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## CHINA'S "OPENING TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD": THE CULTURAL DIMENSION

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In the reordering of priorities that has occurred in China since the death of Mao, "modernization" has been much more centrally focused than before. And although the primary purpose of modernization is to acquire advanced industrial technology, it is also conceded that this implies learning at least some aspects of Western culture as well. This raises an ancient dilemma. How can China acquire the best of Western culture without endangering its own? This dilemma has been particularly acute because of uncertainty about the exact content, and fallen confidence in the efficacy or relevance of "Chinese culture" in the wake of the repudiation of the late-Maoist variant of Marxism.

The whole question of the impact of modern Western culture upon less advanced cultures in what is now the Third World is as old as the rise of industrialism and social science theory. The essential position of Marx on this issue was that economic development is a result of dialectical interaction between conflicting classes, or between the means and relations of production, *within* a given social system, and that the "cultural superstructure" is in turn an epiphenomenon (if not, perhaps, a "reflection") of economic development. So far as Asian systems were concerned, however, Marx was apparently puzzled by the lack of an internal dynamic advancing them predictably from one mode of production to another. It was to account for this that he categorized them under the controversial rubric "Asiatic mode of production."<sup>2</sup> In contradistinction to feudalism, capitalism, and the other modes in Marxist state theory, Asiatic systems were apparently "ultra-stable."<sup>3</sup> This helps to account for Marx's ambivalence about colonialism: on the one hand, it was oppressive and exploitative; on the other hand, given the absence of any internal social dynamic, it was the only salvation from "oriental despotism," and Calcuttans would discover their future in *fin de siecle* Manchester.<sup>4</sup> To be sure, that salvation came not in the form of a *mission civilisatrice* or some other cultural emanation, but in "the laying of the *material* foundations of Western society in Asia" (e.g.,

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railroads, factories).<sup>5</sup> Max Weber, Marx's great rival, was in fundamental agreement that modernization was necessarily extrinsic to both the Indian and the Chinese civilizations, though of course he considered cultural (and specifically religious) factors much more crucial than Marx in explaining the failure of indigenous modernization.<sup>6</sup>

For a variety of still inconclusive reasons, the fact is that China did not develop modern industrial society indigenously, and by the late nineteenth century found itself in a position of severe disadvantage. This impressed itself upon the Chinese in the military realm first and foremost, as the celestial empire suffered several embarrassing defeats. In attempting to account for and overcome their suddenly apprehended backwardness, Chinese intellectuals exhibited ambivalence.<sup>7</sup> On the one hand were the conservative reformers, as exemplified by Zhang Zhidong, who attempted to minimize the need for cultural change: "Zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong" (Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical application). On the other hand were such radical iconoclasts as Chen Duxin, who called for the complete overthrow of traditional culture. The picture is further complicated by the fact that there was a folk as well as a "high" traditional culture, and opposition to traditional culture did not necessarily imply a favorable reception to Western culture—*vide* the late Maoist position, which rejected both Western liberalism and Soviet Marxism in favor of a sinified version of the latter.

These developments deserve further study and discussion well beyond the purview of the present essay. But a brief look at the most intensive previous concerted attempt in the history of the P.R.C. to assimilate modern industrial culture may be instructive before turning to an examination of the post-Mao period. That was the attempt in the early 1950s to learn from the Soviet Union.

### LEARNING FROM THE SOVIET UNION

From 1950 to 1957, China "leaned to one side," as Mao put it, turning to the Soviet Union for comprehensive assistance in the construction of a modern socialist system. In what has been described as "the most comprehensive technology transfer in modern history,"<sup>8</sup> the Soviets dispatched a small army of advisors and officials and accepted an even larger contingent of Chinese students and scholars to "learn from" the Soviet experience. The Soviets claim that "it is probably impossible to name a field of science and technology in which the Soviet Union did not share with China, free or at very favorable conditions, its advanced achievements and rich experience," perhaps somewhat overstating their altruism in retrospect.<sup>9</sup> Assistance began even before the first agreement was signed (on October 1, 1954), and continued under two further agreements on coopera-

tion in science and technology, signed in January 1955 and June 1961; in addition to these broad intergovernmental agreements, about 20 Soviet ministries and government departments and approximately 160 research and development organizations maintained independent contacts with some 90 research and development organizations in China. In many instances even individual factories, laboratories, and other organizations of the two countries established direct contacts (as was later to be the pattern on a much larger scale in the Sino-American exchanges).

The amount of material and informational assistance thereby facilitated was considerable. There is no way of knowing precisely how many Chinese studied in the Soviet Union, but 20,000 seems to be a plausible approximation.<sup>10</sup> We may infer that from 8,000 to 10,000 Soviet scientists and technical advisors were sent to China between 1950 and 1960, despite uncertainty about the precise number.<sup>11</sup> Several hundred delegations, including thousands of Chinese scholars and scientists, visited the Soviet Union, participating in Soviet professional meetings and touring scientific installations.<sup>12</sup> Between 1954 and 1959 the U.S.S.R. reportedly provided China with over 24,000 complete sets of scientific-technical documents, including 1,400 designs for major enterprises; interlibrary loan arrangements were established, and thousands of Soviet scientific and technical manuals were translated and published in China—mostly free of charge.<sup>13</sup>

From 1950 through 1966 the Soviets apparently helped the Chinese undertake no less than 291 industrial projects, including immense iron and steel complexes, metallurgical enterprises, coal mines, oil refineries and power stations, chemical plants and factories (mostly in heavy industry). The Soviets have contended that “there is not a single branch of industry that does not produce goods from blueprints, technical specifications, or technological documentation devised in the U.S.S.R. and transmitted to China.”<sup>14</sup> Among the major projects constructed was China’s first atomic reactor and cyclotron (completed April 1957), which allegedly inaugurated Chinese research in nuclear physics.<sup>15</sup> Soviet assistance also had a profound impact on China’s institutional arrangements—the entire educational and research structure was based on the Soviet model, not to mention the planning apparatus and the Party-government structure more generally. Bilateral trade flourished, amounting to 58 percent of total Chinese trade in 1954 and cresting in money value at \$2.055 million in 1959.<sup>16</sup>

Yet this vastly ambitious effort at cultural transfer did not come to a good end. In July 1960, the Soviets suddenly withdrew their specialists from China; supplies of machinery and equipment were also suspended. By 1960, only 130 of the 291 projects had been finished; many projects, such as the Sanmen Gorge power station, were left uncompleted.

In view of its mutually dismaying denouement, which would embitter Sino-Soviet relations for the next two decades, the question naturally arises

whether the end of the period of close friendship was somehow implicit in the beginning. The original terms of the alliance were not in certain respects overly generous. Of the total amount lent between 1950 and 1955, 61.5 percent consisted of military aid, much of which the Chinese expended in the Korean War, and the Chinese resented this burden: as one Chinese general put it, it was "totally unfair for the P.R.C. to bear all the expenses of the Korean War."<sup>17</sup> When the Soviets returned the naval base at Port Arthur in October 1954, they included an assessment of the buildings and material and other assets in the value of the loan, so that in the end only 26.1 percent of the total loan consisted of actual developmental assistance. The Soviets then collected the loan by manipulating an imbalance of trade, reducing their exports to China while allowing imports to climb. They insisted on continuing to collect debt service installments even during the 1959-62 period when such payments were severely straining Chinese export capabilities (the Chinese nevertheless managed to conclude loan repayments by 1965).<sup>18</sup> Much of the economic aid was invested in projects concentrated along the Sino-Soviet border, particularly in the northeast, long an object of Russian imperialist interests, leading to the hypothesis that the Soviets were trying to cultivate economic dependency.<sup>19</sup>

If from the Chinese perspective the Soviets were niggardly, from the Soviet point of view the Chinese were devious and manipulative. Beginning in the late 1950s China expressed more and more interest in the new secret accomplishments of the Soviet Union, particularly in fields with potential military applications. Chinese students and scholars in the Soviet Union made special efforts to become involved in classified projects. Sometimes Chinese host institutions even tried to change the lecture topics of visiting Soviet scientists to open up restricted areas of research. The Chinese, on the other hand, initiated a policy of "blanket secrecy" about everything pertaining to China, from natural resources to borders (e.g., China forbade Soviet scientists from publishing joint research if it included the reproduction of maps). Particularly during the Great Leap Forward, Soviet scientists and technical advisors were cavalierly ignored in the wholehearted Chinese reliance on the ideological enthusiasm of the masses.

If the Sino-Soviet program of techno-cultural transfer was in many respects disappointing, this is not necessarily to say that it was unsuccessful. Paradoxically, it seems to have been *both* successful and disappointing. Robert Dernberger, on the basis of "a simple economic model with fixed coefficients," has estimated that China's rate of growth during the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57) would have been 20-30 percent less without imports of Soviet capital equipment.<sup>20</sup> It is perhaps not entirely accidental that the duration of the Soviet aid program coincided with one of the most impressive phases in Chinese industrial growth, and that the

abrupt cessation of aid coincided with China's deepest depression. It is also worth noting that Chinese grievances about the aid program did not begin to surface until after it had been suspended.

Three hypotheses suggest themselves to explain this peculiar juxtaposition of success and disappointment. The first is that the very success of the aid program led Chinese hopes to surpass previous achievements, giving rise to a "revolution of rising expectations" all too familiar in rapidly changing societies since de Tocqueville first christened this phenomenon.<sup>21</sup> The second is that the disappointment over the Sino-Soviet aid program, however objectively justifiable, was primarily directed against its abrupt termination, rather than against the program itself; that termination occurred due to ideological and security disputes reflecting diverging national interests. Third, the aid program was premised on a teacher/student, master/slave relationship that was difficult to maintain: the Chinese were eager, even impatient, to overcome their subordination, while the Soviets were highly sensitive to such attempts and tried to forestall them.

### THE POLICY OF OPENING

The "policy of opening" (*kaifang zhengce*) is usually traced back to the reform program inaugurated at the historic Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress in December 1978, though it did not receive top billing at the time. The idea was that, without forsaking the spirit of "self-reliance," the P.R.C. should "boldly open wide" to the outside world, and that this would "help speed the breaking down of the inert elements in the traditional culture, inject new blood into the national culture and achieve cultural modernization." As *Beijing Review* editor An Zhiguo put it, "Closer ties with the outside world broaden people's minds, and this is conducive to overcoming feudal ideas and eliminating backwardness." Although the primary purpose of opening is to acquire information directly relevant to modernization ("China's overall technological level is 20 to 30 years behind that of the developed countries," Gu Mu has noted. "That is known to all."), it is also conceded that "it is impossible to separate the economy from society and culture."<sup>22</sup> As defined in this article, the two principal ways in which "lay" (i.e., nonspecialized) culture is transmitted are *informal penetration* and *enculturation*.

"Informal penetration"<sup>23</sup> refers to the invasion of national sovereignty "informally"—without a passport or formal declaration of war—by electronic media, through mail flows, popular literature and other media likely to escape careful official scrutiny. During the Maoist period the authorities were extremely vigilant in politically controlling all forms of informal penetration, jamming radio broadcasts, severely restricting tourism, censoring international mail, interdicting publications, and otherwise sealing

the borders. But in the post-Mao period, and particularly since inauguration of the opening policy, the rate of informal penetration has increased exponentially. Chinese customs seized and confiscated no fewer than 855 books during the first quarter of 1980, including such "poisonous weeds" as manuals on geomancy, physiognomy, palmistry and divination.<sup>24</sup> Yet this type of control has slackened considerably with the development of friendship with the U.S. and other Western countries, as "friendship" tends to undermine the rationale for vigilant boundary patrol.<sup>25</sup> After 1977 radio jamming ceased, and it became legal to listen to foreign broadcasts; the BBC, Voice of America (VOA), Radio Japan and other stations began to provide a regular diet of news about events inside and outside China. This electronic penetration was welcomed as a way of encouraging the learning of foreign languages, which was also more directly promoted: Radio Beijing's English language service became the most popular of some 37 language services, each of which employs a native speaker of the language to help with language work and script-writing, and broadcasts from 30 minutes to an hour a day.<sup>26</sup> The economic base for this interest was provided by the burgeoning "smokeless industry" of tourism: China hosted an estimated 830,000 foreign tourists in 1985, nearly twice that of the previous year, precipitating a hotel- and restaurant-building boom.

China has thus become integrated into the "global village" of electronic media. With new satellite receptor stations, American TV film clips became a regular staple on China's evening news telecasts, and TV sets became more widely available. At the beginning of 1980 one in every 280 Chinese reportedly had access to a television set, compared with one in 16,400 people in 1970; by the end of 1985 the total television inventory in China had been estimated at 67 million sets—a 70-fold increase since 1970. One indication of the success of the opening to world news is a 1986 poll of 310 Qinghua University graduate students (including 120 coeds), which showed among other things that the second most admired woman in the world was Iron Lady Margaret Thatcher, and the third most admired male was Ronald Reagan!<sup>27</sup> Since 1982, six American TV companies have signed agreements to produce or provide U.S. programs to China Central Television (CCTV); for example, in 1985 CBS concluded a deal to provide 64 hours of reruns, including Dr. Seuss cartoons, "Sixty Minutes," basketball and football games (more than 300 million Chinese, more than double the original broadcast, watched Americans play what they called "olive ball" in the Superbowl in March 1986, thereby also viewing TV ads for Gould, Hewlett-Packard, McDonnell-Douglas, Nike, and the State of Illinois). CCTV has also purchased other American programs such as "My Favorite Martian," "The Man from Atlantis," and Charlie Chaplin films, as well as the BBC series "David Copperfield" and "Anna Karenina."

The success of a particular program may also have multimedia spinoffs:

no fewer than 45 Agatha Christie novels were slated for publication following the 1979 cinematic success of *Death on the Nile*; similarly, the success of the American film *Futureworld* in 1980 excited an interest (officially discouraged) in publishing science fiction. To commemorate his death earlier that year, Sartre's play, *The Dirty Hands*, was staged in 1980, followed by publication of selected translations of his fiction together with a long and sympathetic introduction to his philosophy by Liu Mingjiu. School authorities were then bemused by the appearance of discussions of existentialism in several 1981 honors papers by graduating B.A. students (Liu Mingjiu came under criticism the following year, in the campaign against bourgeois liberalization). A Taiwanese crooner named Deng Lijun became popular via audio tapes imported through Hong Kong, spawning a number of mainland imitators.

The media seem to have fostered the growth of commercialism—and commercials. The CBS agreement mentioned above included a provision for five minutes of commercial time for each hour of programming, amounting to a total of 320 hours. CBS planned to sell this commercial time to ten American advertisers for \$300,000 each—a real bargain in terms of cost-per-thousand of audience. One measure of the rapid increase in advertising activity is that more than 4,000 Chinese and foreign companies were advertising in 1984, compared with only 100 two years earlier; China's advertising budget has been rising at the world record pace of 50 percent per year. China has invited thousands of advertising, public relations and marketing specialists to a giant congress on this subject in 1987, to be held in that erstwhile Maoist sanctum, the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Although there have been no officially sponsored parades or political rallies in Shanghai's Square of the People since 1978, the square is enlivened by huge billboards advertising elevators, auto tires, bee-blossom soap, "Red Lantern" brand audio and video recorders, and vitamins.<sup>28</sup> To the casual observer, advertising seems to have become a functional substitute for the political sloganeering of the Maoist era (and may have a similarly soporific impact on the consumer).

Another part of the media package seems to be such state-of-the-art technical innovations as the video-cassette recorder (VCR), which has become one of the "eight big things" (*ba da jian*) that all Chinese scholars and students are expected to bring back with them upon returning home, and has had a similarly decentralizing impact on program selection (for those who can afford them, of course) as in the United States. The VCR has given rise to a rather lively traffic of sword movies (*wuxia pian*) and pornographic entertainment from Hong Kong, much to the consternation of the CCP leadership. On the other hand, it fits in well with the recent emphasis on the "modernization" (*shidaixing*) of culture that has recently been promoted (and may thus enter the country duty-free). "Cultural mod-

ernization," intended to divest the country of the "blue ants" image of the 1960s, also includes electronic keyboards, video games, stereos, air-conditioning, clothing of many colors and styles (including logo-emblazoned T-shirts, boots, sunglasses), and private Western-style restaurants.<sup>29</sup>

The modernization of culture dovetails with the greater policy emphasis on light industry, material incentives, and consumerism. For example, the 1984 film, *The Girl in Red Clothes*, which won the Golden Rooster award for best Chinese film of the year, contained the moral that to dress well was nothing to be ashamed of and certainly should not disqualify a "three good" student. Previously the only Chinese leader to don Western clothing was the maverick Chen Yi, with his panama hat and sunglasses, but since Zhao Ziyang inaugurated the fashion in 1981, many Chinese leaders have taken to Western suits (excepting, however, the most senior leaders, such as Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, or Deng Xiaoping). With such signals of official approval, Chinese have gone on a buying spree: in the first nine months of 1985, consumers spent 31 percent more than in the previous period, with a 33.2 percent rise in spending on household and entertainment items, a 30.5 percent jump in food sales, and a 33 percent increase in clothes purchases.<sup>30</sup> The fact that so many of these purchases were foreign helps account for the sudden drawdown in foreign currency reserves, shrinking by half in two years (1985-86). Informal penetration seems to have created its own market.

"Enculturation" consists of the deliberate acquisition of culture under official sponsorship; the difference between enculturation and informal penetration thus has to do with the amount of political control. This is a matter of degree, with a certain overlap. The chief means whereby enculturation has been pursued has been the bilateral cultural exchange, which includes the sending of delegations for relatively brief tours<sup>31</sup> and, more importantly, the dispatch of students and scholars for relatively extended sojourns.<sup>32</sup>

The program of sending Chinese students and scholars to the U.S. for study was inaugurated by an announcement in October 1978, under the initial understanding that the Committee for Scholarly Communication with the P.R.C. (CSCPRC) would serve as a "clearinghouse" or central broker for the exchange. Since that time the concept of a clearinghouse has been dropped, diverging (at Chinese behest) from such arrangements with Western Europe and Japan, and myriads of individual institutional arrangements have been formed on an ad hoc basis; this has permitted the exchange to grow very rapidly, and asymmetrically.<sup>33</sup> Roughly 19,000 P.R.C. students and scholars came to the U.S. between 1979-83, growing from 500-700 students in the academic year 1978-79 to ca. 14,000 in 1984-85, two-thirds of whom were matriculated students. The number of P.R.C. students grew more rapidly than the overall foreign student popula-



tion in America from 1981 to 1984, and this trend is likely to continue.<sup>34</sup> According to Chinese statistics, from 1978-83, 26,000 officially sponsored students and scholars and an additional 7,000 self-financed students had studied in other countries. This exceeds estimates of the number of Chinese studying in the Soviet Union in the 1950s or indeed the total number of Chinese students who studied abroad during the entire 1950-77 period. Of the total number of Chinese students who have studied abroad since 1978, 50-60 percent have studied in the U.S. Although relatively concentrated in the east and west coast universities near the centers of overseas Chinese population, Chinese students have become increasingly dispersed throughout the country.<sup>35</sup>

Apart from the possibility that the ostensibly "objective" knowledge absorbed abroad includes cultural baggage, there are two ways in which this massive educational exchange may be expected to "enculturate" the students and scholars involved. The first is that those students who study the "cultural superstructure" (*yishi xingtai*) are apt to discover alternative ways of organizing social reality that are more likely to affect their attitudes toward existing political and social arrangements in their native country than those studying organic chemistry or astrophysics. "Objective" as this knowledge may be, it may be expected to broaden the perceived range of social, economic, and political possibilities available.

There is some evidence of an official shift recently from a strong emphasis on Chinese absorption of the hard sciences to somewhat greater receptiveness to the social sciences and humanities. Part of the reason for this shift is simply budgetary. As of 1982, only 26 percent of all Chinese students and scholars entering the U.S. had F-visa status (which means they receive no Chinese governmental support, and are not subject to the U.S. requirement that they leave the U.S. two years prior to any possible application for change of residency status); 74 percent held J-visas (generally sponsored by the Chinese government after rigorous selection procedures), and more than 30 percent of them were subject to the two-year exit rule. In January 1985, the State Council issued "Draft Regulations on Self-Supported Study Abroad," which encouraged any interested Chinese citizen to apply for study abroad at his or her own expense. This document seems likely to increase the number of students holding F-visas who will come to study. The purpose seems to be to increase the number of students studying abroad without commensurately increasing governmental support payments,<sup>36</sup> even though this entails the risk of increasing Chinese "brain drain" (whereas the overwhelming majority of those holding J-1 visas have returned, a smaller percentage of those holding F-1 visas is likely to return). About two thirds of all students and scholars with J-1 visas are in engineering and the hard sciences, whereas a slightly higher proportion of F-1 visa-holder applicants study the humanities and the social sciences.<sup>37</sup>

A second reason for the shift is, however, substantive—it is increasingly believed, although there are “zigs and zags,” that the social sciences (and even the humanities) can contribute to the realization of the Four Modernizations. A certain impetus seems to have been provided to this trend of thinking by the recent reshuffling of the cultural apparatus. Deng Liqun, the conservative director of the CCP Propaganda Department, was replaced by the relatively young and open-minded Zhu Houze in July 1985. The Ministry of Culture was completely restructured, introducing a new minister and four new deputy ministers, three of whom had previous links with foreign culture: Wang Meng, minister of culture, is a writer of great stature who borrowed “stream of consciousness” (*yishi liu*) techniques from Joyce and Virginia Woolf (for which he was criticized during the Spiritual Pollution campaign); Liu Deyou, first deputy minister, is a translator of Japanese literature, formerly the number one NCNA correspondent in Japan; and Ying Ruocheng, an actor and director (who recently staged *Death of a Salesman* in Beijing in collaboration with Arthur Miller), graduated from the Western languages department of Qinghua University. To be sure, many of the applications conceived for the social sciences and humanities have been idealistic and vague,<sup>38</sup> but at least in the realm of technocracy, their potential political significance—as in the application of systems theory to policy decision-making—is considerable.<sup>39</sup> In any case, the number of students of the “superstructure” seems likely to increase, the majority of whom will return to China in search of opportunities to apply their knowledge and skills usefully, and this seems likely to expand the ambit of choices available in Chinese socio-political arrangements eventually.

The second avenue for enculturation applied to all Chinese scholars and students abroad, and this is casual assimilation of Western life-styles and social techniques. There has been some concern among Chinese political authorities about this tendency, which from their point of view runs the risk of making the successfully assimilated scholar less adaptive to the Chinese social context upon return, not to mention susceptible to spiritual pollution. Thus in those areas in which there is a concentration of P.R.C. scholars, there has been a remarkable attempt at organization by the Chinese government, including appointment of a leader (invariably a CCP member) by the P.R.C. embassy in Washington, regular meetings, and periodic visits by Chinese government officials. All of this seems designed to create a Chinese Communist subculture and to deter assimilation.<sup>40</sup> Nevertheless, some casual assimilation is probably unavoidable. For example, at a June 21-24, 1986 meeting in Houston of the more than 90 P.R.C. students of political science and international relations in this country, not only was there a split between younger scholars who wished to apply Western social science techniques to the understanding of Chinese moderniza-

tion and a much more chary attitude among representatives of the older generation, the conference decided spontaneously to adopt democratic procedures to select its own leadership, undergoing a big-character poster-festooned mini-campaign between rival slates.<sup>41</sup>

Heretofore we have described the two ways in which China's policy of opening to the outside world has facilitated the influx of outside cultural influences, via informal penetration and enculturation. We turn now to the factors tending to promote or inhibit the further expansion of these influences, first examining some of the dysfunctional consequences inherent in the process of cultural assimilation, then reviewing the politicization of the issue that was to climax in the fall of Hu Yaobang in January 1987.

### UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

The two most damaging dysfunctional consequences of the policy of cultural opening have been the reinforcement of hierarchy and elitism and the promotion of what is defined as corruption. Each will be examined in turn.

First, the opening policy, at least as it has been implemented heretofore, tends to reinforce status distinctions in Chinese society by adding worldly sophistication to the advantages which already tend to be monopolized by a "new class" consisting of cadres and intellectuals. This is true both in the case of informal penetration and enculturation, though perhaps marginally less so in the former than the latter.

Informal penetration is filtered through a three-tiered media system. At one extreme are those who are fully and directly exposed to international informational networks. Within Chinese society, this category includes only the statistically tiny (but highly visible) sector of temporary foreign visitors, who are rigorously sequestered from the rest of the populace. In the second category are cadres, both party and governmental (the latter category includes various independent professionals and intellectuals), whose access to international informational networks is screened through various "internal" (*neibu*) publications. The "broad masses" comprise the third category, whose image of the outside world is formed exclusively from the official press. The network of internal publications provides cadres with a much more complete picture of the world than the masses. For example, a content analysis of the most widely circulated publication, *Reference News*, (*cankao xiaoxi*)<sup>42</sup> shows that in 1979, it took 56 percent of its news directly from four Western international news agencies without alteration; in contrast, in the leading public newspaper, *People's Daily* (*renmin ribao*), XINHUA (the New China News Agency) accounted for 75 percent of the news items and 54 percent of the column space.<sup>43</sup> *Cankao Ziliao* (reference materials), a more narrowly restricted publication, is said

to be even more voluminous and objective in its reportage. Due to its scarcity, information is a highly valued currency, like money. And, like other values, it is disproportionately distributed to elites. This implies that information about the rest of the world will tend to be concentrated among the educated elite, giving rise to systematic elite-mass differences in world-view. The resentment fostered by "relative information deprivation" emerges in recurrent critiques of "bureaucratism," with its traditions of secrecy-mongering ("black materials"), a lingering anti-intellectualism (now officially out of favor) and, to a lesser degree, in the resentment of foreign tourists.<sup>44</sup> On the other hand, a systematic power and status discrepancy in the context of *equal* access to outside information networks also exacerbates tension between secular and political elites.<sup>45</sup>

As for enculturation, it is already clear that the geographic origins of students and scholars who study abroad tends to be disproportionately from China's eastern seaboard—that about half in fact come from three metropolitan areas (Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong).<sup>46</sup> Statistics on social origins are unavailable, but anecdotal information suggests that "children of high cadres" (*gaogan zidi*) are overrepresented among those permitted to study abroad, as are the scions of old-line intellectual families. About 150 of the 14,000 Chinese students studying abroad are said by diplomats to be children of "readily recognizable" Chinese officials; many more are children of officials not as well known.<sup>47</sup> In view of the reorientation of the "ladder of success" in China from ideological criteria to a meritocracy based on educational credentials, this apparent selection bias is consequential indeed. Supposedly objective criteria in fact function to legitimate the formation of a "crown prince's party" (*taizi dang*), tied by friendship, intermarriage and kinship as well as schoolmate and class "connections" (*guanxi*).<sup>48</sup> Having acquired a taste for Western life-styles, there is a tendency for these young people to move into strategic positions in the trading companies that have proliferated to deal with foreigners.<sup>49</sup> The problem is that this taste for the exotic apparently extends to entertainment as well, so that those caught trafficking in pornographic VCR tapes and other illicit commodities often turn out to be cadre children, who are embarrassing to prosecute. Thus the Party CC has promulgated documents prohibiting senior cadres, their spouses or children to run business concerns.

The second unintended consequence is that the coincidence of domestic liberalization and opening to the outside world, plus the ambiguity of the boundaries between permitted and forbidden cultural imports, has led to spillover effects. These consist of what Party authorities refer to as "spiritual pollution" or "unhealthy trends." Chen Yun has, for example, mentioned "the sale of obscene video tapes and seducing women into prostitution," whereas Deng Xiaoping has identified "the greediness, cor-

ruption, and injustice which are inherent in capitalism” among the “undesirable products” that have been imported.

It is in fact true that the incidence of crime and corruption is much higher in those capitalist countries with which China has entered into frequent cultural contact, due primarily to the higher level of permissiveness in those societies. Thus it is not surprising that Chinese corruption can often be traced to an external origin. Even when no empirical trail exists, the “spiritual” impact of the West, with its notions that all is permitted (as Chinese tend to understand it), can plausibly be found behind rising Chinese crime rates. Yet Western societies have been able to tolerate relatively high levels of crime and corruption without losing their equilibrium, so the problem must arise from the “demand,” as well as the “supply” side. On the Chinese side, the decline of puritanical Maoism has enhanced the attractiveness of forbidden fruits, particularly at a time when the moral-ideological system is in flux about its positive content (e.g., at one time to get rich is said to be “glorious,” at another the “worship of money” is deplored; “humanism” is first espoused, then critiqued, etc.). The “rule of law” has not yet acquired a firm footing; only the vague taboos of the “four fundamental principles” provide some sense of moral certainty. In a revolutionary society without institutionalized limits on social movements, the authorities fear that augmented “supply” and “demand” could cause corruption to snowball uncontrollably.

### *POLITICIZATION*

There seems to be a cleavage within the leadership concerning how widely the door should be opened. On the one hand, the more culturally conservative (and ideologically leftist) grouping adopts a position similar to that of Zhang Zhidong. Western cultural assimilation should, according to this conception, be narrowly restricted to engineering and the natural or applied sciences. Chen Yun approximates this position when he says:

The policy of opening to the outside world by importing advanced foreign technology and management expertise . . . is entirely correct . . . but . . . one must note that opening to the world will inevitably be accompanied by capitalist ideology and its style of work, both of which are detrimental to our socialist cause.<sup>50</sup>

Deng Xiaoping, as the patron saint of the reform movement, has usually been assumed to hold a more liberal position, so that Chen was construed to be criticizing Deng in his speech to the special CCP National Congress in September 1985.<sup>51</sup> Yet Deng, in his speech to the same conference, ex-

pressed similar sentiments, noting that "some evil things that had long been extinct after liberation have come to life again."

On the opposing side are the cultural liberals (and ideological rightists) who favor opening the door more widely. This group seems to include Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Hu Yaobang, and their younger proteges. They are supported not only by the growing constituency of foreign culture vultures, including much of the intellectual and academic establishment, but those who espouse a more intensive, consumer-oriented industrialization strategy, and those in favor of democratization and the reform of political structure, ranging from moderate to radical reformers.

Beginning in the summer of 1985, the contradiction between these two groupings began to manifest itself in differences over the handling of corruption. Growing class differentiation, the alternative symbolic lightning rod for the two groupings' diverging concerns, is not yet seriously discrepant with post-Mao interpretations of Marxism and affects neither group's material interests. Corruption, on the other hand, is very dangerous because it disproportionately affects the elite (due to their greater exposure to the West), and because it jeopardizes the reform program (primarily the opening policy, of course, but that policy is linked to others).

The conservatives' way of handling the issue was to focus on the nexus between corruption and reform and to ignore any connection between corruption and the elite. Thus the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, chaired by Chen Yun, implemented a dragnet against corruption that resulted in a number of well-publicized arrests in which the connection between corruption and the opening policy was transparent. The most celebrated case was the unauthorized purchase of 89,000 motor vehicles, 2.86 million TV sets, and 252,000 VCRs by local cadres for domestic resale at a high profit in Hainan Island. Such arrests were accompanied by a propaganda barrage against "unhealthy tendencies," with the obvious implication that many "flies" were coming through the open door and that it should be closed.

The reformers were annoyed by such political editorializing, and at the beginning of 1986 succeeded in preempting the issue. On January 6-9, 1986, the CCP convened a conference of 6,000 cadres, which established a new anti-corruption team, consisting of Wang Zhaoguo and Xiang Xiaochu and headed by Qiao Shi, all relatively young men, two of whom have impeccable reformist credentials. Although Party Secretary Hu Yaobang delivered a keynote speech (underlining his patronage of the affair), none of the veteran cadres—Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen, or Ye Jianying—even attended, and the proceedings were dominated by younger cadres like Hu Qili. This new team lost no time in launching a vigorous campaign against crime and corruption, shifting the political emphasis from the reform connection to the abuse of power by elites. Thus,

on February 19, the sons of two senior Party officials were paraded through Shanghai and then shot for sex-related crimes, the first such punishment of *gaogan zidi* (high cadre children) to be announced publicly. Ye Zhifeng, daughter of the late army commander and deputy chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Ye Fei, was jailed 17 years for economic crimes, and there were unconfirmed reports that children of other top Chinese officials were in custody awaiting trial, including Ye Jianying (son-in-law), Peng Zhen, and Hu Qiaomu.<sup>52</sup> Such arrests were accompanied by propaganda denouncing the residual impact of “feudal” culture, the implication of which was that the open door should not be closed but opened further.

This line of thinking was pushed further throughout the spring and summer of 1986, as the leading reformers encouraged China’s intellectual community to promote the “double hundred” policy (one hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend) and to contribute to the next stage of reform, which should necessarily include “political structural reform.” A very lively and wide-ranging debate ensued, in which the Western cultural influx had its most visible impact on the cultural liberals. Thus whereas the conservatives emphasized the differences between bourgeois and socialist democracy, the liberals attempted to play down this distinction in order to legitimate the adoption of Western political structures. Among the “flowers” of apparent Western provenance that “bloomed” were proposals for reform of the people’s congress system to bring it into closer alignment with Western legislative theory, a liberalized press law that would permit ideological pluralism, a contract labor system that would facilitate occupational mobility, bankruptcy law, and some form of stock exchange (in connection with which a Wall Street delegation visited Beijing). At a rhetorical disadvantage because of the capitalist origins of many of these institutions, the liberals tried to argue that bankruptcy law antedated capitalism, that contract labor did not imply a labor market, and otherwise to sever the tainted connection.

The first indication of serious resistance to liberal ideas emerged at the Sixth Plenum of the 12th CC in September 1986. After torrid controversy, a compromise was worked out in which the policy of opening was reaffirmed, now explicitly including cultural as well as technological assimilation, but at the same time a sharp warning against “bourgeois liberalization” was sounded—the liberals’ attempt to trace corruption to “feudalism” had met rebuff. Political structure reform was deferred, at least until the 13th Party Congress. In a meeting of the NPC Standing Committee, initial bankruptcy legislation was tabled, to be passed later only after major revision.

The student protests that began on five college campuses in Hefei and Wuhan, spreading rapidly to 17 additional cities and more than 150 campuses, seem to have symptomized a sense of impatience with the slacken-

ing pace of the reforms, after the heady summer of “blooming” had generated an illusory impression of power. These protests, however, mobilized a dominant opposing coalition of veteran Party officials (led by Deng himself), security and military cadres, which has firmly repressed the demonstrations and initiated a purge of the most outspoken reformers, led by Party Secretary Hu Yaobang. The policy of opening to the outside world has been reaffirmed, but inasmuch as many of its advocates (particularly in the CC Propaganda Department) have been dismissed in the context of a vigorous campaign against “bourgeois liberalization,” the immediate outlook is not encouraging.

### *CONCLUSION*

Some form of cultural learning has been a logically necessary component of Chinese modernization ever since China adopted that objective, as Marx foresaw; but the Chinese have always found this difficult to accept, due to the implied derogation of their own culture. Nevertheless, in the postwar period China wholeheartedly adopted the Soviet “model”; though on the winning rather than the losing side, China resembled Germany and Japan in being so utterly devastated by war, revolution, and the attendant socio-economic dislocation that the country could open itself to sweeping cultural transformation without intolerable loss of face. Yet this first bout of cultural acquisition was vehemently renounced after scarcely one decade’s trial, giving way to a concerted attempt to create a uniquely Chinese political culture from selected memories of the Chinese revolutionary experience. Only after the attempt had run aground (for reasons too complex to detain us here), was the P.R.C. willing to readmit the necessity of some degree of cultural acquisition from abroad. The policy of opening to the outside world that was consequently adopted has remained the most controversial of all the reforms adopted in the post-Mao era. At this writing, that policy’s future is still at issue.

What can be gleaned from a comparison of the 1950s experience and the more recent opening to the West? The policy of learning from the Soviet Union was both successful and disappointing. It left a deep imprint upon Chinese institutional structure that is still visible (indeed, ubiquitous) today. Yet what is most striking is that successful cultural acquisition did not incur friendship or alliance—quite the contrary! The experience stands as a warning: even a well-organized and relatively effective program of international cultural transfer may be badly received, partly no doubt because of flaws in the donor program, but partly also due to the problems of the recipient. Among the latter were unduly inflated expectations, anxieties about the loss of national identity, and the inherently invidious con-



notations of the teacher-student relationship (to which the culturally proud Chinese are particularly sensitive).

Perhaps the discouraging Soviet precedent no longer applies, due to the altered terms of the exchange? The current policy of opening is far more cautious than the policy of learning from the Soviet Union, in the sense that (1) no linkage to China's "independent" foreign policy is acknowledged (i.e., the pretense is maintained that "opening" is politically insignificant), and (2) the fact that the donor culture is capitalist places certain limits on the scope of acquisition. This circumspection has thus far helped minimize the dangers of rising expectations, despite the explosive growth of the program. Nonetheless, the opening policy has already precipitated two unintended consequences quite troubling to the recipients. First, by restricting opportunity to an elite with privileged access to the channels of external mobility, the policy of opening tends to reinforce the division of Chinese society into elite and mass by adding subcultural differences to other distinctions of power and status—specifically, the distinction between a cosmopolitan elite and a nativist mass. The ease with which the resentment latent in such a distinction can be mobilized by culturally conservative elites has been demonstrated in the recent crackdown on bourgeois liberalism (e.g., Peng Zhen claimed in November 1986 that some even thought the moon was brighter abroad). Second, by leaving the bounds of acceptable cultural acquisition vague, spillover becomes inevitable, and the tendency to attribute other unanticipated adverse consequences of the reforms to cultural spillover exaggerates its deleterious effects. The nation is especially prey to cultural paranoia at a time of ebbing faith in Marxism (and a national identity crisis may be artificially stimulated in order to regenerate that faith).

The popular American perception of China's opening policy as a sort of Trojan horse for ideas of democracy and free enterprise is perhaps not entirely illusory, but it is also clear that that policy is most exposed, least indispensable from the perspective of the host country, and likely to be the reforms' first hostage. The Soviet Union has already demonstrated the feasibility of sharply curtailing the cultural dimension of their opening policy while keeping the door open to technology transfer and trade. The policy's survival will hence require sensitive diplomacy and caution on the part of all concerned.

## NOTES

1. I wish to thank Ron Morse of the Woodrow Wilson Center as well as an anonymous journal reviewer for their comments on an earlier draft of this article, and the Center for Chinese Studies of the University of California at Berkeley for financial support.
2. Marian Sawer, *Marxism and the Question of the Asiatic Mode of Production* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977).

3. See Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 8.
4. In a dispatch to the New York *Daily Tribune*, Marx writes: "England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindostan [sic], was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution." K. Marx, "On Imperialism in India," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader* (New York: W. W. Norton, rev. ed., 1978), p. 658.
5. Marx, "The Future Results of British Rule in India," in Tucker, *Reader*, p. 659 [emphasis added].
6. See Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism*, trans. and ed. by Hans H. Gerth (New York: Macmillian, 1964, 2nd ed.).
7. The classic study of the cognitive efforts Chinese intellectuals undertook to reduce dissonance between a sense of cultural self-sufficiency and cultural emulation is Joseph Levenson, *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
8. Hans Heyman, "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China," in Joint Economic Committee of Congress, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 678.
9. L. V. Filatov, *Ekonomicheskay Otsenka Nauchno-Tekhnicheskoy Pomoshchi Sovetskogo Soyuz-a Kitayu 1949-1966* [Economic estimate of scientific-technical assistance by the Soviet Union to China, 1949-1966] (Moscow: Nauka Press, 1980), as quoted in Leo Orleans, "Soviet Union's Evolving Perceptions of China's Science and Technology," paper presented at the 15th SACMC, held June 8-14, 1986, in Taipei, Taiwan.
10. According to Soviet sources, between 1952 and 1962, more than 8,000 Chinese citizens received on-the-job training in the U.S.S.R., over 11,000 Chinese undergraduates studied in Soviet educational institutions, and about 1,000 scientists from the Chinese Academy of Science received advanced training in the research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, for a total of 20,000. Vladimirov, "The Question of Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in 1952-1966," *Voprosy Istorii* [problems of history] no. 6 (1969), quoted in *Chinese Economic Studies*, 8-9 (Fall 1969), p. 8. According to Chinese sources, some 5,000 Chinese students were sent out of the country for study between 1950-55, rising to 14,000 by 1959, plus some 7,000 teachers—resulting in a total reasonably close to the Soviet figure. Leo Orleans, *Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China* (1960), p. 79.
11. Suslov, "On the Struggle of the CPSU for the Solidarity of the International Communist Movement" (Report to the Central Committee, February 1964), as trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, (April 29, 1964), p. 3; *Renmin Ribao* (People's daily), October 4, 1959, as cited in Orleans, *Professional Manpower*, p. 115.
12. Orleans, *Professional Manpower*, p. 116.
13. Suslov, "On the Struggle," p. 3; Vladimirov, "The Question," p. 9; Orleans, *Professional Manpower*, p. 117.
14. Vladimirov, "The Question," p. 3.
15. It was in connection with this project that Chinese scientists trained and worked at the Atomic Energy Institute in Dubna. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* (hereinafter FBIS) Daily Report, Soviet Union, February 4, 1981, p. B-2; as cited in Orleans, "Soviet," pp. 9, 39.
16. Trade fell precipitously after 1960. By 1964, free world trade came to comprise 67 percent of China's total trade, rising from a low point of 25 percent during the American blockade in the early 1950s.
17. NCNA, June 18, 1957, quoted in *New York Times*, June 24, 1957, p. 1.
18. William Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift* (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1964), pp. 233-34.
19. See Dennis Ray, "Chinese Perceptions of Social Imperialism and Economic Dependency: The Impact of Soviet Aid," *Stanford Journal of International Studies*, X (Spring 1975), pp. 36-83.
20. Robert F. Dernberger, "The Foreign Trade and Capital Movements of Communist China," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1965), as quoted in Dernberger, "Economic De-

- velopment and Modernization in Contemporary China: The Attempt to Limit Dependence on the Transfer of Modern Industrial Technology from Abroad and to Control Its Corruption of the Maoist Social Revolution," in Fred Fleron (ed.), *Technology and Communist Culture: The Socio-Cultural Impact of Technology under Socialism* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 261-62.
21. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955).
  22. "More on Socialist Ethics and Culture," *Beijing Review*, no. 47 (November 25, 1985).
  23. Cf. Andrew M. Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration* (New York: Random House, 1965).
  24. Michael Schoenhals. "Playboys and the Eastern World," *China Now*, 86, no. 115 (Winter 1986), pp. 9-12.
  25. The more positive view of the West is relatively easy to trace in the politically controlled press. One content analysis showed that in 1979-80, the number of articles on domestic social and economic crises in the American "bourgeois democratic" system remained approximately equal to that found in 1973, but that the number of articles containing admiring mentions of advanced American science and technology increased substantially. Chinchuan Lee, "The United States as Seen Through the *People's Daily*," *Journal of Communication*, 31: no. 4 (1981), pp. 92-101.
  26. Anna Parkinson, "Making Waves in Radio," *China Now*, 86, no. 115, pp. 15-18.
  27. The questions were so constructed that women could only admire a woman, men only a man. Thus among women, most admired (in order of preference) were the heroine of the Soviet film "Moscow Does Not Believe in Tears," Ms. Thatcher, Jane Eyre, Ah Hsin (a Japanese actress), Lu Wenting and Liu Xiaoping (both Chinese actresses). Among men, most admired were Yao Maozhu (a young geographer who died in a 1985 attempt to trace the Yangtze from the sea to its source), Jean Valjean (of Hugo's *Les Miserables*), and Mr. Reagan (not, it should perhaps be noted, for his politics but for "meeting the challenges of life").
  28. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 11, 1986, p. 19.
  29. Though he tends in my judgment to blow the phenomenon out of proportion, Orville Schell has specialized recently on the impact of Western pop culture on China; see for example his *To Get Rich Is Glorious: China in the 1980s* (New York: Pantheon, 1984).
  30. Chinese bought 839,000 refrigerators, 3.8 million washing machines, 13.9 million electric fans, 4.8 million tape recorders, 7.8 million television sets, 10.6 million transistor radios, 17.9 million bicycles, 35.4 million watches, and 5.9 million sewing machines in that period. *China Daily*, November 4, 1985.
  31. See for example the *US-China Arts Exchange* for a running commentary on this dimension of cultural exchange.
  32. See Joyce Kallgren's essay, "Sino-American Cultural Relations: Exchanges Reconsidered," paper presented to the Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies-Shanghai Institute of International Studies Conference, Shanghai, China, May 20-23, 1985; also her contribution to the follow-up conference held in September 1986 in Berkeley.
  33. See Ruth E. S. Hayhoe, "Europe-China: Education, Science and Culture," paper presented at Conference on "Sino-American Educational and Cultural Exchange," East-West Center, Hawaii, February 18-22, 1985.
  34. To keep this in perspective, whereas China had 8,140 students in the U.S. in the academic year 1983-84, 21,960 students from Taiwan were studying here in the same year, more than from anywhere else. The P.R.C. is not yet among the top ten in total number of students studying in the U.S. Yet if the current growth rate continues, by the early 1990s China will have more students in the U.S. than any other country.
  35. David M. Lampton, *A Relationship Restored: Trends in US-China Educational Exchanges, 1978-1984* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1986).
  36. This is consistent with a general P.R.C. policy to shift the burden of financial support to the host country, which has been quite successful. American universities have become the largest single source of financial support for P.R.C. students and scholars, with expenditures exceeding those of the Chinese government. The percentage contributed by the P.R.C. government to Chinese student support declined from about half in 1979 to about a third in 1983. Part of the reason for the increasing share of the burden borne by U.S. universities is the

- larger number of continuing students, who are more eligible for fellowship support. To keep the situation in comparative perspective, U.S. universities generally pick up about half the total costs of all foreign J-1 visa holders studying in the U.S., with foreign governments usually paying less than 15 percent of total costs.
37. Although this fits a cultural stereotype that holds for even third and fourth generation Chinese-Americans, it is also a worldwide characteristic: those students who come to the U.S. to study from LDCs tend to focus predominantly on the pure and applied sciences, whereas those from economically advanced countries are more concentrated in the liberal arts and social sciences. Lampton, *Relationship Restored*, p. 57.
  38. For example, Liu Deyou made the following statement in a recent conference: "Just as we should open our economy to the outside world, we should also open our culture to the outside world. It is not right to worry that when we introduce a foreign culture to China, Chinese culture can no longer survive. We should overcome this fear. We should actively introduce new culture, new concepts, and this will help us to broaden our vision and to discover how we are lagging behind. When we look at foreign works we should not adopt a simplistic black-or-white attitude. . . . We should also introduce certain works that are aesthetically very good but not too good ideologically." *Renmin Ribao*, July 17, 1986. [Cf. Mao's "Yanan Talks" for an instructive contrast.]
  39. The Chinese refer to information theory, cybernetics, and systems theory as "soft science" [*ruan kexue*]. Introduced as recently as 1983, there are already some 400 soft science institutes, which have accomplished 1,700 research projects, including 12 important projects in national technical policy [*jishu zhengzhi*]. In a recent speech at a National Conference on Soft Science, Wan Li called for the "democratization and scientization" [*minzhuhua yu koxuehua*] of political decision-making, which he said had been merely intuitive for too long. This speech had widespread impact at the time. *Renmin Ribao*, July 26, 27, 31, August 1, 1986.
  40. Patrick Maddox and Anne Thurston, "Academic Exchanges: The Goals and Roles of U.S. Universities," paper presented to conference on "Sino-American Educational and Cultural Exchange," February 18-22, 1985.
  41. "Zhonggong Liuxuesheng Zijue" *Shibao Zhoukan* [China times weekly] (July 27, 1986), pp. 78-79. A similar, larger (about 200 participants) conference of graduate students and scholars in economics was held the previous month in Boston.
  42. It might seem misleading to refer to a publication with a daily circulation of 11 million copies—more than five times as large as that of the New York's *Daily News* (the largest-circulation daily in the U.S.) and nearly twice that of *People's Daily*—as "internal" or "restricted circulation." Nevertheless, it is classified *neibu*, and that presumably means that some categories of people (besides foreigners) are precluded from reading it.
  43. Chin-chuan Lee, "The United States," pp. 92-101.
  44. The proliferation of "foreign guests only" signs in hotels, shops, railway offices and restaurants in all the major cities seems to have given rise to a growing sense of relative deprivation and resentment. One way of scaling the wall of privilege has been to masquerade as an "amateur overseas Chinese," reminiscent of Lu Xun's "false foreign devil," but this practice has been foreclosed by a recent regulation requiring anyone Chinese to show a passport to gain admission. See *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), August 12, 1986, p. 8.
  45. The most conspicuous recent instance of this manifested itself in an interview with Fang Lizhi, former vice president of the Chinese Scientific and Technological University, on November 16, 1986. Noting that the P.R.C. ranks second lowest in the world on: (1) intellectuals' pay and conditions; (2) the percentage of educational funds in the GNP; he called for greater recognition of the independent social status of intellectuals in society. "In the present-day society, knowledge and information represent the most advanced productive forces," he declared, echoing Habermas. "Since these forces are mastered by intellectuals, it is natural that intellectuals are the leading force of society." Yan Xun, "Fang Lizhi Says that China's Greatest Tragedy Is that its Intellectuals Have Not Yet Been Recognized as a Leading Force of Social Progress," *Shijie Jingji Daobao* [World economic herald] (Shanghai), November 24, 1986, p. 3, as trans. in *F.B.I.S.: China*, December 19, 1986, pp. K13-14. Fang's contention evoked an outraged response from the Party leadership, and he was among the first to be evicted from the Party in the January 1987 crackdown.

46. Lampton, *Relationship Restored*.
47. Among the more prominent are Deng Zhifang, youngest son of Deng Xiaoping and a Ph.D. candidate in physics at the University of Rochester; Bo Jieying and Bo Xiangjiang, daughter and son respectively of Vice-Premier Bo Yibo, who studied at the University of Massachusetts; Liu Xiaoxiao, second daughter of Liu Shaoqi, went to the University of Boston, while her younger sister went to the University of Bonn, West Germany; Chen Xiaolu, son of the late Chen Yi, went to the University of Austin in Texas; Ye Jianying's daughter, Ye Xiaoping, went to Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.; Huang Bing, son of Huang Hua, went to Harvard; Chen Zhongying, son of Chen Yun, went to M.I.T.; and Tian Xiaobing, daughter of Xu Shiyou, went to U.C.L.A. Hong Kong *Standard*, November 3, 1986, p. 5; as trans. in *F.B.I.S. China*, November 5, 1986, pp. K5-K6.
48. Examples abound. Deng Pufang, eldest son of Deng Xiaoping, heads the China Welfare Fund for the Handicapped and has reportedly been involved in export business, while a son-in-law—the son of a top military official—is president of Poly Technologies Inc., which negotiated to buy \$140 million of helicopters for the PLA from United Technologies Corp's Sikorsky Aircraft division in 1984. One of Ye Jianying's sons is governor of Guangdong, and his daughter heads a film studio in Shenzhen. Of nine new cabinet ministers appointed to the State Council in June 1985, at least three were related to leading officials: the new minister in charge of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense is son-in-law of Nie Rongzhen; Li Tieying, the new minister of electronics, is the son of a CCP Central Committee member; and the new ordinance industry minister is the son-in-law of Ye Jianying. See *Wall Street Journal*, October 29, 1985.
49. *Zheng Ming* (Hong Kong), February 1986.
50. Chen Yun, Speech at the Sixth Plenum of the Central Commission for Inspection of Discipline (September 24, 1985).
51. E.g. Julian Baum, "Deng Spars with Leading Critic over Chinese Reform Program," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 24, 1985.
52. Hong Kong *Standard*, November 3, 1986, in *F.B.I.S.: China*, November 5, p. K4.