Libya, Mozambique, South Yemen, Syria, and Ethiopia – perhaps subtly offering those countries an alternative “road to socialism.” Traces of the old rivalry are also visible in Chinese support for Somalia (which opposes Soviet-backed Ethiopia) and the Sudan (dating from Nimeiri’s survival of a Soviet-sponsored coup in 1971).

Whereas this opening to the socialist developing countries may serve to bolster the coalition China seems intent on building in the UN General Assembly, no African leftist regime can yet be expected to turn to China as a serious alternative to the USSR as a source of military support.¹¹⁰ Any serious Chinese attempt to compete with the USSR for the patronage of socialist developing nations is likely to founder on the same philanthropical incapacity that has crippled such efforts in the past. On the other hand, China’s interests in the Third World may coincide with those of the Soviet Union to a greater extent now than when the Sino–Soviet dispute was in full flower – at least outside of East Asia, where the two still compete for geopolitical spheres of interest.

In sum, the PRC’s identification with the Third World reflects China’s sense of being unjustly oppressed and exploited by those more powerful, bespeaking a deep underlying sense of vulnerability and grievance.¹¹¹ This identification is not the assumption of a negative identity, for the Third World has remained a positive reference point, but rather identification with the victim, as a way of rekindling the moral indignation and revolutionary ardor of the Chinese masses.¹¹² That identity as helpless victim was internalized early in the history of China’s debut in the modern international system and has survived as a *Doppelgänger* to the nation’s positive image as a highly self-confident, world-transforming revolutionary/modernizing force. While determined to transcend their “victim” identity as soon as possible, the CCP leadership has balanced that ambition with recurrent assurances of its determination to continue to identify with those in this category even after their material interests diverge and “never [to] become a superpower” – by which it seems to mean, never a *victimizer*. Whether that vow will be kept remains to be seen, but in any case it is worth noting that identification with the less developed has always been a marked feature of PRC foreign policy, and it remains at this writing a relatively focal theme in an admittedly much more pragmatic and multifaceted, less rhetorically exuberant approach to world affairs. It has become a vestige of Marxist eschatological assumptions that the “meek [and numerous!] shall inherit the earth,” whereby the PRC continues to see itself as a member of an unjustly maligned vanguard and thus a legitimate claimant to material compensation as well as international leadership; this gains increasing relevance in the wake of declining faith in orthodox stage theory.

Since June 1989, China has intensified its rhetorical identification with

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the Third World in the context of growing alienation from both superpowers – from the United States because of its public sympathy for the democracy demonstrators suppressed at Tiananmen, from the USSR because of its refusal to crack down on analogous tendencies in Eastern Europe and the breakaway Soviet republics. Identification with developing countries (few of which joined in the condemnations of Tiananmen) was far less threatening than was the opening to the West in terms of the political-cultural demonstration effect and the problem of “spiritual pollution.” Li Peng thus made his first official visits after Tiananmen to Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, promising new aid; President Yang Shangkun visited Egypt and other Arab countries. China has even taken a more flexible stance toward Third World countries with which it has no formal relations, such as Israel (in 1990 the PRC opened a tourism office in Tel Aviv, and Israel opened an “academic liaison office” in Beijing). The Thai prime minister made an official visit in 1989, and Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Singapore established diplomatic ties in 1990 (alleviating the impact of Taiwan’s recognition by six small Third World countries the previous year). The Chinese militant defense of Third World countries against superpower intervention is obviously intended to prime the latter to support China’s appeals for support against Western meddling in the name of “human rights”; for instance, a condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Panama was lauded as an expression of Third World unity. In Chinese eyes, that admirable solidarity was also exemplified in a November 1989 UN General Assembly vote (with strong Third World support) defeating a Western resolution on freedom of the press, which the Chinese claim was “designed to interfere in the internal affairs of Third World countries.”¹¹³ That sort of united-front rhetoric has been accompanied by a revival of propaganda themes from the 1960s – anti-imperialism, protests against foreign interference in China’s domestic affairs, reassertions that “socialism will save China” (wittily transposed on the grapevine to “China will save socialism”). Thus, a recent article criticized the Soviet Union for abandoning its ties to the Third World and siding with the United States on such issues as the need for democratic elections. “Meanwhile, the US and Western countries are now considering diverting UN aid from traditional Third World recipients [no doubt including China] to the Soviet bloc.”¹¹⁴

CONCLUSION

Unlike the politics of many new nations (or more developed ones, for that matter), Chinese politics has, since the communist seizure of power in 1949, been characterized by very strong leadership, in the value-neutral sense that national priorities have been resolutely decided upon, suitable

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means to achieve them have been arranged, and their execution has generally been carried through with dispatch and efficiency.¹¹⁵ The PRC has never been afflicted by splits between executive and legislature, deadlock between central and provincial/local governments, irresolvable civil-military strife, or sabotage or crippling cryptopolitical resistance on the part of bureaucrats. Only when the mortality or identity of the supreme leader himself has seemed at issue (as in a succession crisis) has China's leadership exhibited any symptoms of weakness.¹¹⁶

The reasons for this particular strength are not hard to find. Official histories blame errant leadership for the many disasters that befell the CCP during its fledgling years, and strong leadership has been systematically cultivated since then. In a series of writings since raised to canonical status, the architects of the political-military organization that was ultimately to prevail over such long odds set forth the qualities of skill, tactics, and personal character that should distinguish a good leader.¹¹⁷ Those qualities and values were articulated and cultivated in a network of cadre schools, for which candidates were recruited on the basis of the most careful scrutiny and selection in campaign settings where leadership qualities were clearly visible. Those who exhibited such qualities were lauded as superior human beings, worthy of awe and "unquestioning obedience" from more ordinary mortals. To further enforce such obedience, the organizational qua socialization devices of democratic centralism, criticism and self-criticism, and "study" were systematically applied. Marxist-Leninist ideology provided a legitimating formula and spelled out the goals of the movement toward which all should strive. That combination of abstract ideological legitimacy and its dramatically effective application to millions of people's lives was so potent that all rival foci of organizational loyalty could be pulverized. Thus, the errors of domestic politics came not from leadership weakness but from its excessive strength, capable of precipitating enormous damage before it could be checked. In the case of perhaps the two biggest blunders, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, it may be argued that the strength and tenacity of the Maoist leadership were such that the latter indeed unwittingly recapitulated many of the errors of the former.

Foreign policy is another matter. True, China dared attack the world's mightiest superpower in Korea, later broke with and eventually initiated border conflict with the mightiest socialist superpower, courting nuclear retaliation in both cases. China can claim patent rights for the spate of national-liberation wars that made the Third World an arena of international conflict in the 1960s and 1970s. Those policies certainly demonstrated courage and resourcefulness, disproportionately magnifying the international influence of what was still, after all, a large underdeveloped country. And yet, beneath a good deal of rhetorical bluster, China's

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management of foreign affairs has been characterized by an unusual amount of ideologically incomprehensible zigging and zagging, bobbing and weaving (from pro- to anti- to guardedly pro-Soviet, from anti- to pro-U.S. to ambivalence), vastly ambitious programmatic schemes without systematic follow-through (cf. Lin Biao, or Mao, for that matter, on the international implications of “people’s war”). In short, while Chinese foreign policy demonstrates the derring-do associated with strong leadership, it has also been afflicted by an unusual amount of vacillation and self-contradiction – qualities one associates not with strong leadership but with weakness. In foreign affairs, China has been like a boat with a powerful motor but no rudder.

We have attempted to argue in this essay that at least one of the reasons for this disorientation is conceptual. The starring role in foreign affairs is, after all, played by the nation-state, an entity about which the Marxist theoretical tradition has had very little to say: The nation-state has been seen as essentially illusory or “ideological,” having no apparent positive functions – the state being the executive committee of the ruling class, nationalism the result of false consciousness. It is classes that have respectable Marxist ontological status, and classes are trans-national; the party, which is derivative from the class (as its “vanguard”), also supersedes the state.

Although Chinese Marxists have made some progress toward infusing meaning into this theoretically specious yet still operational category, metaphorically equating the nation-state with the class (as in “national liberation,” or the designation of “bourgeois” and “proletarian” national actors), such generalizations provide no concrete guidelines for policy. For these, Chinese leaders have reverted to emulation of traditional models, adopting two national reference groups to guide them through the international miasma: the bloc of fraternal communist party-states, and the Third World. The former depicted their future, the latter their past; the two groups fit together on either end of an inexorable developmental continuum.

Unfortunately, there still has been sufficient ambiguity in an international system reduced to two positive reference groups and one adversarial role (alternately capitalism and hegemonism) to permit a good deal of lurching about. On the one hand there has been a tendency to oscillate between active involvement in international affairs and isolation, and on the other there has been alternation between reference groups, as the divergence between them has increased. Initially the bloc was the main point of reference, while the Third World provided some ambit for ego expansion. When threatened by the imperialist adversary, as in Korea or the two Taiwan Straits crises, China would identify with international

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communism; when the security threat ebbed, China could pursue a more vigorous leadership role in the Third World.

When neither identification seemed to work, China lapsed into isolation. The 1960s marked the low-water mark in Sino–bloc relations, as the Soviet Union reverted to Stalinist control tactics and nuclear blackmail, and China acquired its own nuclear deterrent, ultimately breaking out of the bloc to ensure national survival. At the same time, although Chinese leadership efforts in the Third World continued apace, the heroic defiance of both superpowers expected of PRC clients was not politically realistic and won few adherents. In the late 1970s China's hitherto limited dalliance with the United States seemed for a time to blossom into a more fully fledged alliance, a multifaceted relationship that might not only check the Soviet security threat but also eclipse ongoing relations with the Third World. Since the late 1980s, however, the opening to the West has cooled, while relations with both customary reference groups have experienced a revival.

Altogether, Chinese foreign policy has been characterized by sudden reversals and contradictions of considerable range and magnitude. Yet a few generalizations can be hazarded. First, Chinese foreign policy might be said to approximate, asymptotically as it were, a learning curve. Brash self-confidence, as evinced in China's early Korean adventure (not even the USSR would commit itself once the United States was fully engaged), gave way over time to artillery bombardments across the Taiwan Straits, followed eventually by the Warsaw talks; sharp border clashes at the Sino–Soviet border in 1969 and the Sino–Vietnamese border in 1979 were not repeated with those adversaries. China has been willing to learn from experience and has thus become prudent, gradually shedding more extreme or high-risk ventures.

Second, the communist bloc and the Third World have functioned as reference groups around which much PRC international behavior has rather consistently been organized. China has not remained anchored to these powers, as Germany and Japan remained anchored to the West following their defeat (a rather impressive learning experience!), but they have remained meaningful points of reference to which the Chinese have repeatedly returned – despite growing economic and security reliance on the West. Identification with the tattered remnants of the bloc is still deemed to offer ideological reinforcement for CCP legitimacy claims; the Third World, however heterogeneous, continues to provide a basis for the identification with the poor and afflicted that has been so consistently emphasized in Chinese Marxism, as well as a forum for the PRC to exercise international leadership.

The major difference in the most recent period is that China's approach

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to both reference groups is cooler, more detached, more imbued by the PRC's own specific economic and security interests. Why? China's domestic program of pell-mell economic modernization by whatever means seems to have created a perhaps not fully articulate sense of bad conscience about both reference groups. The Third World is increasingly seen as a collection of impoverished and inefficient competitors, many of which will ultimately be left behind, while the communist bloc is in great disarray at the moment, without a clear or convincing vision of its future. Neither seems to offer the key to China's most pressing needs. Recognition of the irrelevance of wanted external reference groups has led to increasing emphasis on China's unique traditions as a basis for national self-definition.¹¹⁸ Socialism itself has not escaped this nationalistic imprimatur; it is "socialism with Chinese characteristics." The ideological self-portrait of a country at "the primary stage of socialism" that was unveiled at the Thirteenth Party Congress in October–November 1987 was even disarmingly modest, fitting more comfortably with the traditional self-image than with Mao's rather grandiloquent sloganeering.

In the wake of the radical attempt to repudiate China's historical legacy across the board, this search for "roots" (as in the "cultural fever" of the late 1980s), may portend the maturation of a distinctively Chinese national identity. This maturity was even reflected, if not in the regime response to democracy demonstrations at Tiananmen, certainly in its carefully modulated responses to Western tendencies toward ostracism and to the subsequent Eastern European upheavals. Despite speculation that an obviously weakened authority would require an external enemy to justify the suppression of internal dissent, the regime has on the whole adhered to its policy of cordial relations at all azimuths – perhaps the most successful foreign policy in and for itself in the PRC's brief history.

NOTES

1. "Lun guojizhuyi yu minzuzhuyi" (On nationalism and internationalism), in *Liu Shaoqi wenti ziliao zhuanji* (A special collection of materials on Liu Shaoqi) (Taipei: Zhonggong wenti yanjiusuo, 1970), pp. 189–199. Though written in January 1948, Liu's article was not published until 1949.
2. Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR: The Struggle for Stalin's Succession, 1945–1960* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 202–203.
3. During Khrushchev's October 1954 visit to Beijing, he said that "the victory of the Chinese people's revolution is the most outstanding event in world history since the great October socialist revolution." *Renmin ribao*, October 3, 1954. This signified that the PRC should rank second in the bloc. As Molotov put it in a February 1955 foreign-policy report to the Supreme Soviet, "there has been formed in the world a socialist and democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union, or to be more exact, headed by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China." *Renmin ribao*, February 10, 1955.

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4. "Better Fewer, but Better," in V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1943), 9:400
5. Strobe Talbott, ed., *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 250–251.
6. Donald Zagoria, *The Sino–Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
7. Cf. Paul Keal, *Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance* (London: Macmillan, 1983).
8. See Parris Chang, "Research Notes on the Changing Loci of Decision in the CCP," *China Quarterly* 44 (October–December 1970): 169–195.
9. This type of mimesis was perhaps not exclusively one-way. Thus, Medvedev states that "it is clear that it was the certainty of firm support from Peking that prompted Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and their supporters to come out against Khrushchev in June 1957." Roy Medvedev, *China and the Superpowers* (New York: Blackwell, 1986), p. 30.
10. Cf. "On Historical Experience Concerning the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," *Renmin ribao*, April 5, 1956, trans. in *Current Background*, no. 403 (July 25, 1956): 1.
11. According to a 1985 interview with a member of the Institute of Soviet and Eastern European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing.
12. "It seems that Poland and China understand one another very well, for some time, without knowing it," he said to Ochab. "The Poles are good company for us, and we welcome them." Flora Lewis, *A Case History of Hope* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 183–184, as quoted by Jacques Levesque, *Le conflit sino-sovietique et l'Europe de l'Est: Ses Incidences sur les Conflits Soviëto-Polonais et Soviëto-Roumain* (Montreal: Les Presse de L'Université de Montreal, 1970), p. 30.
13. K. S. Karol, *Visa pour la Pologne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 37.
14. *Renmin ribao*, November 21, 1956, as quoted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 277, 502.
15. G. V. Astafiev et al., *The PRC's Foreign Policy and International Relations, 1949–1973*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Misli, 1974), 1:64. Indeed, the Chinese press did not at first refer to the rebels as counterrevolutionaries (merely as rioters) and did not blame the rising on Western instigation. Nor did it carry any report on the actions of the Soviet forces, except the announcement of the Hungarian defense minister that they would be withdrawn by October 31.
16. *China and the Soviet Union*, compiled by Peter Jones and Sian Kevill (New York: Facts on File, 1985), p. 8.
17. Levesque, *Conflit*, pp. 45–47. On November 3, *People's Daily* gave a full account of the Hungarian incident in an editorial, accusing the Nagy government of "leaning to the imperialist side and betraying the national interests of Hungary by scrapping the Warsaw Pact." The following day, the paper urged the Hungarian people to "defend socialism and defeat the insurrection of counterrevolutionaries." On November 5, in an editorial entitled "Celebrate the Great Victory of the Hungarian People," the paper emphasized the correctness of the Soviet decision to suppress the uprising.
18. These events have been most fully described by Roderick MacFarquhar in

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Origins of the Cultural Revolution: I. Contradictions Among the People, 1956–1957 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974).

19. It was during the Hundred Flowers movement that the first criticisms of the Soviet model publicly emerged. General Lung Yun, vice-chairman of the National Defense Council, said that since China was fighting in Korea for the sake of socialism, it was unfair to have to shoulder the burden of all its war expenditures; although the Soviets granted a loan, it had to be paid back in a relatively short period of only ten years, plus interest. Moreover, during the Soviet occupation of Manchuria at the close of World War II, the Soviets had dismantled and removed to the USSR large quantities of machinery and industrial equipment, without indemnification. *Dagong bao* (Tianjing), July 14, 1957. Others complained about having to learn everything from the Soviet Union, calling that dogmatism. *Harbin ribao* (Harbin), August 13, 1957. Anti-Soviet utterances reported by the Chinese press during the Hundred Flowers movement came from all parts of the country, but particularly Manchuria.
20. In the spring of 1957, the temporary rehabilitation of Stalin reached its zenith. An article in late March stated that “great credit is due to Stalin for what he has done for our Party, the working class and the international workers’ movement. . . . Marxism does not deny the role of outstanding personalities in history, nor does it deny the role of the leaders of the working people in leading the revolutionary liberation movement and in building a society.” “Why the Cult of the Individual Is Against the Spirit of Marxism-Leninism,” *Pravda*, March 28, 1957. The resolutions adopted by the CPSU Central Committee and published in *Pravda* on July 2 gave an even higher appraisal of Stalin’s contributions, holding (with the Chinese) that Stalin had more merits than faults.
21. Medvedev, *China*, p. 30.
22. In December, opposition to dogmatism and opposition to revisionism were accorded the same priority: “While we are strengthening the opposition to dogmatism, we must simultaneously firmly oppose revisionism.” *Renmin ribao*, December 29, 1956, as quoted by Yang Junshi, *Xiandaihua yu Zhongguo gongchanzhuyi* (Modernization and Chinese communism) (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1987), p. 150, fn. 4. Then, at a propaganda work conference in March 1957, it was decided that “in the current situation, revisionism is even more dangerous than dogmatism.” Mao Zedong, in Ting Wang, ed., *Mao Zedong xuanji buyi* (Supplement to Mao Zedong’s selected works) (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Yuekan she, 1971), 3:140. The same accent is visible in Mao’s essay, “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” published three months later.
23. Quoted by Hoxha, in Jon Halliday, ed., *The Artful Albanian: Memoirs of Enver Hoxha* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1986), p. 215. Mao insisted that the phrase “the socialist camp is headed by the USSR” be included in the conference declaration, but Khrushchev caviled at the term “head.” Khrushchev later revealed in conversation that it was not at his initiative that the leading role of the CPSU was explicitly set forth in the declaration. *Pravda*, July 12, 1958; *New York Times* (hereafter cited as NYT), June 15, July 15, 1958.
24. As quoted in Levesque, *Conflict*, p. 26. The fortieth anniversary conference, which included representatives of the ruling parties of all thirteen socialist countries (excluding only Yugoslavia), was one of the last to meet under

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- relatively normal circumstances. Khrushchev displayed great cordiality toward the Chinese delegation, whose support he needed to consolidate his own still-precarious ascendancy. The Chinese delegation, under the leadership of Mao himself, enthusiastically championed Soviet primacy, grateful as they were for Khrushchev's promises of strategic military assistance. The final declaration incorporated significant concessions on which the CCP had insisted in a compromise formulation that both reaffirmed the principle of peaceful coexistence and the possibility of "non-peaceful" transition to socialism, and condemned both "revisionism" and "dogmatism."
25. See the polemic *In Refutation of Modern* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1958), p. 45.
 26. Participants later reported that Mao's pro-Moscow role in 1957 particularly annoyed the Polish Workers' Party and the Italian Communist Party. See P. Ingrao (PCI Standing Committee member), "Mao a Mosca nel 1957," *Rinascita* (Rome), no. 37 (September 17, 1976): 10ff., as cited by Heinz Timmermann, "Peking's 'eurokommunistische' Wende: Zur Wiedereinschaltung der Kommunistische Partei Chinas in das internationale kommunistische Parteiensystem," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien*, no. 25, 1983.
 27. Incidentally, the Great Leap also had repercussions in Eastern Europe, particularly Bulgaria, which conducted some Maoist-inspired experimentation in agriculture. See Nissan Oren, *Revolution Administered* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
 28. See Walter Lafeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1980* (New York: Wiley, 1980), p. 37.
 29. See Christer Joensson, *Superpower: Comparing American and Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
 30. Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1973: The Paradox of Super Power* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 17.
 31. *China and the Soviet Union*, p. 48.
 32. On the eve of the Moscow conference, 39 of the 88 communist parties in the world were pro-Soviet, 5 pro-Chinese, 30 split, and 14 independent or neutral, according to U.S. government calculations. "The World's Communist Parties," *Time*, June 13, 1969, p. 28.
 33. Yung-hwan Jo and Ying-hsien Pi, *Russia Versus China and What Next?* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1980), p. 63.
 34. Zdenek Kavan, "Gorbachev and the World – the Political Side," in David A. Dyker, ed., *The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Prospects for Reform* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 164–204.
 35. Levesque, *Conflict*, p. 105.
 36. Cf. Albert Hirschman's analysis of the power of the threat of boycott, in his *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
 37. Kevin Devlin, "Schism and Secession," *Survey* (January 1965): 38; and "Lonely Revolutionaries: The Pro-Chinese Groups of Western Europe," Radio Free Europe report, February 25, 1970, as quoted in Barbara Barnouin, "Dissonant Voice in International Communism," in H. Kapur, ed., *The End of an Isolation: China After Mao* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 202–233, quotation on p. 213.
 38. The resolution of World War II boundary issues (between West Germany and the USSR and Poland in 1970, between West and East Germany in

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- 1973) lowered the threat of German revanchism. In 1969, the Soviets linked Chinese and German territorial aggression, and the Bulgarians and even the East Germans invoked the threat of Nazism by referring to an alleged Bonn–Peking axis. By 1972, the West Germans were disappearing from such nightmare scenarios. Jeffrey Simon, *Cohesion and Dissension in Eastern Europe: Six Crises* (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 126.
39. Military intervention into Czechoslovakia forced the Romanians to recognize that it was the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) that posed the principal threat to its independence. They denounced the use of force against a fraternal ally, adopted the Yugoslav policy of territorial defense, developed a credible “Patriotic Guard,” and broadened economic, political, and military ties with the West, the PRC, and the nonaligned Third World. Simon, *Cohesion and Dissension*, p. 222.
 40. The Albanians blamed China for proposing that the socialist camp had disappeared and for putting itself and Albania in an indiscriminate Third World, alongside Mobutu’s Zaire and Pinochet’s Chile, and for erasing all “class differences” among states. See Elez Biberaj, *Albania and China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 95–96, 126–138.
 41. Richard Nixon went to Romania August 2–3, 1969 (the first such visit to a communist state since Roosevelt went to Yalta in 1945), where he discussed with Ceaușescu the need for a new Sino–American relationship. The Romanians conveyed that message to Beijing. In his October 26, 1970, meeting with Ceaușescu in Washington, Nixon proposed an exchange of high-level representatives short of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations, and that message was relayed to Beijing in a visit by Vice-Premier Corneliu Bogdan. Zhou Enlai responded with a message to Nixon to the effect that the PRC was prepared to receive a special envoy in Beijing and that in view of Nixon’s pioneering visits to Bucharest in 1969 and Belgrade in 1970, Nixon himself would be welcome in Beijing. Romania was the only Warsaw Pact member to react favorably to Nixon’s July 15, 1971, public acceptance of Zhou’s invitation.
 42. Jacques Levesque, “Les ‘trois obstacles’ dans un monde changeant,” *Le Monde diplomatique* 31, no. 361 (April 1984): 1, 6–7.
 43. *Renmin ribao*, May 7, 1987, p. 4, as cited by Chi Su, “Sino–Soviet Relations in the 1980s: From Confrontation to Conciliation,” in Samuel Kim, ed., *China and the World*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 115.
 44. “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” adopted by the Twelfth National Congress (September 1982); “Principles Governing Relations with Foreign Communist Parties,” *Beijing Review* 17 (1983).
 45. Deng Xiaoping, “An Important Principle for Handling Relations Among Fraternal Parties” (May 31, 1982), *Beijing Review*, May 22, 1983, p. 15.
 46. Dong Fusheng, “Theoreticians in Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary Explore Questions of Socialist Theory,” *Renmin ribao*, August 1, 1986, p. 7.
 47. Radio Beijing, June 25, 1986.
 48. Xinhua, November 1978, as cited by Barnouin, “Dissonant Voice.”
 49. Pierre-Antoine Donnet, Hong Kong Agence France Presse, October 17, 1986, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (*FBIS-China*), October 17, 1986, p. C1.

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50. The PCI remains the most advanced in this regard, though the CCP is not far behind. One of the theses adopted at its Seventeenth Party Congress in April 1986 states that the PCI sees itself "as a part neither of a given ideological camp nor of an organized movement on a European or global level."
51. Timmermann, "Peking's 'eurokommunistische' Wende," 41–43; see also Timmermann, *The Decline of the World Communist Movement* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 109.
52. *The Times* (London), April 11, 1987; NYT, November 5, 1987, pp. 1, 6.
53. Gavriil Popov, in *Moscow News*, no. 4 (January 24, 1988): 4, as cited by Gail W. Lapidus, "The Making of Russia's China Policy: Domestic/Foreign Linkages in Sino-Soviet Relations," in Roman Kolkowicz, ed., *The Roots of Soviet Power: Domestic Sources of Foreign and Defense Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).
54. NYT, March 19, 1988, p. 1. Though this would certainly seem to nullify the Brezhnev doctrine, it is worth noting that a similar document was issued in 1955, just one year before Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian uprising.
55. NYT, November 1, 1988.
56. *Pravda*, May 20, 1987.
57. That is, by claiming that no communist party has the universally correct "line," the CCP is implicitly endorsing a pluralistic conception of doctrine at odds with its claim to exclusive domestic ideological hegemony. Moreover, by broadening the ambit of bloc relations to include democratic-socialist parties as well as communist parties, the CCP risks including alternative models for political reform. "Our Party will continue to strengthen its friendly relations with socialist parties and social democratic parties in various countries," as one wary article put it. "However, we cannot deny the principled differences between the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party in the ideological field and between scientific socialism and 'democratic socialism.'" Educational Work Department of Beijing Municipal CPC Committee, "Who Represents the Mainstream and Direction of the Socialist Movement? Analyzing and Commenting on 'Democratic Socialism,'" *Guangming ribao*, April 21, 1987, p. 3.
58. Liu Shao-ch'i, *On the Party* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1951), p. 31.
59. Mao Zedong interview with Anna Louise Strong, as quoted in Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*, pp. 25ff.
60. Xinhua, November 23, 1949; see also Robert C. North, "Two Revolutionary Models: Russian and Chinese," in A. Doak Barnett, ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia* (London: Pall Mall, 1963).
61. At the CPI's Second Congress, Ranadive remarked, without Soviet approval, on the "international significance" of the Chinese revolution. Throughout 1948, reports and articles appeared in *People's Age* (the central CPI organ) hailing the victories of the CCP and predicting that "the final victory of the Chinese revolution will decisively shift the balance of forces in favor of the fighting people of Asia against the imperialist-bourgeois axis." *People's Age*, September 9, October 12, November 11, December 5, 1948, as cited in Heman Ray, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict over India* (New Delhi: Abhinav, 1986), pp. 7–8.
62. Ranadive was chosen to deliver the first public repudiation of Mao, calling him a "heretic" and "deviator" from "Marxist, Leninist, and Stalinist teachings" and emphasizing (in a 35,000-word article in the CPI's theoretical

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- journal) the validity of the “experience of the Russian revolution” for other communist parties. *The Communist* 2, no. 4 (June–July 1949): 9–89; Bar-nouin, “Dissonant Voice.”
63. David Allen Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith: US Policy Against the Sino–Soviet Alliance, 1949–1955* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 117.
 64. Harvey Nelsen, *Power and Insecurity: Beijing, Moscow, and Washington, 1949–1988* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 10.
 65. Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, p. 464. Khrushchev’s account was constructed retrospectively, but circumstantial evidence confirms his account of Soviet mistrust preceding the break. A Chinese informant recounted that Khrushchev asked Adenauer during a state visit in the early 1950s what he should do about his Chinese threat, implying that he hoped the Germans might in some way offset the PRC.
 66. In late 1945 to early 1946, the CPSU and other communist parties still praised nationalist movements and their leaders in Asia, advocating a united front “from above.” Evgenii Varga was a leading exponent of that viewpoint. However, it came under attack in 1947, when Zhdanov, in his speech to the inaugural session of the Cominform, called for a more aggressive policy in the colonies consistent with his world strategy of struggle between “two camps,” repudiating bourgeois nationalism. The attitude toward the newly independent states thus became one of nonrecognition and subversion. Roger E. Kanet, “The Soviet Union and the Colonial Question, 1917–1953,” in R. E. Kanet, ed., *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 1–27.
 67. Mao Zedong, “Talk with the American Correspondent Anna Louise Strong” (August 1946), *Selected Works* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1967), 4:98.
 68. Kuo-Kang Shao, “Chou En-lai’s Diplomatic Approach to Nonaligned States in Asia: 1953–60,” *China Quarterly*, no. 78 (June 1979): 324.
 69. Roger Kanet, “Soviet Attitudes toward Developing Nations Since Stalin,” in Kanet, *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 27–51.
 70. In Molotov’s foreign-policy report to the Supreme Soviet in February 1955, he noted that the Five Principles announced in the Sino–Indian and Sino–Burmese communiqués should be respected – the first time those principles were mentioned in official documents issued by the highest Soviet authorities. *Renmin ribao*, March 11, 1955. (Yet his support may have been nominal, for when Molotov was purged on charges of anti-party activities in April 1957, one of his alleged crimes was his opposition to peaceful coexistence.)
 71. *Renmin ribao*, February 18, 1956, as quoted in Chin Szu-k’ai, *Communist China’s Relations with the Soviet Union, 1949–1957* (Kowloon: Union Research Institute, 1961).
 72. Talbott, *Khrushchev Remembers*, pp. 254–255.
 73. See V. Solodnovikov and V. Boslovsky, *Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975); also Zhukov et al., *The Third World: Problems and Prospects* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974).
 74. Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 12.
 75. Robert O. Freedman, *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc: A Study*

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- of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China* (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 119, 139.
76. Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–70* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 130.
 77. *Renmin ribao*, February 28, 1958.
 78. On July 19, 1958, Khrushchev proposed that the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, France, and India meet to discuss “removing threats to peace.” Beijing’s reaction was quite hostile, viewing that as a Soviet attempt to anoint India leader of the Asian and African countries. After his visit to Beijing later that summer, Khrushchev dropped the proposal. *Pravda*, July 20, 1958; for the Chinese reaction, see *Renmin ribao*, August 4, 1958.
 79. Lin Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,” *Renmin ribao*, September 2, 1965; trans. in *Peking Review*, September 3, 1965, pp. 9–30.
 80. *Pravda*, June 22, 1960. The Soviet assumption at the time was that the United States would not tolerate the loss of a strategic spot anywhere on the globe without putting up a fight, utilizing local incidents to realize global strategies in a nuclear exchange. Writing Eisenhower in 1957, Premier Bulganin conveyed the impression that the polarization of the world had virtually precluded the possibility of limited hostilities anywhere. “Poslanie Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR, N. A. Bulganina, Prezidentu Soedinnennykh Shtatov Ameriki, Duaitu D. Eizenkhauery” (A letter from the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N. A. Bulganin, to the president of the US, Dwight D. Eisenhower), *Pravda*, December 12, 1957, as cited in John Yin, *Sino–Soviet Dialogue on the Problem of War* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 135–140. Khrushchev expressed the same idea in talks with the British Labour Party in October 1957. Interviewed by a group of Brazilian journalists, he said that in the present epoch “small wars” could not remain small for long and would ultimately involve other nations and even coalitions of nations. *Mezhdunarodnye zhizn’* (International Life) 12 (December 1957): 6, as cited by Yin, *Sino–Soviet Dialogue*, pp. 138–139.
 81. Moscow was initially less willing to concede the necessity for violent transition to socialism because that would have stultified its own peace policy. But in the face of Chinese pressure (and apparent success in some cases), Khrushchev was ultimately persuaded to relent. At the CPSU Twenty-second Congress in early 1961, he said that national-liberation wars were just and ought to be supported by the bloc, endorsing such struggles in Algeria, Vietnam, West Irian, and the Congo. Later, after coming to the brink of war with the United States over Cuba in the fall of 1962, he reverted again to a more prudential policy. Under Brezhnev, the Soviets of course became major backers of guerrilla wars in Vietnam and elsewhere. Although it is difficult to generalize in view of such tactical vicissitudes, it would seem that (1) the Soviets have always been less rhetorically exuberant than the Chinese in their endorsement of national-liberation wars, and (2) the Soviets have also been more wary of any direct confrontation with the United States.
 82. See Harry Harding, “China’s Changing Roles in the Contemporary World,” in Harding, ed., *China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 181–193.

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83. Lillian Craig Harris, *China's Foreign Policy Toward the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1985), pp. 30–40.
84. Marie-Luise Naeth, *Strategie und Taktik der chinesischen Aussenpolitik* (Hannover: Niedersaechsischen Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1978).
85. The recognition of the PRC took place in three phases. During the first phase, 1970–1971, China established diplomatic relations with nineteen countries, only four of which were from the West (Canada, Iceland, Italy, Austria), the other fifteen being developing countries. During the second phase, 1972–1973, those nations that had withheld recognition out of deference to the United States, taking a new cue from the Nixon visit and Chinese entry into the United Nations, established relations with the PRC. Twenty were in that grouping, including the United Kingdom (which upgraded relations to the ambassadorial level, having recognized the PRC in 1950), West Germany, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – most of them anti-communist. During the third phase, 1974–1976, an additional seven states, all of them staunchly anti-communist, recognized the PRC, including Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, and the Philippines. Finally, in January 1979, the United States formally established ties.
86. *Peking Review* 47 (1971); also 26 (1972): 3.
87. Translation in Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, eds., *China Readings. Vol. 3: Communist China* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1967), p. 368.
88. *Renmin ribao*, January 21, 1964; trans. in *Peking Review*, no. 4 (January 24, 1964): 7.
89. *Renmin ribao*, September 1, 3, 1986, as quoted in *Beijing Review*, no. 37 (1986): 10–11.
90. Deng's speech was translated in *Peking Review*, special supplement to no. 15 (April 12, 1974).
91. The Chinese scenario is that the strong will progressively decay, and the weak correspondingly grow stronger, resulting in an emerging multipolarity. Thus, they argue that the 1970s marked the beginning of a shift in the balance of economic power from the First World to the Second and Third.
92. Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy: Developments After Mao* (New York: Praeger, 1986), p. 46.
93. The PRC also has occasionally written off Third World debt (as they did in 1983 vis-à-vis Zaire, Zambia, and Tanzania) or extended it when the creditor has appeared to be having difficulty (as in the case of Kinshasa). *Africa*, 138 (February 1983): 34; *Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER)* 119 (February 3, 1985): 25.
94. Detailed analysis of China's General Assembly voting record during its first decade in the United Nations shows that its positions were more favorable to the Third World than to the West, though it seems to have had little impact in the UN program area. See Trong R. Chai, "Chinese Policy Toward the Third World and the Superpowers in the UN General Assembly, 1971–1977: A Voting Analysis," *International Organizations* 33; no. 3 (Summer 1979): 392; see also Samuel Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 280, 329–330, 402.
95. Chai, "Chinese Policy." China's alignment with the Third World is by no means automatic, however. For example, China has continued its friendship with the Pinochet regime in Chile, seeing the relationship as strategically

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- and economically useful, and has refused to join Third World-sponsored resolutions at the United Nations condemning the Pinochet regime's violations of human rights, despite considerable criticism.
96. See Gerald Chan, *China and International Organization: Participation in Non-Governmental Organizations Since 1971* (London: Oxford University Press, 1989).
 97. Robert L. Worden, "International Organizations: China's Third World Policy in Practice," in Lillian Craig Harris and Robert Worden, eds., *China and the Third World: Champion or Challenger?* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986), pp. 75–100.
 98. Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations, 1988/1989*, 6th ed. (Munich: K. G. Saur, 1988); vol. 2, Table 3; as cited by Samuel Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy in the Shadows of Tiananmen: The Challenge of Legitimation" (paper presented at the Sino-American Conference on Mainland China, Taipei, June 12–14, 1990).
 99. Robert Manning, "The Third World Looks at China," in Harris and Worden, eds., *China and the Third World*, pp. 139–156, quotation on p. 154.
 100. The American delegation, placed in an awkward position by public announcement of Nixon's forthcoming trip to China, opted for the first time not to define China's admission to the United Nations as an "important question," as a result of which the issue could be decided on the basis of a simple majority, rather than a two-thirds-majority vote. Thus, when the draft Albanian resolution was introduced to award all of "China's" rights to the PRC and exclude the GMD regime, the most strenuous U.S. efforts to defeat it proved of no avail.
 101. Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese World Policy in Transition," *World Policy Journal* (Spring 1984): 603–633. Thus, in 1986, China paid \$6.5 million (U.S.) into the United Nations and received back \$27.7 million from the UN Developmental Program in technical assistance and \$1.2 billion from the World Bank in loans and credits. In 1982, China contributed \$300,000 (0.23 percent of the total) to UNFPA funds, receiving in return \$11 million in aid. At the same time, China criticizes the industrialized countries for inadequate magnanimity.
 102. When A. W. Clausen visited China in May 1983, he indicated that the World Bank had already provided loans and aid amounting to \$870 million (U.S.) and would give \$2.4 billion (U.S.) in loans in 1984 and 1985 for the construction of twenty projects in agriculture, energy, education, industry, and communications. In 1986, China received another \$1.2 billion from the World Bank to help fund ten projects, and it was anticipated that loans given to China during the "Seventh Five-Year Plan" period (1986–1990) would double or triple the amount given in the previous five years.
 103. Bruce Reynolds, "China in the International Economy," in Harding, *China's Foreign Relations*, pp. 93–104. China has nonetheless consistently supported the Third World position on law-of-the-sea matters, championing the 200-nautical-mile territorial sea for reasons of solidarity, as well as in order to protect its own wealthy coastal area.
 104. Although the PRC cannot compete in the market for sophisticated weaponry, it does produce an extensive line of conventional arms, and Chinese arms sales are up several times over what they were in 1980. The Congressional Research Service estimates that China sold \$5.3 billion worth of arms between 1983 and 1986; exports of "aerospace products" reached

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- \$2.1 billion (U.S.) in 1989, an increase of 60 percent over 1988. While the top three sold far more – the USSR almost \$60 billion, the United States \$25.5 billion, and France \$16.5 billion during that period – the rapidity of China's emergence in this market is striking, representing a 167 percent increase in sales over the previous three-year period. The Chinese estimate that arms sales bring in more money (about \$1.34 billion per year) than the Chinese military spends on arms (the best foreign-exchange earners are the missiles). China's sales policy seems to be relatively indiscriminate, oriented around earning foreign exchange rather than promoting any particular ideological cause; see, for example, the lucrative recent sales of arms to both Iran and Iraq (between 1980 and 1987 nearly 70 percent of China's exports went to those two belligerents, accounting for nearly a third of the money Iran spent on weapons from abroad, and about 10 percent of Iraq's arms imports – all running athwart Beijing's declared policy of promoting a negotiated settlement). When it was discovered in 1988 that China had sold CSS-2 (1,600-mile range) IRBMs to Saudi Arabia, the United States exerted pressure to discontinue such sales; but future prospects for limiting arms traffic are not bright, as Western leverage has diminished in the wake of Tiananmen. A diplomatically isolated PRC increasingly holds the key to arms proliferation. See Wei-chin Lee, "The Birth of a Salesman: China as Arms Supplier," *Journal of Asian Studies* 6; no. 4 (Winter 1987–1988): 32–47; *FEER* (September 22, 1988): 42.
105. The total number of Chinese experts and workers sent abroad under such contracts increased from about 18,000 in 1979–1981 to 31,000 in 1983, and to 59,000 by the end of 1985. From 1979 through 1985, the total value of labor-service contracts was \$5.1 billion (U.S.). Samuel S. Kim, *The Third World in Chinese World Policy* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School, January 1989), pp. 37–39.
 106. *Liaowang*, no. 12 (1986): 30–31.
 107. See Carol Lee Hamrin, "Domestic Components of China's Evolving Three Worlds Theory," in Harris and Worden, eds., *China and the Third World*, pp. 34–53.
 108. In this connection, Chinese writing about Third World schemes for economic redistribution have begun to assume a more critical tone. "Factors such as failed policies and improper management can be held responsible to varying degrees in particular countries," wrote one author. "It is not practical to blame the North for all the South's troubles, though exploitation is truly a root cause of the situation." Tong Dalin and Liu Ji, "North-South Cooperation for Mutual Prosperity," *Beijing Review*, no. 26 (July 1, 1986): 19, as quoted by Samuel S. Kim, "China and the Third World," in Kim, ed., *China and the World*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); pp. 148–180.
 109. Levesque, "Les 'trois obstacles'," p. 6; Qi Yan, "New Trends in Cuba's Foreign Relations," *Shijie zhisbi* (World News) (Beijing), no. 9 (May 1, 1985): 7–8, trans. *FBIS-PRC*, May 15, 1985, p. J1.
 110. Lawrence Freedman, *The West and the Modernization of China* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, 1979), p. 19.
 111. See Lucian W. Pye, *Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968). Pye seems to enjoy satirizing and to some extent even mocking Chinese feelings of righteous indignation. Still, it seems inescapable that

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such feelings do play a prominent role in the makeup of the modern Chinese national identity.

112. I owe this point to Susanne Hoerber Rudolph, in a very perceptive commentary.
113. Chen Jiabao, "Third World's Role in International Affairs," *Beijing Review* 33; no. 4 (January 22–28, 1990): 14–16.
114. Commentator article in *Liaowang*, January 8, 1990.
115. For a thoughtful discussion of the implications and problems of political leadership, see Robert Eden, *Political Leadership and Nihilism: A Study of Weber and Nietzsche* (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1983).
116. See Lowell Dittmer, "Patterns of Elite Strife and Succession in Chinese Politics," *China Quarterly* (Fall 1990).
117. E.g., cf. Mao Zedong's "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party," "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," "On New Democracy," or "On the People's Dictatorship," or Liu Shaoqi's "On the Self-Cultivation of Communist Party Members," or "On Inner-Party Struggle."
118. For contrasting perspectives on this development, see Allen S. Whiting, "Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy," *Asian Survey* 23; no. 8 (August 1983): 918–939; and Michel C. Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," *Foreign Affairs* 65; no. 3 (1987): 501–524.